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01/19/2010 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
#1
Dominique Arel:
With 99.7% of the precincts in, Yanukovych received 35.4%, Tymoshenko 25.0% and Tihipko 13.1%. Yushchenko, the incumbent President, finished fifth at 5.5%. Four exit polls predicted results yesterday when polls closed. Tymoshenko, in the passion of the moment, claimed that three of them (Inter-Sotsis, ICTV and Shuster) could not be trusted, since they had been paid by interested parties (zamovnyi), and that the only reliable one was the “National” exit poll, comprised of a consortium that included the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). In fact, these three polls were right on the money, with Shuster exactly predicting the outcome of a 35-25 Yanukovych victory over Tymoshenko, while the National poll was a little off (31-27), underestimating the Yanukovych score by four percentage points. Election polling thus appears to be as reliable in Ukraine as in the West.
The election itself was praised by international observers (see the OSCE and CUF reports) for its high standards. As Damon Wilson writes below, this is the true legacy of Yushchenko and of the Orange Revolution. It remains a mystery, however, as to why Yushchenko, against all reasonable assessments of his free-falling standing, chose to be so publicly humiliated. He received around 30% of the vote in Galicia, and less than 4% just about everywhere else. The turnout, at 65.6%, was 9.3% less than in the first round of the 2004 elections, perhaps reflecting the general lack of enthusiasm with the actual candidates that Ukrainians had to choose from. Interestingly, this drop in electoral intensity could be observed in both Galicia and Donbas, with the rate of participation decreasing by between 12 and 15% in these traditionally electorally polarized regions of Ukraine.
Adrian Karatnycky estimates that Tymoshenko will need in excess of 60 percent of the “other” vote, those who supported neither Yanukovych nor Tymoshenko in the first round, to defeat Yanukovych in the second round. The great unknown is where the Tihipko electorate will go, especially since he performed really well in key Eastern oblasts (22% in Dnipropetrovsk, 19% in Kharkiv). The other unknown is whether the turnout will increase, as it did in 2004 (a six point increase between the first and second rounds), or decrease, as the KIIS end of December poll (UKL438) predicted. (In this poll, around 20% of those who expressed a willingness to vote in the first round said they wouldn’t vote in a second round contest between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko. But six weeks is a long time in an electoral campaign). At 35.4%, Yanukovych actually scored lower than in the first round of 2004 (39.9%), since he had an opponent (Tihipko) who took away votes from him in Eastern Ukraine. This is the beauty of post-Orange elections in Ukraine, and the dread of Russian officials: no one knows who will win in the end.
Dominique Arel:
With 99.7% of the precincts in, Yanukovych received 35.4%, Tymoshenko 25.0% and Tihipko 13.1%. Yushchenko, the incumbent President, finished fifth at 5.5%. Four exit polls predicted results yesterday when polls closed. Tymoshenko, in the passion of the moment, claimed that three of them (Inter-Sotsis, ICTV and Shuster) could not be trusted, since they had been paid by interested parties (zamovnyi), and that the only reliable one was the “National” exit poll, comprised of a consortium that included the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). In fact, these three polls were right on the money, with Shuster exactly predicting the outcome of a 35-25 Yanukovych victory over Tymoshenko, while the National poll was a little off (31-27), underestimating the Yanukovych score by four percentage points. Election polling thus appears to be as reliable in Ukraine as in the West.
The election itself was praised by international observers (see the OSCE and CUF reports) for its high standards. As Damon Wilson writes below, this is the true legacy of Yushchenko and of the Orange Revolution. It remains a mystery, however, as to why Yushchenko, against all reasonable assessments of his free-falling standing, chose to be so publicly humiliated. He received around 30% of the vote in Galicia, and less than 4% just about everywhere else. The turnout, at 65.6%, was 9.3% less than in the first round of the 2004 elections, perhaps reflecting the general lack of enthusiasm with the actual candidates that Ukrainians had to choose from. Interestingly, this drop in electoral intensity could be observed in both Galicia and Donbas, with the rate of participation decreasing by between 12 and 15% in these traditionally electorally polarized regions of Ukraine.
Adrian Karatnycky estimates that Tymoshenko will need in excess of 60 percent of the “other” vote, those who supported neither Yanukovych nor Tymoshenko in the first round, to defeat Yanukovych in the second round. The great unknown is where the Tihipko electorate will go, especially since he performed really well in key Eastern oblasts (22% in Dnipropetrovsk, 19% in Kharkiv). The other unknown is whether the turnout will increase, as it did in 2004 (a six point increase between the first and second rounds), or decrease, as the KIIS end of December poll (UKL438) predicted. (In this poll, around 20% of those who expressed a willingness to vote in the first round said they wouldn’t vote in a second round contest between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko. But six weeks is a long time in an electoral campaign). At 35.4%, Yanukovych actually scored lower than in the first round of 2004 (39.9%), since he had an opponent (Tihipko) who took away votes from him in Eastern Ukraine. This is the beauty of post-Orange elections in Ukraine, and the dread of Russian officials: no one knows who will win in the end.
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2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
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#2Ukraine Vote: Predictions and Outcomes
by Adrian Karatnycky
18 January 2010
All in all my January 15th predictions about the outcome help up quite well. As I noted earlier, these were made based on internal polling conducted by the leading campaigns in the last two weeks, incorporation of trends and a little bit of guess work. But above all it suggested that the campaigns had a good handle on what was likely to occur in the
days before the actual vote.
Overall, I predicted all the results to within roughly 1 percent of the actual result.
And the 9.5 percent gap between opposition challenger Viktor Yanukovych and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko that I posited was actually 10.4 percent, so I was again off by less that a percentage point.
Ukraine Presidential Elections First Round:
My Predictions (1st figure)
Actual Results with 99.3 percent of the vote counted (2nd figure)
Differential (3rd figure)
Yanukovych 34.0 35.4 1.4
Tymoshenko 24.5 25.0 0.5
Tyhypko 12.5 13.0 0.5
Yatseniuk 6.5 7.0 0.5
Yushchenko 5.5 5.5 0
Symonenko 4.0 3.5 0.5
Lytvyn 3.5 2.3 1.2
Tyahnybok 2.0 1.4 0.6
Hrytsenko 1.0 1.2 0.2
Others/Against Everyone 6.5 5.7 0.8
It is too early to predict what will happen in round two. However, one thing is clear: Viktor Yanukovych enters the second round with a major advantage.
If you remove the likely 3-4 percent of voters who will spoil their ballots or vote against everyone, that leaves roughly 36 percent of the vote in contention between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych. Of these, Tymoshenko will need to capture roughly 23 percent--or nearly two out of every three-- to overtake Yanukovych's lead. Please keep in mind that many of those voters are located in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, where Tymoshenko has not done well. Add to that the fact that some of her potential electorate in Western Ukraine backed Tymoshenko's bitter rival, President Yushchenko and, so, is unlikely to vote.
Bottom line: Tymoshenko has very long--though not yet impossible-- odds to succeed. Indeed, only her amazing skills as a campaigner leave open the possibility she could score a second round upset.
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
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#3Yanukovych Comes Out On Top, But Tymoshenko Has Momentum
by Damon Wilson
Atlanticist Blog, 18 January 2010
Damon Wilson is Vice President and Director of the Program on International Security at the Atlantic Council. He was responsible for Ukraine policy at the National Security Council from 2004-2009. He is also a Senior Advisor to the U.S.-Ukraine Business Council.
Ukrainian voters today braved frigid temperatures to narrow the field of presidential contenders to Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko. These two candidates will face off in a run-off on February 7. This outcome was consistent with pre-election polls and conventional wisdom. However, according to numerous exit polls, Tymoshenko seems to have polled better than expected helping to narrow the gap between her and Yanukovych. The results give her a basis to claim momentum heading into the run-off. Former central banker Sergei Tyhypko's surge at the end of the election campaign delivered him the #3 spot, positioning him as an important deal-maker.
Both leading camps are by-and-large content with the conduct of the elections as are international observers. Despite some allegations of fraud and complaints with mobile voting, neither side is expected to contest the vote.
Tymoshenko's confidence and rhetorical skills position her well to project a sense of momentum coming out of the run-off, while her underdog status helps highlight her image of a relentless fighter. Her challenge is to widen her lead in the center, consolidate disenchanted backers of the Orange Revolution in the west, and hope for lower turnout in the east and south. Her campaign needs to aim to collect as many of the third candidate voters as possible – a solid majority of the electorate which backed Tyhypko, Yatsenyuk and Yushchenko would put her over 50%. Yet much like each of these leaders, their constituencies have reason to doubt her and may stay home. Tymoshenko's greatest political liability is that she is running as the incumbent in the wake of nearly a 15% decline in Ukraine's GDP in 2009 and looming IMF restrictions. It is a testament to her political acumen that, with such a record, she is even a competitive candidate.
The key challenge for Yanukovych is to dispel the perception that he is unable to motivate a majority of Ukrainian voters. Following the reversal of the fraudulent election in 2004, Yanukovych has demonstrated a remarkable ability not only to survive as the leader of the Party of Regions, but to maintain the loyalty of a solid 40% of Ukrainians, primarily in the east and south. Yet many view this stable support base as a ceiling rather than a floor. His challenge is to ensure high turnout in his base, be competitive in the center, and hope for lower turnout in the west. In this regard, Yushchenko has been a key ally; his campaign's sole focus on destroying Tymoshenko raised her negatives in the nationalist constituencies in the west, where she needs to run strong with high turnout on February 7. Yanukovych's campaign will likely seek to reinforce the image of a Yanukovych presidency as offering a steady, predictable hand on the economy in turbulent economic times, underscoring his record of impressive growth rates during his tenures as prime minister.
