

**Maidan Monitoring
Information Center**



Ukraine International Framework for Information and Communication Security

October 2016

Authors of the framework are members of Maidan Monitoring and Information Center: Nataliya Zubar (Director), Victor Garbar, Olexander Severin, Olena Syrinska, Serhii Petrov, Vitaly Ovcharenko, Ihor Dubrovsky, Olha Malysheva, Marko Pinteric, Viktor Pushkar and Mykola Molodyko.

Author of the document: Mykola Molodyko

This document is intended for a broad English-speaking audience and as such incorporates the [original Ukrainian document](#) with facts about Ukraine, and source terms, concepts and methodologies relevant to the Maidan Movement and the work and legacy of the *Maidan Monitoring Information Center*.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	4
BACKGROUND	6
PURPOSE	9
COMMUNITY DRIVEN FRAMEWORK.....	9
THREATS.....	10
Ukrainian Language.....	10
Human Values	11
THREAT ACTOR.....	11
VULNERABILITY (PESTEL)	12
Social	12
Technological	13
Environmental: Acoustic violence.....	15
CROSSCUTTING VULNERABILITY	16
Geography.....	16
History.....	17
Infrastructure	18
RISK	19
THE MEDIA	19
THE ORTHODOX CHURCH	20
MAIDAN MONITORING AND INFORMATION CENTER – STRATEGY	23
PRACTICE AREAS	23
PRINCIPLES	24
Human Rights.....	24
Security and trust.....	24
Human Security.....	25
Hostile State	26
Vampirism	26
Anti-development interest groups.....	28

Anti-terrorist Operations (ATO)	28
Holodomor	29
Resilience	29
Confluence of real and cyber worlds – nodes.....	30
MAIDAN MONITORING INFORMATION CENTER – RESULTS.....	31
HISTORY	31
PROJECTS	31
MEMBERS.....	32
KEY PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS	32
CONCLUSION.....	33
COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATIONS	33
LEADERSHIP RECOMMENDATIONS.....	33
POLICY AND STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS: BUILDING RESILIENT CITIES.....	34
LAW RECOMMENDATIONS	34

PREFACE

Ukraine's future as an independent and sovereign nation is at stake from Russian aggression presented in its hybrid warfare and terrorism. It is estimated that only one quarter of Russia's aggression in Ukraine is military. The remaining three-quarters of Russia's aggression is non-military: psychological warfare, information warfare, active measures, influence operations and other covert tactics. This non-military warfare presents itself as a threat to the Ukrainian language and human values, the core of Ukraine's culture and identity.

They kill souls before targeting bodies

~Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko

Ukraine is a sovereign and independent nation. *Ukraine Constitution Article 1: **Ukraine is a sovereign and independent, democratic, social, law-based state.***

Ukraine's national security interests require completion of decommunization, anti-corruption efforts and general reform, cultural diplomacy, and **an international approach to information and communication security reforms.**

On September 1, 2015, a new military doctrine announced as the first in Ukraine's history **clearly identified the Russian Federation as an enemy and an aggressor.**

Ukraine is dedicated to overcoming the impact and effects of aggressor Russia's warfare and to comprehensively combat its attempts at destroying elements of Ukrainian society. National information and communications are part and parcel of Ukraine National Security. Aggressor Russia's information warfare operations capitalize on Ukraine's vulnerabilities and most Ukrainians are unaware of active measures, influence operations, information war and other covert tactics implemented in Ukraine by Russian Federation. Through communication channels and networks, the USSR and later Russia managed to secure in Ukraine an artificial sense of social norms and the acceptability of criminal and irresponsible behavior. Those who live in closer proximity to Russia, in rural areas and within levels of poverty are at higher risk of Russian aggression. Poor roads and public transportation lead to isolation of communities and higher risk of Russian aggression.

The framework counters, mitigates, reports on and prevents hybrid warfare and terrorist threats, threat actors, vulnerability and risk at the **community level** through leadership, policy and strategy, and laws. Within this framework of information and communication security for Ukraine, primary threats are established as those to the **Ukrainian language and human values** with the ultimate risk identified as the assimilation of Russian [anti]values. Meaning, in simple terms that Ukraine would "turn into" Russia. Vulnerabilities are comprised of political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal. Crosscutting vulnerabilities unique to Ukraine relate to leftover Soviet infrastructure, geographical closeness to its old Soviet neighbor, and historical inaccuracies imposed during Soviet occupation by its primary threat actor, Russia.

The goal of this strategic framework is to establish an international dialog on information and communication security of Ukraine and as part of the continued sustainable development of a democratic Ukraine. The main objectives of the framework strategy are to:


- formalize mechanisms to counter hybrid war and terrorist threats from the Russian Federation and its global network,
- mitigate damage of those attacks,
- assess and report damage for knowledge sharing and learning purposes, and
- reduce risk of and prevent further attacks.



*Hybrid war always starts with an ideological attack. Gross military power is usually preceded by the so-called soft power. They kill souls before targeting bodies. We should complete decommunization, for it is the issue of Ukrainian national security, our responsibility for the future and moral obligation to millions of Ukrainians eliminated by the Bolshevism, **Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko**, noted at the Bykivnia Graves National Historic Memorial on May 15, 2016.*


Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyberwarfare. By combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts, the aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution. To achieve our goals and objectives, we break down in our framework, a threat matrix for Ukraine’s national assets:

- threats,
- threat actors,
- vulnerability, and
- risk.



BACKGROUND

The Maidan Movement began in 1990 with the Revolution on Granite, continued with the Orange Revolution in 2004, culminated with the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 and continues today during the Ukrainian Patriotic War. Major protest events are illustrated in the timeline below. A more detailed timeline of major events in Maidan's history and contributions from MMIC's members to its activities can be viewed [online](#).



Not unlike the American Civil Rights movement, the mass protest movement against racial segregation and discrimination in the southern United States that came to national prominence during the mid-1950s, the Maidan Movement has its roots in the centuries-long efforts of Ukrainians and their descendants to resist Russian aggression. A quarter century of public objection in response to direct, indirect and subversive Russian aggression. At the heart of this aggression is Russia's assault on the basic human values of democratic civilized countries. The aggression has increased with the internet and globalization and transnational crime. Now, additional opportunistic predators can easily participate with the Kremlin in its terrorism, hybrid warfare and psychological operations in Ukraine.

At the same time, Ukrainian society has undergone a renaissance of deep value according to the work of eminent Ukrainian historian and culturologist Yaroslav Hrytsak and colleagues. There is a significant shift in the values Ukrainians hold, a widening gap with Russia, a return to, or perhaps a new interpretation of, values of earlier generations deeply rooted in the community. Human values rediscovered since Independence such as those expressed in the past by the Zaporozhian Cossacks. From the outside, this is seen as the signs of instability as resistance to Russian aggression held. During the Maidan period, Ukraine has endured 25 years of Russia's untitled hybrid warfare and terrorist campaigns and civil society raised objection and protest to each major offensive. **Maidan Monitoring Information Center (MMIC)** is part of this provenance and has provided for both quantitative and qualitative information security and

communications safety, in a sense, as a type of community center, key to the community building. While counter-terrorism measures are important to fight terrorism, resilience to terrorism is also an important deterrent to terrorists. A population that is resilient in the face of terrorism and remains steadfast and cohesive in the face of attacks on the civilian population refusing to be moved by fear into political concessions is one of the most overlooked and perhaps best tools in the fight against terrorism. The concept of building resilient communities could be a cornerstone of a robust national security and counterterrorism, the U.S. as an example. Building resilient communities is first nature for Ukraine. MMIC employs the learned principles in its approach to building a community in Ukraine that is resilient to Russian hybrid warfare and terrorism.

General tactics used to pursue the objectives associated with this strategy focus on capacity building of community services. The framework builds on the work of the Maidan Monitoring Information Center and integrates organizational principles and cyber security approaches. While this work is not new, the Center has primarily published in Ukrainian and rarely in English. Thus, the English language version of this framework while conceived over the last decade will be viewed as new, by and large. The Center itself has been a direct target of Russian information terrorism and hybrid warfare. As a result, little is known about the Center's important and trailblazing work outside of Ukraine. The Center has even been targeted by WikiLeaks. Modern information warfare methods including troll factories were used for the first time in the campaign against Maidan Monitoring Information Center. The Center's website was one of the few early battlefields of this war and remained the only one with all archives up and running. However, to this day, there are NO references to these events and other accompanying events in analysis of Russia's information warfare.

In his annual address to Ukraine Parliament, on September 6, 2016, President Poroshenko emphasized that the unity of country and consolidation of Ukrainians as modern political nation was his main priority: "The status of Ukrainian language as the only one state language will be filled with real meaning and with respect to national minorities. As the events of recent two years have demonstrated, they stand firmly on the positions of Ukrainian national patriotism." According to the President, external threats have accelerated the shaping of modern Ukrainian political nation on the basis of the civil patriotism. All polls demonstrate that high support in the issues of unity, integrity, unitarity. "People are proud of their Ukrainian citizenship, state symbols, respect and honor Ukrainian language. The Euro-Atlantic vector, the EU and NATO predominate in geopolitical preferences of majority of Ukrainians," the Head of State added. The President noted that the war had removed from the agenda many issues related to foreign and adverse to Ukrainian interests symbols, traditions and cultural codes. In the framework of the law on de-communization more than one thousand and two hundred idols of Lenin were demounted; 987 of Ukraine's localities lost their communist names. "The law has restored justice in relation to those, who dedicated life to fight for independence and unity of Ukrainian state. The state has restored the historical truth in the issue of national memory," the President said. Ukraine will not observe indifferently the interference of another state into the Ukrainian church affairs, its attempts to use in its own interests the feelings of the part of Ukrainian orthodox, as stated by the President.


Information warfare can target all levels: individual/family, local, national, regional and global. Subjects of information warfare on the global level are the foreign political agencies and special services of foreign states, advocacy structures. Thus, not only is Ukraine itself at significant risk of **“turning into Russia,”** but also being perceived externally as a rabid state like the Russian Federation, which would in turn propel number of losses in the areas of international support and investment, ultimately leading to loss of land and independence.

PURPOSE

This strategic framework is intended to establish for the community, a national campaign and dialog as part of the sustainable democratic development of Ukraine as part of information and communications security reforms. The main objective of this framework strategy is to create mechanisms to counter conflict and prevent further conflicts instigated by the Russian Federation.

COMMUNITY DRIVEN FRAMEWORK

The overall framework is comprised of strong **leadership** to provide vision and across the board coordination. Clear cut **policy and strategy** with precise a mission are necessary to execute efforts. Adequate funds and human/material resources are required to roll out programs in civil society to engage the **community** in a national dialog around, and establish national narratives for, the sustainable democratization of Ukraine. Unambiguous **laws** and law enforcement capacity serve as a foundation.



This strategy framework focuses mainly on community and community building (gold base of pyramid) but informs and is informed by, supports and is supported by leadership, policy and strategy and Ukrainian laws and law enforcement.

At its core, a national information and communication security program will promote accurate transfer of knowledge and information about Ukraine among its citizens and the international community – free of the aggressor Russia’s bias.

There are limitations to any model. Our work incorporates traditional models that have been tailored bespoke for Ukraine. This paper offers a framework for addressing vital national policy issues which will advance over time. As technology, in particular, advances, new and different threats will present themselves. Therefore, this framework is best visualized as a constant process of properly prioritizing among competing missions, and balancing between short-term and long-term objectives. This approach is vital to military success. And it is no less vital to national information and communication security efforts.

THREATS

Ukrainian Language

The Ukrainian language is threatened by the Russian Federation on a number of levels and the issue is multifaceted. At the most extreme direct level in its hybrid warfare, Russia imposes an artificial mandate on its [Russian] language. The Russian government has officially declared that it protects all Russian-speaking people regardless of their citizenship and nationality. As of the end of 2013, most of the population of Donbas and Crimea (Russian occupied areas) used Russian and had not heard or read the Ukrainian language for years. This tactic will remain regardless of any political changes in Russia in the foreseen future. The only way to establish an informational and communicational border with Russia is to change the dominating communication language in Ukraine. Without this border, Ukraine would always be vulnerable to informational aggression from Russia.

Language in the modern world is used not only as means of communication, but also as a lever of influence on the conscience of people. Professor Ivan Pylypovych at Kyiv International University has provided evidence of language's impact in the conduct of modern warfare. At the beginning of Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine, language played a key role. The aggressor did not hide their weapon against Ukraine as "Russification," and directly stated: "The Russian interest is where the Russian language is, and the Russia's borders lie where the Russian language ends." The Professor of Kyiv International University provides the wisdom of experience, "To resist the enemy's language aggression, first of all, we should not forget our mother tongue, we should be proud of our nation and culture, and pass traditions and experience of previous generations to our youth."