The third place candidate (and erstwhile campaign manager for Yanukovych in 2004), Sergei Tyhypko, benefitted from frustrations with Ukraine's political establishment by positioning himself as the only viable alternative. Exit polls suggest he will garner 13.5% of the vote, the high end of what pre-elections polls indicated, and a complete surprise given his weak performance last fall. While not sufficient to score an upset and enter the run-off, Tyhypko is well-positioned to leverage his voters for influence, especially as he drew key constituencies in central, eastern and southern Ukraine. While Tymoshenko is running strong in the center, Yanukovych is dominating the east and south. Tyhypko has already indicated that he will not endorse either Yanukovych or Tymoshenko; he may be angling for an important post after the election, such as speaker of the Rada or even prime minister.
Yushchenko's dismal results were predictable and are a sad conclusion to his political life in Ukraine. His final political act was fueled by personal animosity against his erstwhile Orange Revolution partner. While Yushchenko's campaign amounted to an effort to sabotage Tymoshenko, she will work to pick up his slice of the voters.
The disappointment in the race is Arseniy Yatsenyuk, former foreign minister and speaker of the Rada. This 35-year-old boy wonder was well-positioned to assume the mantle of change, capitalizing on the frustrations with Ukraine's establishment leaders. Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and Yanukovych have dominated Ukrainian politics arguably since 1999, and given their track record, Ukrainian voters seemed open to alternatives. Polling at 15% last year, Yatsenyuk was poised to capture the narrative of handing leadership to the next generation. But he ran a poor campaign, sending mixed messages on policy and appearing cocky yet lacking the requisite stature to be a president.
Yatsenyuk is still young enough to recover. And Yanukovych, Tymoshenko and Tyhypko all personify the possibilities of political comebacks in Ukraine. While Yatsenyuk is not likely to play a major political role in the near-term, Tymoshenko will need to win over his voters to best Yanukovych.
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
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#4Yanukoyvch Lead in Ukraine Could Be Illusion
By Douglas Birch
Associated Press, 18 January 2010
KIEV, Ukraine - Voters in the first round of Ukraine's presidential election appeared to hand opposition leader Viktor Yanukoyvch, the 2004 Orange Revolution's chief target, a decisive victory over his rival, Orange heroine and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.
But that lead in Sunday's vote could prove illusory when the two go head to head next month in the final round of voting.
No matter who wins the Feb. 7 runoff, when it comes to the most important policy issue facing Ukraine, relations with Russia, both candidates may have little choice but to follow the same path.
Analysts say Yanukovych's 35 percent to 25 percent advantage over Tymoshenko, with more than 90 percent of votes counted Monday, is misleading, because she is likely to pick up most of the votes scattered among 16 also-rans.
Some analysts say that despite Tymoshenko's second-place finish, her sharp political instincts will give her the edge in the runoff.
"Yanukovych's voter base has been exhausted. Although it was strong and compact and never betrayed him, it did not grow," said Viktor Nebozhenko, director of the sociology institute Ukrainian Barometer. "Tymoshenko, as a great communicator, has a chance to win this election."
Some polls show Tymoshenko trailing Yanukovych in a head-to-head matchup, but analysts say Tymoshenko's strength is difficult to measure because much of her support comes in rural areas.
In the final poll, analyst Oleksandr Dergachev said, many voters will turn against Yanukovych because of what he called "high levels of distrust" that have prevented him from getting more than 40 percent of the vote in nationwide elections.
"It is difficult to predict the outcome of the second round, but Yanukovych will find it harder to expand the electorate than Tymoshenko," Dergachev said.
Despite sharp differences and personal animosity, Tymoshenko and Yanukovych share a similar view of Ukraine's relations with Russia, its giant neighbor to the east, by far Ukraine's biggest trading partner and the region's dominant military power.
In the future, NATO membership is out. There will be no more Kremlin-bashing in Kiev, and relations with Georgia will not be nearly as close as they were under Orange President Viktor Yushchenko, who was trounced in Sunday's ballot, getting just 5.5 percent of the vote.
Five years ago many Orange protesters dreamed of breaking Ukraine's historic dependence on Moscow and becoming part of Western Europe.
But they've had a rude awakening, in the form of a battle with Russia over energy prices, the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and one of the worst recessions in Europe.
All seemed to demonstrate that like it or not, Ukraine couldn't get along without good relations with Moscow, its historic ally.
The blunt-spoken Yanukovych, a former electrician and factory manager, has pledged to scrap Ukraine's NATO bid and elevate Russian to the status of a second official language alongside Ukrainian.
Tymoshenko, a heroine of the 2004 pro-Western Orange Revolution, in 2007 criticized what she called Russia's imperial ambitions. But in the past year she has made peace with the Kremlin on energy and security issues.
Despite warnings of large-scale election fraud in the days leading up to Sunday's vote, officials and international election observers said the ballot was fair and orderly.
"The polling in Ukraine yesterday was overall the same as polling in any other democratic country," Matyas Eorsi, chairman of the observation mission from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, said Monday. "It is the first time since independence (in 1991) that it has been possible to say this. Ukraine deserves enormous congratulation for this."
Joao Soares, president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, said the election was "very promising for the future of Ukraine's democracy."
Five years ago, fraud allegations sent tens of thousands of Ukrainians into the streets of Kiev, demanding an end to what they regarded as a corrupt regime. After weeks of protests, Yushchenko beat Yanukovych in a court-ordered revote.
Yushchenko's win was hailed in the West as a victory by democratic forces over the cynical veterans of Ukraine's Soviet regime. But in Moscow, many saw it as part of a Western plot to surround and weaken Russia.
After his election, Yushchenko became embroiled in political skirmishing that paralyzed the government and he failed to push through many of his promised reforms.
Yanukovych seemed elated by his victory over Yushchenko, his old rival, on Sunday. "Today marks the end of Orange power," he said. "There will be no room for (Yushchenko) in the second round. He has officially lost the faith of the people."
Ukraine's currency crashed in 2008, the economy sputtered and the International Monetary Fund had to step in with a $16.4 billion (euro11.41 billion) bailout. Ukraine's gross domestic product plunged by 15 percent in 2009, according to the World Bank, which estimates that the country will see anemic growth this year.
The next president will same the same problems.
Yury Yakimenko, an analyst at Razumkov Center, said the presidency itself is hopelessly compromised, because the office's powers were given to parliament as part of a compromise that ended the 2004 conflict.
"Either Tymoshenko or Yanukovych will be forced to reform the Constitution to have real authority to overcome the crisis," Yakimenko predicted. "Ukraine is mired in political squabbles and fights. The economic situation is close to collapse. The situation could spiral out of control."
Yanukovych faces one of the biggest challenges, Yakimenko said, because if he becomes president he will have to work with Prime Minister Tymoshenko. "This will lead to a new political war and early parliamentary elections."
Associated Press writer Yuras Karmanau contributed to this report.
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
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#5Presidential Election in Ukraine Goes to a Runoff
by Clifford J. Levy
New York Times, 18 January 2010
KIEV, Ukraine — Two of the chief combatants in the 2004 Orange Revolution, which brought to power a pro-Western government that has left the public increasingly disillusioned, began their campaign on Monday for a presidential runoff after neither received enough votes to win outright in balloting on Sunday.
That runoff, scheduled for Feb. 7, is seen as a referendum on the Orange Revolution, which has mired Ukraine in political and economic upheaval for much of the past five years.
The results of the voting on Sunday reflected the revived fortunes of the opposition leader, Viktor F. Yanukovich <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/y/viktor_f_yanukovich/index.html?inline=nyt-per> , who was the loser in the Orange Revolution but who has taken advantage of the public’s soured mood and bickering among Orange politicians.
Once criticized as a tool of Moscow, Mr. Yanukovich has retained an American political consultant and softened his image. He is to face Prime Minister Yulia V. Tymoshenko <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/t/yulia_v_tymoshenko/index.html?inline=nyt-per> , one of the Orange heroes, in the runoff.
According to official results released on Monday, with 82 percent of the ballots counted, Mr. Yanukovich had 35.7 percent, and Ms. Tymoshenko had 24.8 percent. The other candidates were far behind.
The official turnout was 66.7 percent.
On Sunday night, both Mr. Yanukovich and Ms. Tymoshenko reached out to losing candidates for endorsements. A looming question is whether those more ideologically aligned with Ms. Tymoshenko will support her.
Ms. Tymoshenko, with her provocative speeches and peasant braid, has long been a polarizing figure. But if she unites the other candidates with her argument that Mr. Yanukovich represents a step backward for Ukraine, then she could make a strong showing in the runoff.
President Viktor A. Yushchenko <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/y/viktor_a_yushchenko/index.html?inline=nyt-per> , another Orange leader, was projected to be in fifth place in Sunday’s voting, with 5.4 percent, all but ending his political career. He is unpopular because of the weak economy and the paralysis in the government.
Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko have feuded for years, and it remained unclear whether he would support her against Mr. Yanukovich.
The Orange Revolution grew out of huge protests in Ukraine over what many voters said was Mr. Yanukovich’s fraudulent victory in the 2004 presidential election over Mr. Yushchenko. The results were overturned, and Mr. Yushchenko won a new election.
Mr. Yanukovich said Sunday night that his strong finish this time showed that the public craved new leadership. “I realize very well that I am obliged to do everything that I can to unite the country so that it will be strong and independent,” he said.
Ms. Tymoshenko assailed Mr. Yanukovich as a marionette of shady oligarchs and contended that he would drag Ukraine away from Europe. “To vote for Yanukovich is to go back to the stone age,” Ms. Tymoshenko said.
Mr. Yanukovich’s aides said he intended to press ahead with his strategy of painting Ms. Tymoshenko as an incumbent responsible for Ukraine’s problems.
Ms. Tymoshenko’s challenge is to position herself as an outsider who was unable to adopt the changes that the country needed because she was not president.
Interviews with voters at a polling place in Kiev on Sunday hinted at the level of discontent with the country’s direction.
Many people said they had once been Orange supporters, and had hoped that the leadership in the past five years would chart a path toward integration with Europe.
Artur Kulish, 27, who works at an Internet cafe, said he pulled the lever for “against all,” which is allowed under election law.
“I dislike them all equally,” Mr. Kulish said. “None of them is going to change anything. And I very much regret supporting the Orange Revolution.”
People complained about the government’s inability to address the fallout of the global financial crisis, which has hurt Ukraine more than many of its neighbors.
“What we have now is absolutely not effective,” said Lidia Korotchenko, 24, an economist who supported Sergey Tigipko, a businessman who placed third. She said she had also considered Mr. Yanukovich.
“We all favored the Orange Revolution, we all came out and demonstrated, but in these five years, we have been extremely disappointed,” she said.
Some, though, still had faith in the Orange leaders.
“This is our only chance for Ukraine,” said Valery Alenikov, 65, a biochemist who voted for Ms. Tymoshenko.
Ukraine, which has 46 million people, has been a focal point of the struggle for influence in post-Soviet space. It has long been divided, with Ukrainian speakers in western regions wanting ties to Europe and Russian speakers in the east and south more sympathetic to Moscow.
President Yushchenko is an antagonist of the Kremlin, which was angered by his efforts to join NATO <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/north_atlantic_treaty_organization/index.html?inline=nyt-org> .
Mr. Yanukovich and Ms. Tymoshenko have both indicated that they will try to smooth relations with Russia while continuing to court Europe. Neither has called for Ukraine to join NATO.
Interviews of voters showed the geographic split.
Irina Matseva and her husband, Sergey, who are both 62 and scientists, said they supported Mr. Yanukovich because they were appalled by Mr. Yushchenko’s attitude toward Russia. Ms. Matseva said the two countries had profound historical ties.
“I do not want us to lose each other — Ukraine and Russia,” Ms. Matseva said. “I think that to spurn Russian culture is a big mistake.”
Nearby was Yekaterina Romashchenko, 42, who said she voted for Mr. Yushchenko.
“Yanukovich will sell us to Russia,” she said. “We don’t want history to repeat itself.”
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
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#6Concerns about Home Voting
by Tammy Lynch
Jamestown Foundation Blog, 16 January 2010
A ruling Saturday by the Kyiv Administrative Court requiring medical certificates for those who will vote at home caused confusion this morning as Ukraine's presidential election polls opened.
Just after midnight early Saturday morning, the court ruled on a complaint that home voting procedures were not appropriate. The parliament had allowed voting at home even for citizens without proof of disability. PM and presidential candidate Yulia Tymoshenko has claimed that these loose regulations allow fraud.
According to the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYUT), this weekend's ruling means that voters must produce a medical certificate and have demonstrated difficulty moving outside of their home.
For those unfamiliar with this procedure, a special portable ballot box is taken to the homes of voters on a previously approved list. The law requires that a ballot is given to a voter, and that the voter marks it with no assistance from voting officials. It is required to be a secret ballot.
In 2004, although many regions were praised for their home voting procedures, this writer witnessed a scuffle in a Kyiv polling place, when a political party election observer claimed double the number of ballots were returned in the portable ballot box than were originally provided to officials visiting homes. Additionally, in some areas, the number of those voting at home increased throughout voting day. Following the second round of the 2004 presidential election, the home voting procedures were tightened. For the first time, medical certificates were required when requesting to vote at home.
In 2009, Ukraine's parliament removed the requirement of a medical certificate for the home voting procedure. Kyiv's Administrative Court now says that legislation is in error.
However, the Central Election Commission on Sunday morning claimed the court's ruling was impossible to enforce at this late date <http://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/1036482> , and also claimed they never received a copy of it from the court itself. Finally, they vowed to enforce accepted legislation, not a sudden court ruling.
At the same time, officials in the Donetsk region claimed that 35,000 voters would be suddenly disenfranchized by the move. It is unclear how they determined this number.
According to the Ukraine Ministry of Interior, 781,290 people applied for and were granted the right to vote at home <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/4b51af37cf804/> .
As of Saturday, three Eastern regions had the highest number of home voters - Donetsk (95,000,) Luhansk and Kharkiv (56,000). These three regions account for almost 20% of all home voting ballots.
BYUT further claimed that in some cities of Donetsk, up to 10% of the population was registered vote at home.
The Bloc's press service released the following: <http://zik.com.ua/en/news/2010/01/13/211736> "In 8 out of Donetsk oblast 22 voting districts the number of home-voting requests tops 10%, with over 11% in the other 4 districts. Such statistics are in stark contrast with other Ukraine oblasts where in the majority of voting districts the number of voters willing to vote at home does not exceed 0.5 – 1% of the registered voters."
BYUT did not release the actual data on which it based this press release.
It is impossible to know if these numbers are indeed larger than they should be statistically.
The Ministry did not announce the official number of voters in Donetsk. But the Donetsk region contains almost 10% of Ukraine's population, or about 4.8 million persons <http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/estimate/> . The number of requests naturally would be larger than the total number of requests in other regions.
Moreover, Donetsk is a mining/industrial region. There is every reason to believe that there could be a higher number of disabled voters in Donetsk than in other areas.
Regardless, Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko did announce that the voting rolls included 36, 881, 300 persons throughout Ukraine <http://www.rbc.ua/ukr/newsline/show/yu_lutsenko_781_tys_290_grazhdan_napisali_pismennye_zayavleniya_o_neobhodimosti_golosovaniya_za_predelami_uchastka_16012010> . If Donetsk's voting population is also 10% of the country, or around 3.6 million, 95,000 at home votes would seem a realistic number. But, again, there's no way to know or sure.
Given past problems with home voting, concern is understandable, and home voting statistics may be some of the most interesting to come following the election -- as will BYUT's comments about the issue. The Bloc's pre-election statements and current confusion provide an interesting jumpstart to potential fraud complaints.
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
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#7Presse Kiev
Media Digest, French Embassy in Ukraine
[excertps translated by Dominique Arel for UKL]
Delo is asking “Who will get the Tihipko vote in the second round?”. “This is the drama of the second round: who will benefit from the Tihipko 13% support? To win the presidency, Tymoshenko must get the support of the Tihipko and Yatseniuk electorates. Yet the Party of Regions also counts on the Tihipko electorate”. For Segodnia, “the neutrality of Tihipko gives all the chances to the Party of Regions leader”.
Delo observes in passing that “the West has for a long time adopted the system of electronic vote. It is only in the CIS countries, in Afrique and in Central Asia that people vote manually, like in Ukraine. [Actually, the vote is still manual in Canada –UKL]. The official results will only be know by the end of the week, while in developed countries, with electronic vote, the results are known a few seconds after the closing of voting precincts, and the probability of falsification is reduced to a minimum”.
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
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#8Ukrainians on the Elections
Gazera Wyborcza (Poland), 18 January 2010
[Excerpts translated by Jacob Krolczyk for UKL]
A taxi driver from Donetsk:
"I voted for Yanukovych. He's a bandit, yes, and so is his sponsor Rinat Ahmetov. But these are *our* bandits, from Donetsk. Ukraine is a bandits' country, we have to support our bandits, lest foreign bandits [from other Ukrainian regions] end up taking our resources. Yanukovych sat in jail as a youth, it helped him become a hardened man. He and Ahmetov won't allow the Donbas to die out, they'll bright us closer to Western and Russian investors, and they propped us to the Euro 2010 (Soccer)."
A journalist from a famous Kyiv weekly newspaper:
"I thought of our former defence minister Hrycenko, but his campaign was simply terrible. I voted for Yulia [Tymoshenko]. In my opinion this country needs a strong hand. It needs a leader that will stand up in its talks with Russia. [etc..]."
A retired woman from the Donetsk region:
"I used to be for Yanukovych, as he's from our region. But it's over now. His Party of Regions ruled over us for so many years, but didn't do anything. [...]. I voted for Tuhypka. I like his program: he speaks concretely, and he wants to change things rather than argue amongst other [politicians]."
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
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#9Viktor Yushchenko’s Legacy for Ukraine? Smiling People
by Tony Halpin in Kiev
TimesOnline (UK), 18 January 2010
Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine’s outgoing president, has tasted a heavy defeat at the polls. But despite his humiliating rejection by all but 6 per cent of the electorate, history should judge him kindly.
For all the political and economic turbulence of the past five years, Ukraine has been transformed under his presidency from just another ugly post-Soviet basket case into a country with real hopes of success as a democratic civil society.
One has only to compare political life in neighbouring Belarus and Russia to the vibrancy of the contest in Ukraine to see the effect the Orange Revolution has had.
Voters enjoyed a genuine choice of candidates reflecting a full spectrum of political opinions. Campaigns were conducted without fear that the ruling regime would send in riot police to break up election meetings and arrest opposition activists.