In addition to the prioritization of Ukrainian, the English language must also be prioritized in Ukraine in order to protect the Ukrainian language, human values, and enhance national security. Only a single digit percentage of Ukrainians are fluent in English. This represents an obstacle to further integration into the civilized world and to combat Russian dominance in such areas as academia. It is a fact that it is rare to find English language analytics about Ukraine from Ukrainian historians, scientists and thought leaders. English is the primary language of the civilized world and its utility also lies in keeping Ukraine competitive in markets as a nation. But, consider it as a general issue of information security. The aggressor Russia benefits when nobody knows truths about Ukraine in English. It is a fundamental issue to sharing knowledge from Ukraine and the imperative of operating with a guiding principle of "nothing is self-evident." This document illustrates that depth and breadth of Russia's information warfare and Ukraine's critically needed comprehensive response. Once such example is a national mechanism required to prevent significant Kremlin propaganda pass without rebuttal. An exquisite illustration of this was a [rebuttal](#) written by Volodymyr Viatrovych, Ukrainian historian and Director of the Institute of National Memory to the magazine *Foreign Policy* for publishing significant propaganda. [Here, Ukraine was not only defending the truth but its sovereign right to write and preserve its own history. The English language is mandatory to achieve this.](#)

Within an overall international security framework, Ukraine must defend its land, independence, language, and its human values.

To once again quote President Poroshenko, “The status of Ukrainian language as the only one state language will be filled with real meaning.”

Human Values

Through communication channels and networks, the USSR and later the Russian Federation managed to secure in Ukraine an artificial sense of social norms and the acceptability of: irresponsible and criminal behavior, domestic violence including child abuse, violence as a means of defending one’s own interests, personal suffering, animal abuse and suffering, abuse of people with disabilities, and a general disregard for humanity. Racism, sexism, homophobia and other oppressive behavior is not only tolerated, it is encouraged in modern Russia.

Russia’s antidevelopment behavior represents itself in total as a massive attack on basic human values and sensibilities driven by the fundamental principles of human rights. Human rights protect civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. But no matter what kind of right is at issue, there are basic principles that are always part of human rights standards and implementation: freedom, privacy; civility, respect, consideration; honesty, fairness, sharing, solidarity; openness, listening, welcoming, acceptance, recognition, appreciation; brotherhood, friendship, empathy, compassion, love.

A word of caution here: the issue of values is not an easy one. It requires the most expert attention – researchers, practitioners, donors, policymakers. This is evident in the campaigns of dangerous religious conservative groups in the U.S. Thus, this will continue to represent a hot spot for Ukraine’s primary threat actor the Russian Federation to capitalize on vulnerability from small to large. For example, the aggressor can attempt to frame Ukraine’s value renaissance as the “imposition of Western values.” This, of course, is patently false. Ukrainians are reclaiming, rebirthing, reconnecting with their legacy of human values.

Ukrainians hold a fidelity to human values. Most fail to see that Ukraine rejects Russia's [anti]values. It is about values, not about sympathies. Bearers of Soviet values are today the main source of terrorism in so-called DNR and LNR. Therefore, both decommunization and national information and communication reform are vital to Ukraine national security in this instance.

THREAT ACTOR

A threat actor, also called a malicious actor, is an entity that is partially or wholly responsible for an incident that impacts – or has the potential to impact – a nation’s national security. In Ukraine’s case, the Russian Federation is its primary threat actor. Russia is a hostile state and a

state sponsor of terrorism. Russia has always been a violent country, and terrorism has been a recurrent theme throughout its history.

VULNERABILITY (PESTEL)

Vulnerability is viewed through the structure of a PESTEL analysis (political, economic, social, technological, economic and legal) lens of macro-environmental, part of an external analysis when conducting a strategic analysis or doing market research, and gives an overview of the different macro-environmental factors to be taken into consideration. It is a strategic tool for understanding market growth or decline, business position, potential and direction for operations. **Here we focus on three: social, technological and environmental.**

Social

Representing Ukrainian culture as close to Russian culture is dangerously harmful for Ukraine as it encourages identification with the aggressor. However, in reality, there are few similarities between the two cultures. In fact, despite some shared history during Soviet occupation, important evidence from cross-cultural research points to significant differences, self-evident to a person familiar with and honest about both societies.

Within the six dimensions of national culture as based on [extensive research](#) done by Professor Geert Hofstede, Ukraine's reading for "power distance" sits low while Russia's rests high. This dimension expresses the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. The fundamental issue here is how a society handles inequalities among people. People in societies exhibiting a large degree of Power Distance accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place and which needs no further justification. In societies with low Power Distance, people strive to equalize the distribution of power and demand justification for inequalities of power. Russians are more inclined to authoritarianism and vertical social organization. Ukrainians are inclined to anarchy and self-organized horizontal structures and more readily accept the diversity and gender equality.

Another benchmark for the gap of difference in Ukrainian and Russian society is "chosen trauma" and the work of Vamik D. Volkan. The psychological links between massive large-group trauma and the development of political ideology of exaggerated entitlement such as irredentism; thousands or millions of individuals sharing certain sentiments associated with certain shared emotions. An ethnic group therefore is a large group. Shared societal traumas occur for various reasons, such as war. For Russians the most important chosen drama is WWII – officially named the "Great Patriotic War" in Russia. For Ukrainians the main chosen trauma is Holodomor, the manmade genocidal famine Stalin used to brutally murder millions of Ukrainians. We discuss this at greater length later in this document.

As mentioned earlier, through communication channels and networks the USSR and later Russia managed to secure in Ukraine an artificial sense of social norms and the acceptability of:

- Irresponsible and criminal behavior
- Domestic violence
- Violence as a means of defending one's own interests
- Personal suffering
- Animal abuse and suffering
- Abuse of people with disabilities
- A general disregard for humanity
- "Salvation lie" (it is ok to lie)
- "If he beats her it means he loves her" – A real and popular Russian proverb

Since 2000, Russian propaganda has focused on the renewal of "traditional family values" or "Domostroy," which continues to be written into Russian laws. These artificial social norms are pervasive in the Russian-speaking world via soap operas and reality shows. This is described in detail in Peter Pomerantsev's book, "Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia."

There are a range of approaches and tactics used in psychological operations, a few most prevalent in Ukraine are noted here in this framework.

A keystone of Soviet/Russian psychological operations is using mass consciousness to erode the idea and existence of communities.

We cannot leave the topic of social vulnerability without mentioning social transformation. In short, Ukraine has been unable to complete the social transformation process necessary to transition from totalitarianism to democracy, in whole or in part, due to the external but internally destabilizing hybrid war and terrorism efforts of aggressor Russia. Essentially, the Russian Federation for 25 years has prevented Ukraine from moving past the first stage, independence, to the second stage, political reforms. In addition, this process has not ended. The process of democratization of Ukraine is also not linear and is characterized by frequent changes in the transformational phases.