Vigorous debates were available on every television channel, while street billboards were a riot of posters from competing candidates.
Mr Yushchenko and his former Orange ally Yuliya Tymoshenko, the Prime Minister, did not use the infamous “administrative resources” so often wheeled out in Russia to rig results.
One of the most remarkable aspects of the first round of voting was the absence of any serious complaints from candidates about ballot-rigging, given the massive fraud that prompted the Orange revolt in 2004.
Ukraine still has many problems, particularly with corruption, and none of these achievements is irreversible. But people freely speak their minds here and the fear that so stifles public life in other former Soviet republics has gone.
Which is why Ukraine matters and why the West has a big stake in the outcome of this election. The Kremlin keenly portrays its neighbour to domestic audiences as being in a state of constant chaos since the revolution because it fears the example of a thriving open society on Russia’s border. A Ukraine that works is a direct challenge to the former KGB spooks and shadowy apparatchiks who control politics in Moscow.
A trend has developed in recent years for Russians to travel to Kiev for the weekend to enjoy the more relaxed atmosphere of Ukraine’s capital, where police keep a lower profile than their counterparts in Moscow. They see that people smile more easily, service in restaurants and stores is more cheerful, that the tension they sense at home is absent in human relations.
In short, they see that Ukrainians have a stake in their society and can influence its future, and that this affects the public mood. The average Russian has no such opportunity and feels a sense of sullen resentment towards the authorities that leaves the Kremlin constantly fearful of political upheaval.
This election will determine whether the Ukrainian experiment continues or starts to degrade. It is tempting for the United States and the European Union collectively to wring their hands at the bickering that soured the Orange dream but Mr Yushchenko has left a legacy worth defending and they should be far more vigorous in saying so.
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
Âà´ñòèëü ³ Îëåàð÷èê
#10Yanukovich Asserts Substance Over Style
by Stefan Wagstyl and Roman Olearchyk
Financial Times, 18 January 2010
When it comes to making speeches, Viktor Yanukovich, a former lorry driver and provincial bureaucrat, is no match for Yulia Tymoshenko, his fast-talking rival. But he insists that he can be a more effective president than his slick opponent.
“The difference is that Tymoshenko talks a lot, but doesn’t do a lot. I don’t talk a lot, but work hard and get things done,” said the opposition leader in a Financial Times interview.
Despite his solid lead in Sunday’s opening round of the first presidential election <http://www.ft.com/indepth/ukraine-elections> since the Orange revolution, Mr Yanukovich cannot afford to take it for granted. Ms Tymoshenko is expected to gather more votes from the defeated candidates because of her charisma and broad appeal.
But Mr Yanukovich has polished up his act since losing the 2004 presidential election that precipitated the Orange revolution. With the help of US political advisers, the former prime minister has learnt to project a modern image by wearing fashionable suits, sporting a stylish hair-cut, and, in interviews, abandoning long monologues for short and punchy answers.
However, Ms Tymoshenko, a partner in the Orange revolution for Viktor Yushchenko, outgoing president, seems certain to target Mr Yanukovich’s behaviour in 2004, when his campaign was condemned for fraud and abuse of power. Mr Yanukovich now says the allegations were no more than “political technology” by his opponents, and that he is a democrat.
Five years ago Mr Yanukovich was openly backed by the Kremlin. This time, Moscow is publicly keeping a low profile. However, Mr Yanukovich’s Regions party is formally allied to United Russia, the party of Vladimir Putin, the Russian prime minister, while Ms Tymoshenko is supported by the European People’s party, an alliance of centre-right European parties, which on Monday called her “the only democratic pro-European candidate”.
Mr Yanukovich pledged to support Ukraine’s EU integration, including a planned free-trade agreement, while maintaining good relations with Russia. He insisted his plans to join a Moscow-led customs union “did not contradict” Kiev’s EU integration, as long as this was “within the framework of the World Trade Organisation”.
But Mr Yanukovich declined to say whether he would fulfil earlier pledges to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the breakaway territories of pro-west Georgia that have been recognised by Russia. Such a move would win favour with Moscow but bring Kiev into conflict with Brussels and Washington.
Mr Yanukovich pledged to co-operate with the International Monetary Fund, which last year suspended a $16.4bn rescue package. But in remarks that highlight tensions, he accused the IMF of interfering in Ukrainian politics by supporting Ms Tymoshenko’s election candidacy.
Among the defeated candidates in Sunday’s first round, Sergei Tigipko, a banker-politician, scored the biggest success, coming third with 13 per cent, followed by Arseniy Yatseniuk, a former foreign minister, on 7 per cent. Mr Yushchenko, the pro-west president, won 5 per cent.
International monitors from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and other institutions on Monday declared the elections largely met democratic standards. “Democratic standards and mechanisms have made a great step ahead and have stabilised democracy in Ukraine,” said Pawel Kowal, head of a European parliament delegation.
Oleh Rybachuk, former chief of staff to Mr Yushchenko, said: “This is what we fought for in the Orange revolution, free and fair elections. It is still an open race.” The main issue for voters in the run-off, Mr Rybachuk added, was deciding which of the two candidates could better “deliver results” on improving their living standards.
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
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#11Russia Reflects on the Presidential Elections in Ukraine
by Pavel K. Baev
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 18 January 2010
The outcome of the first round of elections in Ukraine is fairly clear, despite the usual procrastination with confirming the results, but it could have more impact on Russia’s stalled political modernization than the misanthropic political elite in Moscow expects. Taking a lesson from their utterly counter-productive involvement in the previous elections in fall 2004, the Russian leadership has remained demonstratively indifferent to the political battles in its most important neighboring state. President Dmitry Medvedev has singled out President Viktor Yushchenko as a man he could not do business with, anticipating his imminent political fiasco. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, on the contrary, has conducted a lot of business with his counterpart Yulia Tymoshenko, but declared that he did not support her in the elections (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, December 3). He also mentioned “special relations” between United Russia and the Party of Regions, but not Viktor Yanukovych, whom he congratulated twice with the victory that never came in 2004.
Yanukovych now radiates confidence that the elections will not slip away, but the Russian public opinion by a considerable margin expects Tymoshenko to snatch victory (Levada, January 14). The mainstream media in Moscow sticks to the line –also drawn by Putin– that no candidate in the remarkably diverse Ukrainian list could be seen as “pro-Russian” (Ekspert, January 14). This impartial attitude reflects the gradually matured acceptance of the political reality of a Ukrainian state that pursues its own interests and cherishes its vision of becoming a part of Europe rather than reintegrating with Russia. Ukraine is still seen as culturally too close to be just another foreign country, yet the disappointment in building a “union state” with Belarus, poisoned by endless economic quarrels and political scandals, informs a progressively sober perspective on the Slavic “post-brotherhood” (Gazeta, January 11).
The feature of the elections that gains the most attention within the Russian media is the bitter acrimony and tilt towards negative campaigning, which is presented as a consequence of a protracted political crisis created by the “Orange Revolution” (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, January 15). Still, the express-poll by Moscow Echo radio showed that 90 percent of its audience preferred this kind of competitive election to the heavily manipulated quasi-elections held in Russia (Ekho Moskvy, January 15). Irresponsible populism may still dominate in the debates, but experts point to the evolving culture of compromise and the rise of a new generation of politicians, like Sergei Tigipko and Aresniy Yatsenyuk, who try to bridge the “Orange versus blue-white” divide (Vremya Novostei, January 15). Whatever the vitriol in the Russian political bureaucracy about the self-destruction of the “Orange Revolution,” its legacy lives in the uncensored media, the politically engaged populace, and even in the disregard of Russian or, for that matter, Western opinions.
Yet the risk of breakdown in the “winner-takes-it-all” democratic process in the second round of the elections is alarmingly high from Moscow’s perspective. The stakes for Tymoshenko and Yanukovych are in fact greater than they were in 2004, because defeat would mean not only plunging into political oblivion but also painful material losses for interests groups backing the loser (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 15). Irregularities are certain to be widespread, however legal instruments are practically unavailable for addressing them since the High Administrative Court is split into feuding factions (Lenta, January 15). Enthusiastic crowds would hardly assemble to insist upon their choice, but there is much anger within the divided society and this protest can be mobilized particularly if some money is smartly distributed. As the two main antagonists start to marshal their forces towards the decisive battle, tensions will inevitably escalate –and instead of gracefully accepting defeat, the loser might resort to desperate measures. The term “maidan” [online Ukrainian citizens’ action network] might acquire a new, uglier meaning than the cheerful street-party that goes on for weeks defying the weather.
What makes such alarmist predictions more credible is the depth of economic decline in Ukraine, which is one of the worst cases in the global track record of the still evolving crisis. GDP is expected to contract by 15 percent in 2009, and the political paralysis of the government has prevented the approval of any coherent anti-crisis policy, and consequently the country has no state budget for 2010 (RIA Novosti-Ukraine, January 14). Every monthly payment for gas imported from Russia requires another increase in foreign debt, and the IMF had to stop its emergency aid amounting to $11 billion, because it was diverted to political aims (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 12). Candidates try to outdo one another in promising economic miracles, but a new leader will have to tackle a disaster of catastrophic proportions, while having a weak mandate and facing an unforgiving opposition.
The Russian leadership is inclined to observe this deepening recession with barely hidden satisfaction maintaining that the chaos is a direct consequence and final proof of the failure of the hated “Orange Revolution.” Putin has made some calculated “goodwill” gestures, like forgiving Tymoshenko the penalty for importing too little gas, but the main target was to make sure that Yushchenko’s electoral support would remain in single digits (Novaya Gazeta, January 15). In comparison, Russia’s own economic problems look rather manageable, while Moscow is not taking into serious consideration the risk of Ukraine’s sovereign default, which might affect the feeble recovery in the Russian economy and trigger the much feared “second wave” of the crisis.