Among the external factors inhibiting the democratic transformations in Ukraine, the main role is played by the destructive politics of the Russian Federation, in terms of both economic and social development. Corruption in Ukraine left over from its Soviet days still remains one of the top problems threatening economic growth. Ukraine is constantly experiencing interference in its internal affairs on the part of the Russian Federation.

Technological

Up until recently, there was little attention given to Russian cyber warfare. However, there is now some familiarity with Russia's unprecedented cyber-attack on Ukraine that led to a power grid failure, when, on December 23, 2015 and residents of the Ivano-Frankivsk region of Western Ukraine were preparing to end their workday and head home through the cold winter

streets. Inside the Prykarpattyaoblenergo control center, which distributes power to the region's residents, operators too were nearing the end of their shift. But just as one worker was organizing papers at his desk that day, the cursor on his computer suddenly skittered across the screen of its own accord. This is cyber war. Like information war, it is part of hybrid warfare which Ukraine has been a recipient at the forefront.

Cyberwar is a confrontation on the Internet, aimed at destabilizing the computer systems of government agencies, financial and business centers, creating confusion and chaos in life. To do this, traditional methods such as phishing and real cyber-attacks are used.

Russian cyber-attacks on Ukraine's information systems began during the Revolution of Dignity. There were attempts to also complicate traditional communications, including telephone, through automated phone calls to politicians, human rights defenders (NGOs) and civil society activists. Social networks became more active with bots that were cluttering the information space using related "EuroMaidan" tags / labels.

After Russia's military aggression began, the number of cyber-attacks not only grew, but changed in character. If in the beginning their goal was to obtain information, the attacks in December 2015-February 2016 were aimed at disabling grids of Ukraine, transport communications, which can lead not only to economic loss, but also a serious destabilization in some regions.

On May 22, 2014, during the presidential elections in Ukraine, Russia attacked the electronic electoral system.

On July 29, 2014, President of Ukraine's official website suffered powerful DDoS-attacks. The press office of the President was forced to send their announcements through news agencies. The hacktivist group, "CyberBerkut," took responsibility for the attack.

As we began this section, on December 23, 2015 recorded the world's first confirmed cyber-attack on power system, and it happened in Ukraine. About 180.000 energy consumers were affected for two hours as a result of this attack.

Maidan Monitoring Information Center itself has been a direct target of Russian cyber warfare. The Center's website was one of the few early battlefields of this war and remained the only one with all archives up and running.

There were three large scale DDoS attacks (more than 50,000 hosts involved in an attack) on the [Maidan website](#) – December 2007, related to publication that predicted Russian invasion into Georgia, October 2012 – related to documentation of fraud during election to Ukrainian Parliament, January 2014 – related to First Euromaidan's Forum in Kharkiv. The site is still a subject of permanent DDoS attacks.

To this day, there are no references to these events and other accompanying events in analysis of Russia's information warfare.

Environmental: Acoustic violence

The threat to basic human values has expanded to a high level of constant agitation aimed at increasing the perception of violence as the only means of conflict resolution. Growing discontent about public authorities in relation to structural reforms and protection of national interests of Ukraine from Russian aggression has fueled this threat. Part of this is due to real problems, while the other is sabotage, part of Russia's information operations.

A particular mechanism of influence on social behavior embedded in the USSR and Russia is aggressive audio noise – constant loud audio programs in public places like public transportation, shops, markets and the service sector, in general. This totalitarian practice is still not recognized as abnormal by the general public and continues to operate in Ukraine. One result of sustained “acoustic violence” is that people perceive it normal to shout and engage in hysterical and loud conversation. The conditions prevent them from speaking calmly. Acoustic violence is reinforced by Russian television talk shows, which promote loud and hysterical behavior as normal and acceptable. This threat is further exacerbated by the large number of public and private TV sets set at high levels of volume, particularly the bass. Acoustic effects influence viewers on a neurobiological level and turn, the “zombie box” (a popular nickname for a TV set) from a metaphor to a reality. The audio effects of Russian news and other Russian programs create an audience that remains in a constant state of fear of some unknown but perceived inevitable turmoil.

To appreciate the potential negative impact of acoustic violence tactics, one must consider that not only is the loud nature an assault on the community, but also the agitation propaganda content of the mass media. Forced consumption of mass media can cause harm. Thus, it is important to distinguish tasteless from harmful content to minimize damage to the community. Disturbing rumours and fabricated stories presented as news on Russian stations might cause waves of panic, negatively affecting human security within a community.

Regular listening to any loud audio causes a particular loss of hearing. Exposure to noise at should be calculated on sound intensity and exposure time and correspondent protective measures should be taken. However, there is no zoning or noise control conducted by a state body or civic organization for public places or public transportation.

Regular exposure to the loud audio may even cause of neurological imbalance leading to depression or aggressive behaviour. Russian psychological operations could create a type of hypothesis, yet there is no scientific evidence.

Russian media products are often offered at no cost to the end user, creating problems with commercial distribution of audio and video products. People do not pay for the content, and content providers do not pay copyright owners. This ruins the market and supports practices of

piracy. The same problem is also seen with free printed media distribution. When pro-Russian daily propaganda newspaper “Vesti” is given out for free in Ukraine, the competition is stifled.

Environmental vulnerability is heavily tied to the overall issue of the media, which is embedded throughout the framework and addressed in a forthcoming section.


CROSSCUTTING VULNERABILITY

Crosscutting vulnerabilities unique to Ukraine relate to the residual effects of Soviet occupation:

- leftover Soviet infrastructure,
- geographical closeness to the Russia Federation,
- and historical falsifications imposed over centuries by Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.

Geography

To understand why Putin does what he does, look at a map. Mountains in eastern Ukraine surround the great expanse of flatland that is the European Plain. As things stand, Putin, like Russian leaders before him, likely feels he has no choice but to at least try to control the flatlands to Russia’s west. So it is with landscapes around the world – their physical features imprison political leaders, constraining their choices and room for maneuver. These rules of geography are especially clear in Russia, where power is hard to defend, and where for centuries leaders have compensated by pushing outward. In short, for centuries the Russian state has attempted to use Ukraine strategically as a buffer zone. There are perhaps other factors and motivations to consider in Russia’s geopolitics in 2016, but this is of historical significance. The political map below demonstrates our point and also reinforces it by showing democratic civilization as organized among the European Union and the NATO states.



The map validates that the human values and Ukrainian language which represent the core of Ukrainian history, culture and identity are literally on the line.

Ukraine's proximity to the Russian Federation not only represents vulnerability but a pathway for Russia's direct influence. Russia's influence is more tangible in remote areas that may lack access to Ukrainian communication. Thus, remote areas of Ukraine may lack a sense of Ukrainian community.

History

The issue of Ukraine's history, often incredibly misunderstood, is paramount. Russia's aggression is multidimensional and relies on Russia's fabrication of both Russian and Ukrainian history. The Russian Empire and Russian Federation never recognized the existence of Ukraine as independent from the "state-building Russian nation." Today, even most Russian liberals operate with the notion of "brotherly nations," e.g., elder Russians and younger Ukrainians. This is historically false, as the Ukrainian state and nation existed long before the Russia.

As of September 2016, the main objective of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine is the total extinction of Ukrainian identity, rejection of the basic human values and the creation of an atmosphere of total mistrust inside Ukrainian society. However, none of the aggressor Russia's objectives have been achieved. Ukrainian society demonstrates remarkable resilience against the hybrid war.

Historian Stephen Velychenko has eloquently [summed up](#) the issue of history and Kremlin mythology. Russia cannot be both capitalist and anti-capitalist:

According to this particular discourse there are only Little Russians (brothers) in a territory (Ukraine) that always was and is Russian. Inhabitants who do not regard themselves as Russian and have no wish to be ruled from Moscow are either, traitors, dupes, or idiots. Batu Khan tore apart a supposedly united people in 1240, Stalin set things right in 1940, and Putin is correcting Gorbachev's mistakes. At best, Ukrainians are artificial inventions of Russia's enemies and might be allowed an independent existence in what was the Habsburg region of eastern Galicia. Those who think Russian history begins with something called Kievan Russia are predisposed to agree. From such a perspective, normal loss of empire becomes Russian national tragedy and the destruction of a natural geopolitical order – which is assumed to actually exist. It is of no concern to those who share these assumptions that former Russian subjects see nothing tragic about imperial collapse or natural about its existence.

As noted in other sections in this document, Holodomor has a significant role in Ukraine's history. In general, it represents that not only did Russia attempt over centuries to steal Ukrainian culture and identity, it attempted to also wipe out significant populations of Ukrainian society.

This section is intended to underline that not only did Ukraine exist before Russia, Ukraine's culture and identity were hijacked by Russia. However, for the greater part, Russia was unsuccessful in hijacking or killing the spiritual, emotional and psychological aspects of the Ukrainian nation and its citizens.

Infrastructure

The Soviet occupation left Ukraine with an undeveloped national communication infrastructure and decommunization efforts were all but abandoned after Independence in 1991. In fact, more reforms have been accomplished in the last two years than the prior two decades. Poor quality national communications may also be a product of enemy sabotage.

Maidan Monitoring Information Center defined four major problems of Ukrainian society as bad communications, inability to plan the future proactively, misunderstanding of security, and the lack of ability to discern reality. Most define security as the absence of threats. Misunderstanding of security by Ukrainians is a security threat by itself.

Bad communications in Ukraine pertains to both interpersonal and intergroup communications and to the physical aspect of access like roads and bridges. The communities in eastern Ukraine were impacted by both the poor Soviet physical infrastructure and its anti-development influenced society due to low mobility. A sense of remoteness and insularity promoted people in Donbas to use disposable income to buy expensive clothes rather than to travel abroad or even to the neighboring region.

To transform infrastructure in Ukraine, both physical bridges and human bridges (relations) are necessary. Poor or lack of adequate roads and bridges that link eastern, rural, and remote areas throughout all of Ukraine to other regions not only reduce physical contact, they discount human contact. Human contact is necessary for security, trust and comfort. Strategies of transformation will aid in preventing borderline conflicts. Direct human contact is the only sure way to prevent hostile information actions. Communities cannot increase security without the improvement of roads and reconstruction of roads and bridges destroyed in 2014 as a result of hostilities.

Therefore, improvement of all types of roads both in towns and cities, and between them is a priority for improving public communication and public safety by increased mobility. Without which it can increase the level of trust in society. As an example, rail passenger service to Mariupol was halted for a half year period between 2014 and 2015. The recovery of rail service significantly influenced the level of social optimism despite the fact that half a million in the city still run two trains.

Lastly, critical to improving communications is providing full broadband internet access to all regions of Ukraine. Creating opportunities to improve communications is a common theme among remote communities and their local authorities.

RISK

Within this framework of information and security for Ukraine, primary threats of the Ukrainian language and human values are established with the ultimate risk identified as the assimilation of Russian [anti]values. Meaning, in rough terms that Ukraine would “turn into” Russia.

It is no coincidence, that Ukrainian society as a whole does not have a common vocabulary that describes the current state of society, the state of the country and its place in the world. There is no common understanding of basic and frequently used terms like "security," "corruption," "democracy," "human rights," and "discrimination." Thus, a national dialog framed within the ultimate risk is required for the sustainable democratic transformation of Ukraine.

THE MEDIA

The media and virtually every aspect of it, both mass and social, is woven into the fabric of Russia's direct, indirect and covert aggression against Ukraine and the ultimate risk described above. Intrinsic to this is language, both, the nation's mother tongue and the words, phrases and vocabulary used within Ukrainian within the nation as a whole, on every level.

The approach in this framework places most emphasis on the continued decommunization, democratic reform and transformation of Ukraine. A truly democratic Ukraine will provide the best self-defense for Russian information operations that involve Ukraine's media. Corruption creates additional pathways for Russian influence. Corruption is a menace to democracy and enables Ukraine's primary threat actor the Russian Federation and opportunistic predators to work against both Ukraine and democracy.

Among the core human values is freedom of speech. This should not be compromised, however, the national community should have the resources and tools necessary to discern and negotiate mass media and social media conflicts. The framework provides for a community based approach to national information and communications security. Tackling issues around media are part of this response and embedded within. Outcomes of the work of Maidan Monitoring Information Center serve as a catalyst for an organic, but potent national media reform. Additionally understanding the Russian government strategies towards mobilizing conflict with influence operations is key to successful reform of the media. Existing international understandings and applications of Russia's aggression against Ukraine are incompatible and will remain a source of tension.

Since Ukraine became an independent nation, there has remained a dominance of Russian media in Ukraine's information space. Most especially, after 2000, Russia continued to dominate through modern communication technologies and completely controlled and censored some television, radio, and printed media in Ukraine. In Ukraine, in 2013 there was virtually no open market for media. The most influential media channels were monopolized by the oligarchs close to the Russian government and almost the entire media space was filled

with Russian-speaking media produced in Russia. In 2013, the majority of Internet service in Ukraine was fully controlled by Russian secret services (mail.ru, vkontakte, Odnoklassniki (Classmates), Anti-Virus software). Today, Vkontakte is the default primary social network for students of primary and middle school age because of the greater prevalence of games and online communities for those ages. Games, including those built-into Facebook, typically have no Ukrainian service or Russian service instead of Ukrainian is on offer.