Ukraine, nevertheless, has a chance to overcome the economic downturn and gain new political momentum from the elections leaving behind “Orange” illusions and acrimonious squabbles. If it settles on a recovery track, this example of functioning democracy will inevitably strengthen discontent in Russia against the self-serving political bureaucracy that has established monopoly on power, but is unable to deliver the basic service of governance. Ukrainian media may be spreading too much slander, though it grants space for every opinion; the political competition has not checked the spread of corruption –but it creates a healthy situation when no group controls the outcome and the winner is not known until the last vote is counted. Medvedev and Putin dismiss these lessons as unsuitable for Russian “stability,” but their odd duumvirate performs satisfactorily only in public relations, while the inflexible and deeply corrupt bureaucratic machine sabotages the task of modernization.
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
Áàðë³
#12Ukraine's Economy Is Hostage to Politics
by Richard Barley
Wall Street Journal, 18 January 2010
The Orange Revolution of 2004 was supposed to usher in new hope for Ukraine. But at the start of 2010, investors are paying more to insure Ukraine's debt over one year than for any other country, even though default seems virtually impossible with just $400 million of foreign debt falling due this year and $26.5 billion in reserves.
Political risk continues to hold the economy in limbo. Sunday's presidential election brings resolution one step closer; but the risk remains that even February's run-off vote between Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych, whose victory in 2004 was overturned after street protests, may not generate much-needed political stability.
Whoever wins will face huge challenges. The priority is to persuade the International Monetary Fund to resume payments under a $16.4 billion program. The IMF halted payments ahead of the election when the government failed to push through agreed rises in domestic gas prices and Parliament adopted a budget-busting rise in wages and pensions that could boost the budget deficit by 7% of gross domestic product.
Without IMF funds, Ukraine has had to use foreign-exchange reserves to pay its bills, including for Russian gas. Relations with international creditors have suffered. The economy has been hit hard: GDP shrank 14% in 2009 and will grow only 2.7% in 2010, according to the IMF.
IMF support will reassure markets that reserves can be preserved, easing pressure on the hryvnia, which has fallen 60% against the dollar from its pre-crisis levels, and averting more trouble in the banking sector.
But the new president will need political support to push through austerity measures. If Ms. Tymoshenko wins, she should be able to consolidate power relatively quickly; if Mr. Yanukovych wins, he may push for early parliamentary elections to shore up his support, extending the electoral cycle. A contested result or one which, like 2004's vote, is subject to allegations of fraud will prolong the instability.
Investors will be watching closely. With one-year credit-default swaps at 13 full percentage points, or $1.3 million per $10 million of debt insured, and bonds due 2011 yielding more than 11%, the potential returns are attractive, particularly as risk appetite has reduced yields elsewhere in emerging-market debt. But a flare-up in political instability would hit Ukraine and investors hard.
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
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#13Ukraine Is Headed for National Bankruptcy
by Christopher Granville
Wall Street Journal Europe, 17 January 2010
Mr. Granville is managing director of Trusted Sources, an emerging-markets research company.
Ukraine's presidential election yesterday—which appears headed to a second round run-off on Feb. 7 between the two leading candidates, Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko—unfolds against the background of financial ruin.
It has long been obvious that the defeat of the incumbent, Viktor Yushchenko, who has painted himself into the anti-Russian nationalist corner, would produce a political rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia. Mr. Yanukovych is committed to non-alignment (meaning no application for NATO membership) while Ms. Tymoshenko promises to submit to popular referendum any decision to join a military alliance (in practice ruling out NATO membership, which, as revealed by a long series of opinion polls, is opposed by a solid majority of Ukrainians). What seems much less widely appreciated is the prospect of this geopolitical shift being magnified by Ukraine's imminent national bankruptcy—casting Russia in the role of "Abu Dhabi" to Ukraine's "Dubai" in the sense of easing the financial distress of a closely related neighbor.
In October 2009, the IMF suspended the latest planned disbursement of $3.8 billion (ˆ2.6 billion) from its $17 billion rescue loan to Ukraine, citing the need to wait for the presidential election campaign to run its course before the Ukrainian authorities would be in a position to pursue responsible economic policies. In the meantime, the IMF has quietly helped keep Ukraine's funding crisis at bay by a series of expedients, culminating in approval for a drawdown of $2 billion of the Ukrainian central bank's foreign-exchange reserves to meet this month's $900 million payment for imported Russian gas.
From now on, however, the cupboard is bare. Total austerity will be the only way to preserve Ukraine's reserves and prevent another run on the currency—which would be ruinous, given the mountain of public and private debt denominated in foreign currency (exceeding 100% of GDP at the start of the crisis). The newly elected president, and whatever government emerges from the presidential election, will have to abandon their election promises by slashing public spending (the budget deficit reached around 12% of GDP in 2009, largely financed by printing money) and passing on higher energy costs to domestic consumers. Failure to cut spending will lead to widespread defaults. Already, the state-owned energy and railway companies (Naftohaz and UkrZaliznytsya) have been unable to meet their contractual obligations on foreign loans and entered into restructuring negotiations with their creditors.
This would be a daunting task even for a leader elected on a tide of national unity and with a popular mandate to face up to the crisis. But no such political capital can be generated by Ukraine's presidential election. The reason for this goes deeper than the country's well-known East-West divisions. A no less fundamental problem is the lack of functional institutions. As things stand, control over the executive is divided between the president and the legislature. This is the real cause of Ukraine's chronic political chaos—not the personal rivalries of the leading politicians and the business groups that finance them.
The only solution is radical constitutional reform to cement the supremacy of the parliament as the sole institution in which the country's deep internal divisions can be accommodated and managed. Amending the constitution requires two-thirds parliamentary majorities, which could only result from a coalition of the main political forces based in the center and east of the country (and now led, respectively, by Ms. Tymoshenko and Mr. Yanukovych). But after slugging out the battle for the presidency, those two leaders will transfer their struggle to the parliament—quite likely precipitating an early parliamentary election. This is not exactly the ideal environment for getting the IMF program back on track and staving off financial collapse.
Yet this analysis still does not capture the full extent of Ukraine's plight. Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that the country miraculously escapes its political trap with the emergence in the next few weeks of a strong leader in control of both the presidency and the parliament, and hence able to take decisive policy action. Even then, with IMF loan disbursements renewed and with some recovery in battered investor confidence, Ukraine would face massive external financing gaps. A recovery in the price of Ukraine's exports (mainly ferrous metals and bulk chemicals) would be offset by the closely correlated moves in the prices of its (energy) imports—and any temporary decoupling of those prices is unlikely to be in Ukraine's favor, given the surge in Chinese steel production.
Above all, Ukraine has $37 billion in external debt falling due in 2010. Even assuming, in this miracle scenario, that half of that could be refinanced (despite the bitter taste left by recent defaults), the financing gap would remain above $10 billion in 2010—rising to $15-$24 billion in 2012-13 as the IMF disbursements first cease and then themselves start falling due for repayment.
The only plausible way to plug these gaps is to tap the huge savings of the Russian government. Will Ukraine ask for such assistance from Russia and, if it did, how would Russia respond?
Fears for Ukraine's sovereignty mean that a Russian bailout will always be regarded by Ukraine's mainstream political class as a last resort. But a national insolvency would be seen as an even greater threat to sovereignty than being bailed out by Russia and, most important of all, would jeopardize the power and wealth of Ukraine's entire political and business establishment.
Mindful of its humiliation in Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution, the Russian leadership will respond cautiously. Nevertheless, Russia will now be sucked into the Ukrainian crisis—motivated by potential geopolitical gains and asset-acquisition opportunities on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a natural interest in doing what it can to prevent a financial and economic debacle in Ukraine, for the sake of regional stability and given the importance of bilateral trade and still strong economic links between the two countries.
Is this prospect a good thing or a bad thing? There will be strong views on either side, with much crowing and hand-wringing. One way or another, Russia bailing out Ukraine should be seen as a natural development—as natural as, for example, the response of the U.S. to the Mexican peso crisis in 1994.
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
Âîðä
#14Dreams of Reform Fade in Ukraine
by Olivia Ward
Toronto Star, 17 January 2010
Ukraine's Orange Revolution has soured, and voters aren't expecting any plums from Sunday's presidential election.
Five years after the spiral of excitement that swept popular politician Viktor Yushchenko to power, following protests against a fraud-ridden poll, a deep economic crisis has flattened expectations, and cynicism about reform has spread.
"There's a candidate who changed his name on the ballot to 'Against Everybody,' " said University of Western Ontario political scientist Marta Dyczok who recently returned from Kyiv.
"People are demoralized. The crisis has hit hard, and most don't see much difference between candidates."
So changed is the atmosphere since those events of November 2004 that the front-running candidate is Viktor Yanukovych – then accused of a fraudulent victory, and reviled as Moscow's choice.
In second place is Yulia Tymoshenko, then an anti-Russian nationalist who became Yushchenko's prime minister before winning favour with the Kremlin.
A recent poll by the U.S.-based International Foundation for Electoral Systems shows Yanukovych leading with 42 per cent approval, to Tymoshenko's 30 per cent. But with a number of candidates splitting the vote, and neither with a solid majority, a runoff is expected.