An open and competitive media market is fundamental to Ukraine's national security.

For non-Ukrainians, Americans in particular, it is important to understand that there is no black and white issue of freedom of speech or of related civil liberties currently being violated by the Ukrainian government. Ukrainians hold fidelity for freedom of speech as a human value core to human rights. The bogus notion of endangered "media freedom" in Ukraine is not only false it is gas lighting. Russian information operations have ensured that the conflict that Ukrainians face is control of not only the Ukrainian media market but manipulation of market data. In essence, aggressor Russia is dominating nearly every aspect of the Ukrainian mass media market.

Through information operations, the Russian Federation has manipulated marketing and demographic data within the media environment to push out all Ukrainian media from advertising in the market and to cut out all independent sources of financing. The overall aim is to unite and to join Russian and Ukrainian media markets. Associated with this is the intention to form the unconscious opinion of Ukrainians to see themselves as "nearly Russians" or to give the impression that Ukrainian markets are Russian submarkets. The analytical center Texty.org.ua has created a database of pseudo-researchers in market research who perform PR functions that provide a fake Russian bias. In fact, some highly respected international companies appear on the list for tampered systematic market research that, for example, falsifying political statistics. There are sometimes event complete shams where the founder and public face of a market research company publishes phony statements such as "the low ratings of Viktor Yanukovich are not important and he will improve soon." The date of this actual statement was January 10, 2014; 40 days before then president and Kremlin puppet Yanukovich fled to Russia. There is also evidence that exit poll and even World Value Survey research is manipulated to show a Russian bias.

We end this section by underscoring here that Russia's manipulation of Ukraine's media market takes on a form of highly dangerous psychological abuse.

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

We begin this section with a [good overview](#) of the Orthodox Church in Russia from Reverend Myron Panchuk:

The Russian Orthodox Church has historically served the interests of the Tsar and the politics of imperial expansionism. The Moscow Patriarchate was always generously rewarded for its

cooperation. The Tsar, like his cousin the King of England, was an “anointed of God” and effectively the supreme leader of the Orthodox Church. This changed dramatically after the Bolshevik Revolution – churches were closed, bishops and clergy arrested and killed, property confiscated. Patriarch Tikhon anathematized the new Soviet government, ushering in an era of greater suppression until Stalin revived the Church in 1941 as a means of bolstering Russian patriotism.


Today, the Kremlin is clear and upfront about the church’s role in the “Russian World.” The Russian Orthodox Church and its Patriarch Kirill, who once famously likened Putin's long rule to "a miracle of God," are active in promoting Russia's culture abroad and strengthening ties with compatriots around the world, helping the Kremlin boost its leverage on the global stage. The church’s close ties to the state were on display early in the Ukrainian Patriotic War when Patriarch Kirill and the Russian Foreign Ministry issued nearly identical statements, warning against a confrontation and speaking of the larger Russia's "brotherly" Ukraine.

Religion may be embedded within or encompasses one’s values. This is significant as we have identified that human values are an ultimate threat within this framework for information and communication security. However, Moscow’s potent and direct role may weaken in the foreseeable future. The establishment of one united Ukrainian Orthodox Church will certainly create a path forward for both Orthodox faithful and the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. In July 2016, Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s Parliament) appealed to the Archbishop of Constantinople and New Rome Patriarch Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople of the Eastern Orthodox Church Bartholomew I to accelerate the speed of giving the status of autocephalous church to Orthodox Church in Ukraine. In the same month, during a ceremony to mark the adoption of Christianity, President Poroshenko clearly stated, “We will not be passive observers of the attempts made by one state to use to their advantage the feelings of the Ukrainian Orthodox believers.”

Aggressor Russia uses religion as a political tool or “soft power,” and if the Moscow Patriarch directly or indirectly endorses criminal or irresponsible behavior, for example, church sanctioned domestic abuse, child abuse, homophobia and isolation of LGBT, its reach can be felt in Ukraine. Though Russia decriminalized homosexuality just after the fall of communism in 1993, anti-gay sentiments have been on the rise in the country in the past few years. Tragically, the injustice and violence faced by members of the LGBT community in Russia also have a direct link to the Russian Orthodox Church.

We must underscore that the Russian Orthodox Church, which currently claims Ukraine as part of its canonical territory, is closely aligned with the Kremlin. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko is pressing for recognition of the Kyiv Patriarchate as an independent national church as a matter of national security. The Kyiv Patriarchate, unlike its rival, isn’t officially recognized by the global Orthodox community, leaving the Moscow Patriarchate with power.

We end this section addressing a particular “thought virus” imposed by Russia in the XVII century, the notion of “Kievan Rus.” Since knowledge can be like a “thought vaccine” we clearly illustrate in the timeline below the history of Ukraine’s occupation. Noted by red flags is occupation of the Russian Empire and USSR and an associated timeline noted at the bottom.



We must reiterate here that Russia’s claims to “Kievan Rus” and Ukraine were fabricated in the XVII century – four centuries ago. Simply put, Russia hijacked the birth of Christianity in Ukraine marking the Rus period and the first Ukrainian state. Not only has the Russian Orthodox Church represented the territorial interests of the state, it has played a significant role in the fabrication of a mystical event which has been wrongly upheld as history by some Orthodox people for centuries. Orthodoxy has remained the dominant religion in Ukraine since its acceptance in 988 by Volodymyr the Great, who instated it as the state religion of Rus.

MAIDAN MONITORING AND INFORMATION CENTER – STRATEGY

PRACTICE AREAS

The Maidan Monitoring Information Monitoring Center is unique on a number of levels and particularly outside of Ukraine where some of its functions may be part of government social services, public campaigns and outreach. While it would be considered a mission-driven, values-based institution in the U.S., its scope of work cannot be compared to any like institutions. On top of that, in the U.S., in particular, the Center’s broad scope of work is considered trailblazing and revolutionary in regards to a legacy of public response to information warfare. To help better understand the functions of the Center’s information and communication security services, the Maidan Monitoring Information Center works can be viewed as working within six practice areas:

- **M**onitoring of political rights and civil freedoms
- **A**ntiterrorism operations (ATO): Research, investigation, forensics and surveillance via crowdsourcing intelligence
- **I**nformation and communication security education, skills building and outreach
- **D**efending and affirming human values and Ukrainian language
- **A**dvocacy for human security
- **N**ational leader in civic policy and knowledge management



--Overall the framework leads reform with the model of human security. In the conclusion section of this document, we make recommendations in this regard-- The functions of the Center have evolved and will continue to evolve in relation to not only Ukraine’s response to Russian aggression but other democracy’s interest in knowledge sharing and learning.

PRINCIPLES

The following is a set of principles relevant to understanding both the methodology of the Maidan Monitoring Information Center and this framework for Ukraine's national information and communications security.

Human Rights

American columnist Anne Applebaum [has written](#), "Lenin believed that the destruction of civil society was crucial to totalitarian dictatorship." However, yes, a profound suspicion of civil society was central to Bolshevik thinking and this paranoia was transferred by communists from Russia to other states of the USSR. In a sense, the complete repression of civil society defined the Soviet Union.

Civil society provides the critical foundation for promoting all human rights. Civil society holds governments accountable, ensures good governance, and promotes all human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights. Citizens, activists, organizations, journalists and reporters each play a vital role in encouraging governments to respect human rights. From its inception, Maidan Monitoring Information Center has been at the forefront of championing in the community the importance of these groups in creating and maintaining a healthy, vibrant society.

The Maidan Monitoring Information Center is one of founders of the Maidan Movement, the quarter century of public objection in response to direct, indirect and subversive Russian aggression. In 2005, the Center formalized "The Maidan Memorandum – The Next Objectives of the Orange Revolution," which outlined for public discussion, human rights within the Ukrainian government's legal framework as follows: 1) civil rights, 2) judicial system, 3) public affairs, 4) local governance, 5) economy and finance, 6) national governance, and 7) national security and defense.

Security and trust

The issue of security is both interesting and not easy to understand. If you first consider Ukraine's cross cutting vulnerabilities, the crux of the matter – trust – appears more apparent. In regards to security in Ukrainian society, there are two opposite notions:

- Internal state – "bezpeka – the Ukrainian word for security, which could be translated as "without sorrow." The notion is shared mostly by Ukrainian language speakers, bilinguals and youth. The same root and etymology is present in most Slavic language, including all countries neighboring Ukraine.
- State of external control – "bezopasnost" – Russian word for security, which literally translates as "without danger." This notion is shared mostly by Russian speakers and the elderly.

The first category of people is willing to actively participate in security practices. The second category is waiting for an authority to delegate personal security. What distinguishes the two

groups is the issue of trust. By and large, Ukrainian society already perceives comfort as aspect of security. Thus, it is important that the idea of comfort is included the understanding of collective security and integrated into the political rights of citizens and the National Security of Ukraine. This is intended to pave a road for trust.

The issue of the community's positive trust in the Government of Ukraine runs throughout a robust framework for national information and communication security. Increasing and sustaining at a healthy level, overall trust in society, is an imperative for human security of Ukraine's citizens whether they reside in Lviv or Donbas.


Human Security

Human security addresses the combination of threats associated with war, genocide, and the displacement of populations. At a minimum, human security means freedom from violence and from the fear of violence. Unlike traditional concepts of national security, which focus on defending borders from external military threats, human security is concerned with the security of individuals. Human security and national security should be—and often are—mutually reinforcing. But secure states do not automatically mean secure peoples. The concept of human security came to prominence when the United Nations Development Programme first drew global attention to the concept in its 1994 Human Development Report (HDR).

The key principles and framework for advancing human security

- People-centered
- Comprehensive
- Context-specific
- Prevention-oriented
- Protection (top-down) and Empowerment (bottom-up)

The protection and empowerment framework further guarantees the development of appropriate responses to a particular threat. By combining top-down norms, processes and institutions, including the establishment of early-warning mechanisms, good governance and social protection instruments, with a bottom-up focus in which participatory processes highlight individuals' roles in defining and implementing their essential freedoms and responsibilities, human security improves local capacities, strengthens social networks, and ensures coherence in the allocation of resources and policies.



Ukraine is dedicated to protecting its human values and human right via human security. The concept of human rights is an essential element for national security. One of the most pressing

challenges facing Ukraine in regards to communication is a coherent vision for Ukraine national security. Beyond addressing specific threats to national security and the promotion of broad national interests, Ukraine foreign policy defines for the world, and its own citizens, the values the Ukraine hopes to embody as a nation. The vision has to be translated into strategy, and perhaps more importantly, that strategy must align international goals with national domestic politics and national values. The promotion of human security, however, required more than just new rhetoric; it necessitated a broad rethinking of basic national security paradigms and government functioning.

Hostile State

On an interpersonal level, there is, for the most part, peaceful coexistence between Ukrainian and Russian people, good relations within families and little public conflict. However, at a policy level, Russia itself is a hostile state and a state sponsor of terrorism. Russian people are ultimately responsible for their government but, to quote Ukraine President Poroshenko from a recent speech at the United Nations General Assembly:

“In the last century, the humanity paid an enormous price following two world wars – about 70 million. Isn’t it enough?”

“We are a peaceful nation. It was never – under any circumstances – our intention to start any conflicts with our neighbors.”

Russia has always been a violent country, and terrorism has been a recurrent theme throughout its history. Repeated governments have used terror as a means of control, whether it was the Okhranka before the Russian Revolution, the Cheka, NKVD or KGB in Soviet times, or the FSB since the fall of the Soviet Union. The worst exponent was, of course, Stalin whose purges of government officials, military officers, intellectuals and peasants led to over 66 million deaths according to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

The history of Russian aggression in Ukraine is terrorism, not only physical but psychological, emotional and spiritual; they kill souls before targeting bodies. Since independence, Ukraine has endured Russian state-sponsored terrorism. After this war, Russian terrorism will most likely continue. Aligning strategy to threat is a fundamental aspect of this framework. Threats to Ukrainian language and human values via physical, psychological, emotional and spiritual terrorism represents a baseline of which represents reality for Ukrainians a marker for successful resilience strategies and outcomes.

Vampirism

To understand how people are manipulated by methods of information warfare, including tactics employed in the media, start by looking at interactions between people. In particular, “mirroring” or the behavior defined in communications in which one person subconsciously imitates the gesture, speech pattern, or attitude of another. Mirroring occurs in social

situations, particularly in the company of close friends or family. Without exception, people, even monkeys, mirror each other. If you combine this notion with Russia's attack on basic human values, this particular concept helps better explain the notion that Russian's kill souls before targeting bodies. In a sense, in mirroring the behavior of Russians, Ukrainians have been resituated or disorientated; their souls have been hijacked or killed. The characteristics of Russian behavior are often described by Ukrainians as "vampirism," a psychological, emotional and spiritual immaturity that feeds off the energy of others.