Yushchenko is considered out of the running with only 14 per cent.
The elections will be monitored by more than 200 Canadian election observers, sent by Ottawa and the Canada Ukraine Foundation.
But whichever candidate wins, it will be a victory for Russia, which took a beating as the villain of the Orange Revolution.
"The 2004 election was ideological," said Ukraine expert Jakob Hedenskog, a visiting scholar at the University of Toronto. "It was an important choice between East and West. This time it's about bread-and-butter issues."
Under Yushchenko, Ukraine veered toward the West, with failed attempts to join the European Union and NATO, and a "national project" to promote the Ukrainian language and church, and gain recognition for the 1930s famine that killed millions of Ukrainians under Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's brutal economic policies.
But antagonizing Moscow came at a price. Russia cut off gas deliveries to Ukraine over a payment dispute, causing a drop in pressure in the Europe-bound pipeline and gas shortages in European countries.
Moscow's fierce opposition to Ukraine's EU and NATO membership also helped to curb the West's enthusiasm for Kyiv's entry.
This time, the crisis on the home front is more pressing. The International Monetary Fund has frozen an emergency bailout because government infighting undermined required budget cuts.
Unemployment is biting, and a new European visa regime has destroyed the livelihoods of cross-border traders in impoverished western Ukraine.
Meanwhile, corruption, broken government promises and an oligarch-dominated economy have disillusioned many of Ukraine's 46 million people, and low turnouts are predicted at the polls.
Still, says Dyczok, life has improved in many ways since 2004, when she observed the elections.
"Society has moved forward in ways people don't notice," she said. "They are more engaged. They're active, and they protest at the local level. The political spectrum is diverse, and there will be a strong opposition."
The vote itself should deliver evidence of change, said Bob Onyschuk, chair of the Canada Ukrainian Foundation, who is still hoping for a "fair transparent election."
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
̳ñ³ÿ ì³æíàðîäíèõ ñïîñòåð³ãà÷³â
#15International Election Observation Mission
Ukraine — Presidential Election, 17 January 2010
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions
Preliminary Conclusions
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2010/01/42386_en.pdf
The first round of the 17 January presidential election in Ukraine was of high quality and showed significant progress over previous elections. This election met most OSCE and Council of Europe commitments. Civil and political rights were respected, including freedom of assembly, association and expression. Election day was conducted in an efficient and orderly manner.
This election saw a diverse field of candidates representing alternative political views, offering a genuine choice to the electorate. Candidates were able to campaign freely across the country without impediment. The campaign period was generally calm and orderly. Unsubstantiated allegations of large-scale electoral fraud negatively affected the pre-election atmosphere and voters’ confidence. In contradiction with the law, administrative resources were misused by candidates in official positions. More transparent campaign financing is necessary during the pre-election period.
By voting in large numbers and freely expressing their will, Ukrainians have shown the desire to decide on the course of the country. The intertwining of political and economic interests had a negative influence and undermined public confidence in the political process, posing a challenge for Ukraine’s leadership.
Election rules have to be set clearly and should not be a permanent subject of discussion.
Regrettably, a unified election code has not yet been adopted in Ukraine. The existing election law as amended in August 2009 was a step backward compared to previous legislation. As a result, the legal framework remains unclear and incomplete. Last minute court decisions contributed to a lack of clarity in the procedures. However, if implemented in good faith and in a non-restrictive manner, the legislation could provide a basis for holding democratic elections.
Freedom of expression significantly improved since 2004. Overall, the pluralistic media
environment offered voters a variety of information about leading presidential candidates and their platforms. The media was subject to heavy financial pressures and economic interests. The coverage by the electronic media was often not determined on the basis of newsworthiness, but rather as a result of candidates paying to appear in the news or current-affairs programmes.
Despite a delay in funding, the election commissions were generally efficient in meeting tight deadlines while coping with a heavy workload. The Central Election Commission (CEC) mostly operated in a non-partisan and collegial manner, although in a highly polarized political environment. The CEC did not fully address the shortcomings of the law, at times leaving the District Election Commissions (DECs) and Precinct Electoral Commissions (PECs) without proper guidance. Some actions of the CEC lacked the required transparency.
In a positive development, for the first time a State Voter Register was established and the election and state administration made considerable efforts to decrease the number of multiple registrations of voters and to improve the overall quality of voter lists.
Throughout the campaign, candidates rarely used the legal means available to them in the electoral legislation to address their complaints. The administrative courts adjudicated election-related cases in a timely and transparent manner, meeting tight deadlines and providing plaintiffs effective remedies. The CEC did not address complaints in a transparent manner and answered most of them without a formal decision, thus denying access to effective remedies.
The presence of domestic observers significantly increased transparency. Non-governmental organizations monitored the elections despite the fact that they were not permitted by the election law to register their members as observers.
Women were well-represented in the leadership positions of the election administration.
The election day was orderly and calm. Voting and counting was assessed as overwhelmingly positive by observers.
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
Background
The political landscape in Ukraine is characterized by confrontation between the legislative and executive branches as well as tensions between the president and the prime minister, former “orange coalition” allies. Both the president and the prime minister have publicly blamed each other for causing the political and economic crisis.
A lack of quorum or the opposition hindering parliamentary sessions paralyzed the work of parliament. As a result, important laws were not adopted, including the 2010 state budget. The constitutionality of the date of this election set by the parliament was contested by the president. Following the ruling by the Constitutional Court, the parliament eventually established the date for 17 January 2010.
Election System and Legal Framework
The President of Ukraine is elected for a five-year term. In case no candidate wins more than 50 per cent of votes cast in the first round, a second round takes place three weeks later between the two candidates with the most votes.
The Constitution and the Law on the Election of the President of Ukraine (hereinafter election law) provide for universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. Regrettably, a unified election code has not yet been adopted in Ukraine. The election law, adopted in 2004, as amended in August 2009 represented a step backward. The Council of Europe and OSCE/ODIHR reviewed the law and concluded that although the amendments incorporated a number of previous recommendations, many remained unaddressed. They also noted that some amendments raised serious concern and did not comply with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments.
Some of the concerns include electoral dispute mechanisms, the possibility to make changes in the voter lists up to one hour before the close of the poll, the mechanism for appointing members of electoral commissions, and campaign finance provisions.
The Constitutional Court ruled several of the amended provisions unconstitutional, thereby addressing some of the concerns raised in the joint opinion related to limitations on the right to challenge result protocols in courts. The Court also nullified provisions inter alia requiring all members of District Election Commissions (DECs) and Precinct Election Commissions (PECs) to live within their respective district or precinct and provisions that required citizens residing abroad to be listed in the consular registry in order to exercise their right to vote.
In general, the election legislation included significant shortcomings. Incomplete, inconsistent and ambiguous provisions frequently led to confusion. Nonetheless, if implemented in good faith and in a non-restrictive manner, the legislation could provide an adequate basis for holding democratic elections.
Election Administration
The election administration is comprised of the Central Election Commission (CEC), 225 DECs, and 33,695 PECs. Despite the late disbursement of funds, the election commissions generally worked efficiently and met the deadlines required by the law.
The CEC operated in a non-partisan manner despite the complex political environment. Although the CEC was responsible for clarifying how to apply election-related laws, most CEC clarifications simply repeated the provisions of the law and did not further clarify the inconsistent or incomplete aspects of the law. These shortcomings left the DECs and PECs without proper guidance.
The CEC performed its work in a relatively open manner by holding regular sessions open to the media, candidate representatives and observers. However, the CEC members also held closed meetings at which the agenda and draft decisions were discussed so that a coordinated position could be reached and presented. The official sessions therefore became the forum where many decisions were just voted upon, but not debated. These actions were not in conformity with the law and decreased transparency.
Overall, the CEC members worked collegially but the commission became polarized as election day approached. This first surfaced during discussions on numbering candidates on the ballot and continued over the issue of homebound voting and the procedure for amending the voter lists on election day. These controversies were further highlighted by the opposing press statements made by the chair and other members of the CEC.
Despite legal requirements, the CEC did not produce any voter education programs on the rights and obligations of voters, voting procedures, and the complaints and appeals procedures.
[…]
Voter Registration
Previously, voter lists were created anew for every election. For the first time a State Voter Register (SVR) was established and voter lists were extracted from the SVR. The SVR was compiled on the basis of voter lists used in the 2006 and 2007 elections. In September 2009, initial verification took place and voters were sent a personal notification with a request to report back on any inaccuracies.
The SVR contains 36,302,473 voters.13 Since the SVR was created, over eight million inclusions, exclusions and corrections were made, of which one million directly addressed citizens’ requests. A total of 651,975 duplicates have been removed, while 103,254 entries remain unresolved. From 27 December, the preliminary voter lists were made accessible for public scrutiny. The final voter lists were delivered to the PECs by 14 January as required by law.
The procedures to add voters on the voter lists on election day and the documents required to apply for homebound voting created controversy. The Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeals (KACA) decision clarified these two issues in conformity with the law and the High Administrative Court of Appeals (HAC) confirmed the decisions. On the eve of the election, the KACA reversed their initial decisions. They reintroduced the requirement that only voters with a medical certificate could be listed as homebound. They also upheld the decision of one DEC that instructed PECs not to make changes to the voter lists on election day but to refer these citizens to the court. Both decisions
cannot be appealed. On election day, the CEC communicated to the PECs that its decisions would govern the process on election day, because new court decisions were not in conformity with the election law.
Candidate Registration
Candidate registration was inclusive and resulted in a diverse field of candidates representing alternative political views and offering a genuine choice to voters.
(…)
The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM) noted that some presidential candidates abused their official positions and misused administrative resources for campaign purposes, which contradicts the election law. This offered them an undue advantage over their opponents. Both Ms. Tymoshenko and Mr. Yushchenko were warned by the CEC for campaigning during official working visits.
In a clear case of violation of the campaign regulations, the governmental Pension Fund of Ukraine sent official letters to all pensioners, explaining that the law sponsored by the opposition Party of Regions would not raise pensions to the extent they claimed. The letter then explained that the current government was able to preserve the increase even during the economic crisis and promises further increases in 2010. There was also a letter sent to depositors of Rodovid Bank, recently nationalized, which contained campaigning on behalf of Ms. Tymoshenko. This blurs the distinction between state and political party that is prescribed by paragraph 5.4 of OSCE Copenhagen Document.
The cabinet of ministers, under the direction of the prime minister, ordered that the PECs who accept homebound voting applications without a medical certificate would not be paid and threatened them with criminal liability. She has also ordered the Ministry of Interior to verify all applications concerning homebound voting. This directly involved the government in the election process which is against the law. On the eve of election day these actions were declared illegal.
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The Media
Media coverage of the election campaign is mainly regulated by the election law that provides candidates with direct access to media through paid and free air time. Only a few articles refer to the editorial coverage of the campaign, not providing journalists with rules requiring fair, balanced and impartial coverage in news and current affairs programs on television. The election law prohibits only state and municipal media from showing preference to any candidates. Some aspects of the law remain unclear and there is no requirement for relevant guidelines to be issued. This allowed candidates to interpret the law to their benefit.
Freedom of expression significantly improved since 2004. Overall, the pluralistic media
environment offered voters a variety of information about leading presidential candidates and their platforms. The media was subject to heavy financial pressures and economic interests. Most private media broadcasters, however, showed editorial bias reflecting political views of their ownership.
The coverage by the electronic media was often not determined on the basis of newsworthiness, but rather as a result of candidates paying to appear in the news or current-affairs programmes. Journalists informed the OSCE/ODIHR EOM observers that as a result of this they were not always able to work according to the highest professional standards.
Media monitoring results of campaign coverage within newscasts have revealed different
approaches in how TV stations determined when a candidate was acting in an official capacity or as a candidate. This had a significant impact on the total amount of air time devoted to campaign coverage in newscasts for candidates with official positions on different TV channels.
All five nationwide TV stations monitored by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM clearly favoured various main candidates in their newscasts. This can be seen both in terms of the amount of airtime devoted to covering their campaign and the tone of coverage. The state-owned TV station UT1, that has low viewership, provided free air time and debates to all presidential candidates, as required by law. This channel also broadcast ample information about the candidates through political talkshows. However, its news coverage was biased in favour of the incumbent prime minister and
president. Presidential debates would have enhanced a voters’ ability to compare platforms.
While Channel 5 displayed a bias in favour of Ms. Tymoshenko and Mr. Yushchenko, other private TV stations Ukraina TV, ICTV and Inter favoured Mr. Yanukovych in tone and time devoted to his campaign coverage. Out of 18 candidates, 11 received less than 1 per cent coverage in newscasts on the monitored TV stations. Regional media monitoring results also showed a bias for particular candidates.
(…)
Domestic and International Observers
The presence of domestic observers significantly increased transparency. Candidates were active in nominating observers to follow the electoral process. In addition, non-governmental organizations monitored the election despite the fact that the law does not allow them to register as observers, contrary to paragraph 8 of the OSCE Copenhagen Document. As in past presidential elections, such observers applied for accreditation as journalists, who have fewer rights to access the electoral process than observers. They for example cannot obtain copies of result protocols. Domestic observers stated that they were unhindered in their work.
Election Day
Election day was calm and voting was conducted in an orderly and transparent manner. IEOM observers assessed the voting process as good or very good in 97 per cent of polling stations visited.
The CEC reported voter turnout at some 67 per cent based on preliminary data.
Most polling stations opened on time or with minor delays due to protracted opening procedures.
Significant delays of four or five hours were noted in Sumy oblast where polling stations waited for a new supply of ballots following the unauthorized use of “withdrawn” stamps, as well as a lack of quorum in some polling stations in Kyiv oblast.
A last minute court decision rejected by the CEC led to different procedures being applied for voters who were not in the voter lists. In most cases, the PECs referred such voters to the court, the DECs or the Register Maintenance Bodies for inclusion into the voter list. In contrast, the IEOM received significantly fewer reports of PECs which decided to include such voters on the list based on their own decision, as instructed by the CEC.
The secrecy of the vote was largely respected, though group voting was observed in 4 per cent of the polling stations visited. IEOM observers noted three cases of voters taking a photo of their ballot inside the voting booth, which could potentially indicate a vote buying scheme.
Circumstances in and around polling stations were rated very positively. IEOM observers noted a number of crowded polling stations (7 per cent), mainly due to small premises and the presence of a large number of PEC members and domestic observers. The
transparency of the process was assessed as good or very good in 96 per cent of the cases. Civil society representatives were present in 18 per cent of the polling stations observed, while observers representing candidates were present in nearly all polling stations visited (98 per cent).
The counting process was assessed as good or very good in 95 per cent of reports, without regional variations. Although some procedural errors were observed during the count, these did not appear to have an impact on the process. Contrary to the law, the results protocols were not displayed in about 10 per cent of polling stations visited.
Reconciliation and tabulation procedures at DECs were rated positively in 98 per cent of reports.
However, in 48 DECs observers were not given access to the room where preliminary results were entered into a computer for transmission to the CEC. Transparency was noted as a problem in every sixth DEC. The reconciliation of PEC protocols was generally correct and only resulted in a few recounts.
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
Êàíàäñüê³ ñïîñòåð³ãà÷³
#16Preliminary Observation Report
Canada Ukraine Foundation Observer Mission for Ukraine’s Presidential Elections
January 17, 2010
Delivered by
Ann Szyptur, Head of Mission, and Lubomyr Markevych Chief Election Observer
Kyiv, January 18, 2010 – Ukraine’s electoral law encourages and permits interested international Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to observe the country’s elections.
The Canada-Ukraine Foundation (CUF) is a Canadian charitable foundation established by the Ukrainian Canadian Congress to coordinate, develop, organize and deliver assistance projects generated by Canadians and directed to Ukraine. CUF has organized and lead several internationally-acclaimed election observation missions to Ukraine, earning the highest award available to a Canadian civic organization – the Certificate of Commendation – bestowed by the Governor General of Canada in 2005.
The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) brings together under one umbrella all the national, provincial and local Ukrainian Canadian organization throughout Canada. Together with its member organizations, the UCC has been leading, coordinating and representing the interests of one of
Canada’s largest ethnic communities (1.2 million) for almost 70 years.
CUF, in association with UCC, established its 2010 Election Observation Mission (EOM) on January 3, 2010 deploying experienced and trained Canadian volunteer election observers. The EOM was comprised of 5 team leaders and 60 short-term observers in 6 oblasts (regional centers) observing over 600 polling stations. The EOM worked collegially with international observers from numerous other election observation groups, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), CANADEM, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) and the World Congress of Ukrainians (WCU).
The EOM assessed compliance of the electoral process with domestic legislation and international standards for democratic elections. This statement of preliminary findings and conclusions is issued prior to the final certification of election results. The EOM will publish a comprehensive Final Report after its completion of a more extensive review process to include more specific details of its observations. CUF and UCC are committed to assisting the authorities and civil society of Ukraine in meeting its democratic electoral commitments in order for its citizens to enjoy the basic rights and freedoms to which they are entitled.
Preliminary Assessment
On January 17th 2010, Ukraine's voters cast their ballots in the country's fifth presidential election since gaining independence 19 years ago. A total of 18 registered candidates contested the election and assured citizens of a genuine choice. Official results have not been announced but preliminary returns suggest that no candidate will obtain the necessary 50% + 1 of votes cast. Accordingly the top two contenders will advance to a second round to be held in February 2010.
Our current assessment indicates that on balance, in the Oblasts under observation, there was an adequate attempt to meet internationally accepted standards for free and fair elections. However there remains an overriding concern that the institutionalization of free and fair elections requires a greater exercise of political will at the highest levels.
Details
Due to the shortness of time since the closing of the polls, this report will provide a summary of findings rather than specific examples. More detail will be provided in our final report in due course.
The following positive aspects of the electoral process were noted by CUF observers:
A National Voting Registry debuted for the first time in Ukraine's elections with support for its development by such international organizations as the Canadian International Development Agency, OSCE and the US Mission to OSCE. An assessment should be made of the registry to determine whether any changes are required to meet international standards.
Observers did not report a significant use of administrative resources in comparison to the 2004 presidential elections.
A local judicial mechanism exists for the resolution of election disputes.
Women are represented on election representative bodies in great numbers however this may be a cultural issue or indicative of the low level of remuneration offered for such services, or both.
Many polling station commission members were committed to fulfilling their responsibilities in spite of short timelines, systemic difficulties and inadequate working conditions.
Mobile voting at home did not materialize to be the problem that many people had expected and the overall instances of such voting did not appear to exceed generally acceptable limits.
The following shortcomings were observed:
Whereas in September 2009, a joint opinion of the Venice Commission and ODHR on changes to Ukraine's Election law noted that such laws did not meet international standards. Ukraine's Parliament did not make the recommended amendments prior to the election. Of particular concern was the lack of civil society oversight of the election process occasioned by the omission of domestic NGOs from the election observation process.
The accreditation process for International Observers was particularly onerous both in process and in time. Many NGOs encountered inexplicable delays in obtaining official accreditation including more than 1,000 potential observers from Georgia who were denied accreditation altogether.
Recurring systemic failure to provide adequate budgetary funds for the operational needs of a major political election has resulted in many polling districts being unable to provide acceptable premises, adequate salaries and necessary office supplies to ensure their operations.
Information sharing between the CEC and the territorial voting districts was fragmented resulting in the inconsistent application of the law on Election Day as well as confusion for the committees and voters. As an example, a late ruling by the CEC permitting the addition of names to the voter list on Election Day upon the presentation of a passport was struck down by the Constitutional Court. This change was not well understood by all election committees resulting in confusion on who had the right to vote. This resulted in numerous instances of ballots being issued on Election Day solely on the basis of a written complaint without obtaining a prior Administrative court order upholding the complaint. The CEC had to issue an order clarifying this situation.
There were widespread differences in the general level of preparedness of individual polling station commissions and the knowledge of their respective duties and responsibilities by individual commission members.
An Election Day failure by the CEC to take emergency action in District Election Commission #91 (Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast) where 23 polling stations failed to convene opening day quorums leading to chaotic voting conditions and the disenfranchisement of voters, including those voting at home. An additional provocation occurred with the circulation of a false CEC declaration (see attachment) advising that the election was postponed to a future date.
It is generally acknowledged that media reporting in Ukraine is characterized by widespread instances of 'paid for' journalism. Despite the appearance of general freedom to report on campaign and electoral events without censorship and interference, the distinction between legitimate journalism and political propaganda was often blurry and indistinct.
Some election observers have noted that certain Russian media, which have the privilege of broadcasting in Ukraine, appear to have abused their status by the manner in which they have covered the current presidential election with abusive reporting and provocative commentary.
Principle Recommendations
Given that this interim report is being issued between the first and second rounds of the Presidential elections, we are proposing: a) recommendations that should be implemented over the next three weeks and b) recommendations that have a longer term impact.
Short-Term Recommendations
It is not clear why the large contingent of international observers from Georgia were not accredited for the first round and we look forward to either being provided with the reasoning for this decision or a confirmation that they will be allowed to serve as observers for the second round.
Given the large number of voters that did not find their names on official voter lists, a public service campaign should be implemented as soon as possible to encourage citizens to ensure their names appear on these lists prior to the next voting day.
Longer Term Recommendations
Unequivocal adoption of recent and longstanding recommendations of amendments to Ukraine's election law as submitted by the Venice Commission, the CUF and the Ukrainian World Congress.
Creation of a permanent election civil service at the district election committee level that would reduce the need for continual training of new election committee members.
A significantly greater display of political will to prosecute the organizers of violations of the electoral law.
As important as the above observations are, there is an overriding concern that free and fair elections in Ukraine require an overt display of greater political will at the highest levels. This will be especially true in the second round voting when the political stakes will be much higher and the temptation for the use of administrative resources and recourse to fraud will be greatest.
Contacts:
Ann Szyptur, Chief of Mission, +38 067 696 0310
Lubomyr Markevych, Chief Observer, +38 066 877 5222
Canada Ukraine Foundation: http://www.cufoundation.ca <http://www.cufoundation.ca>
Ukrainian Canadian Congress: http://www.ucc.ca <http://www.ucc.ca>
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
Óìëÿíä
#17Crimean Roulette:
Though Violence in Russian-Ukrainian Confrontation Remains Unlikely to Escalate, Politicians on both Sides Should Start Thinking How to React if It Does
by Andreas Umland Russia Profile, January 7, 2010
On December 26, 2009, the Crimean port city of Sevastopol saw yet another round of confrontation between Ukrainian and Russian nationalists. A group of activists from the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda," Ukraine's largest explicitly nationalist party, tried to conduct what they called a "March Against Illegal Immigration" through the town that hosts Russia's Black Sea fleet. As was to be expected, they soon encountered a pro-Russian counter-demonstration. Although some violence did occur, Sevastopol's police was able to keep the two groups apart, and to prevent the situation escalating.
A straightforward political interpretation of the incident is not an easy task. The Russian nationalists labelled their Ukrainian counterparts "fascists." That is a not entirely inappropriate label for the members of "Svoboda" - an organization that has grown out of the manifestly ultra-nationalist Social-National Party of Ukraine. Some of the "Svoboda" demonstrators, at their Sevastopol march, raised their arms in the Roman salute, as used once by the NSDAP and today by neo-Nazis worldwide. However, the pro-Russia counter-demonstrators, according to a report by "Sevastopol Life," also included activists from the Vitrenko Bloc. This grouping's leader, Natalia Vitrenko, has for several years been in an open alliance with Russia's so-called International Eurasian Movement. The Eurasian Movement's leader, Alexander Dugin, in turn, has repeatedly eulogized fascism in general, and the Waffen-SS in particular. The neo-Eurasianist leader once praised SS Obegruppenfuehrer Reinhard Heydrich, the Holocaust's initial organizer, as a "convinced Eurasian." Dugin has made many similar statements, and it is difficult to believe that Vitrenko and her entourage have not noticed his fascist inclinations. This makes the Vitrenko people's use of "fascism" as a derogatory term for their Ukrainian opponents sound odd.
Whatever the exact meaning of the incident, similar future events are probable, especially on the Crimean peninsula. In the worst case, they could get out of control and provoke bloodshed. In both Ukraine and Russia, there are politicians and political groups who, for domestic reasons, would benefit from such an escalation. To be sure, most Ukrainian and Russian citizens would be horrified by the idea of a violent confrontation between their co-nationals. Yet, a small circle of determined extremists, whether within Russia or Ukraine, may be able to succeed in provoking such an escalation - especially if the confrontation, such as the last one, contains pro-fascist activists on both sides. What would be the repercussions of bloodshed? In Russia and to a lesser degree in Ukraine, many would feel it necessary to react decisively. One can easily imagine the president, prime minister or pseudo-parliament of Russia issuing yet more offensive statements concerning the Ukrainian nation state and political class. Worse, in both Russia and Ukraine, state and party officials might start engaging in public debate on how to respond appropriately to violence in Sevastopol or elsewhere. If this triggered a "patriotic bidding war" between politicians trying to demonstrate superior allegiance to the supposed national interests of their countries, it would sooner or later include the discussion of a military "solution." Both Russian and Ukrainian politicians may, in principle, understand that the deployment of troops would not result in decisive victory for either side. Yet, emotional public debates in Russia on how to properly "protect" ethnic Russians in Crimea, or an outburst of patriotism by Ukrainians worried about the sovereignty of their young state, would put pressure on both countries' commanders-in-chief. It might create a dynamic that could supersede rational calculations of the actual pros and cons of military intervention. At least Russia has, in Georgia, shown that it has no qualms about rapidly deploying regular troops beyond its borders in order "to protect" people whom it regards as "Russia's own" and perceives as being physically threatened.
In such a situation, Kiev would have to remember that military confrontation with Russia should be avoided at almost all costs. As the case of South Ossetia has shown, NATO is not prepared to step in for a non-affiliated state. True, the Ukrainian army would be a much more formidable opponent for the Russian one than Georgia's armed forces. Yet a military confrontation even at only one circumscribed location, like Sevastopol, would have repercussions within other Ukrainian regions with large ethnic Russian communities. Even an unlikely Ukrainian victory in a relatively short war in Crimea would put the integrity of the Ukrainian state as a whole under strain.
Russia, too, should not have any illusions. True, it has a large conventional army, is a nuclear superpower, and would be the more likely "winner" of such a war (though "victory" would surely not come as easily as in Georgia). Russia may even be able to "re-unite" with Crimea. Yet, such a military "success" would be costly, on the international scene. While Russia has partially succeeded in portraying one unfriendly post-Soviet leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, as a "madman," it would be more difficult to convince the world that yet another democratically-elected post-Soviet government is "mad" as well. Whatever spin Russia's political technologists may come up with, most people around the world would start thinking that the real "madmen" sit in Moscow, rather than Tbilisi or Kiev.
A Russian-Ukrainian war would also trigger a full-scale second Cold War with the West, with effects on economic relations, cultural exchange, travel freedom, etc. The EU-Russia summits, the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia's membership in the Council of Europe, Russian participation in the Eurovision contest - these and many more joint events, common projects and Russian-Western links would be put into question. The International Criminal Court may, as in the case of Serbia's former leadership, issue arrest warrants for Russian leaders.
Moreover, after the de facto annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a second territorial expansion of Russia would prompt the leaders of such countries as Belarus, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan reconsider their alliances with Moscow. These and other Russian allies in Europe and Asia were already conspicuously silent during and after the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008. None of them has recognized either Abkhazia or South Ossetia's "independence." Another intervention on the territory of a Russian neighbor may let even those few international partners that Moscow still has today look for security and cooperation elsewhere. In a war in Crimea, Russia may, after the death of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians, be able to "get back" its treasured peninsula. But the price it would have to pay would be far-reaching international isolation, for years if not decades to come.
While these scenarios sound fantastic today, they are feasible once bloodshed has started. As groups who benefit politically from increasing Russian-Ukrainian animosity are on the rise in both countries, the likelihood of the situation escalating in- rather than de-creases. Against this background, the leaders of both Russia and Ukraine should keep reminding themselves what military intervention from either of them would eventually lead to.
2010.01.19 | Ñåðã³é Âàêóëåíêî
P. S.
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