While this may sound like the stuff of folklore, the concepts of emotional and energy vampires do exist in psychology and in hard science. Biologists at Bielefeld University added cellulose to green alga cultures and used biochemical and molecular-biological methods to show that the algae break down the cellulose into simple sugars and can use this as a source of energy. Algae can take energy from other plants.

The vampirism described here does not involve blood, of course. However, these vampires have little capacity to see another person's perspective and often lack empathy. They quite literally drain hosts of not only their physical energy, but levels of emotional, spiritual, psychological energy as well.

Speaking of blood, a significant act of vandalism in Ukraine recently utilized paint as the appearance of blood on a beloved fixture of Ukrainian society.

The world famous monument in Kyiv to Prince Volodymyr which stands 67 feet high was desecrated by vandals on September 26, 2016. It is the Ukrainian capital's oldest monument – the bronze monument was erected in 1853 on Volodymyr Hill. It is a prominent fixture not only in the lives of Kyiv residents but in the hearts of all Ukrainians, not dissimilar from the Statue of Liberty in this regard.

Locals have referred to the vandals as "vampires." The notion of vampirism is a real social issue for Ukrainian as explained above. This



associated event is also a classic example of the use of FUD – fear, uncertainty and doubt. It is a tactic that is part of the ABC’s of psychological operations. To some degree, information operations have generated fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the economic, cultural, and national security of Ukraine. Outside of the incredibly creepy aspect of this, the modus operandi was most likely to create fear, leading people to blame Jews or Muslims. However, Kyiv residents quickly attributed the vandalism to Russian thugs. The irony in this case is not only that but that the place itself has served as a popular location for the tradition of ecumenical prayers in recent years. Different religious leaders conduct joint ceremonies with diverse faithful of different religions. Lastly, this vampirish vandalism is also significant in another way relevant to international information and communication security for Ukraine. If the Statue of Liberty had been vandalized in such a manner, every news outlet in the world would have covered it. The defilement has received no international media attention and little in Ukraine.

Of course, there is no scientific evidence of “vampirism.” We disclaim any notion as such. The fundamental issue here is that most cultures do have ideas of vampirism and in Ukraine these ideas could be seen as vulnerability exploited in a predatory manner by the aggressor’s information operations. Psychological operations can play off local superstitions as reflected in popular folk lore. “Zombies” are also popular in Ukraine. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to the aggressor’s objectives.

Anti-development interest groups

One of the primary objectives of this framework is to establish a common set of terminology and concepts. We have culled these from leaders in the field and our own work. One concept key to this framework from the work of Andrzej Zybertowicz is the “anti-development interest group” or type of informal interest group whose activities produce results, which are harmful for the common good – a group whose activities co-constitute a minus-sum game. The common good is a set of conditions (institutional and technical) that positively influence the capacity of members of a society to achieve these private aims which are congruent with the norms of social life. An anti-development interest is a type of concrete practical interest whose pursuit excludes, or significantly hampers, the implementation of theoretical interest. Anti-development interest triggers (or joins) the dynamics of minus-sum social game or, at best, a zero-sum game.

Anti-terrorist Operations (ATO)

A combined government and community based response to terrorism – counter terrorism, antiterrorism (ATO). Therefore, apart from comprehensive efforts to eliminate the political, social, economic, cultural, religious and other grounds for the spread of violent extremism and terrorism, there is a need to address such phenomena as state



propaganda of intolerance and hatred, as well as information wars, which often serve as part of hybrid warfare. Thus, while MMIC's early efforts lacked a scientific approach they are now bolstered to ensure the historical importance not only of the data itself but also our work as a means of anti-terrorism operations (ATO) or counter terrorism.

Holodomor

For one to understand the full potential impact of information warfare in the both the Ukrainian and the global contexts, Holodomor is the most unimaginable example. Bluntly put, journalist Walter Duranty and the New York Times won a Pulitzer Prize essentially covering up Josef Stalin's atrocities.

To this day any attempt to account with certitude the number of victims of the Holodomor is flawed. The number of Ukrainians victims of the famine of 1932-33 in the USSR is certainly more than four and probably less than ten million. Irrespective of the number one accepts, the Great Famine of 1932-33, the "Holodomor", was an act of genocide against the Ukrainian nation and one of history's biggest crimes against humanity.

In spite of Russian persistent propaganda and distraction and some international reluctance to recognize the genocidal nature of Holodomor by appeasing governments, the issue of whether this historical event was, in fact, a genocide of the Ukrainian people, however, has been resolutely determined.

As a concrete example of the power of history as [noted by Alexander J. Motyl](#):

The first thing Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich did after his February 25 inauguration was delete the link to the Holodomor on the president's official Web site. Yanukovich's predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko, had made the Holodomor—the famine of 1932–33 produced by Joseph Stalin and responsible for the deaths of millions of Ukrainian peasants—into a national issue, promoting what Czech novelist Milan Kundera famously called "the struggle of memory over forgetting" as part of his attempt to move the country toward democracy. That Yanukovich turned his back so dramatically on this movement to rehabilitate Ukraine's tragic past indicated the extent to which the recent election was as much about identity as it was about politics.

Ultimately, Kremlin puppet Yanukovich's assault on Ukrainian identity, newly resurgent following the Orange Revolution, focused on **education, culture, language, and history.**

Resilience

The resilient city is fundamentally part of the human security discourse that focuses on efforts that promote tolerance and enhances resilience towards aggression-triggered conflict. Resilience is required at all levels of the spectrum, from individual/family, to local community, to region and nationally. A resilience index for community recovery of terrorism and hybrid warfare activities is proposed as part of the recommendations in the conclusion section of this

document. Several attempts have recently been made to identify the key indicators of community resilience and to group them into an overall resilience index. These studies support the evaluation of the effectiveness of resilience during recovery, and they also help establish a yardstick by which to monitor progress in resilience enhancement over time.

Confluence of real and cyber worlds – nodes

Both the work of Maidan Monitoring Information Center and this framework treat the relationship between the cyber world and the real world as a continuum. Instead of two separate worlds, effective information and communications security requires an emergent view. In particular, threat actors now move seamlessly in and out of both worlds, opportunistic predators, in particular. The confluence of terrorism and cyberterrorism is undeniable. Thus, a confluence of thought is not only required, it is mandatory. As an indicator, in the Center’s work, the application of a “node” in the communication network can be both cyber and human.

MAIDAN MONITORING INFORMATION CENTER – RESULTS

Maidan Monitoring Information Center is an international NGO with headquarters in Kharkiv, Ukraine and is the country’s premiere civic organization for building communities resilient to threats of anti-development and psychological warfare.

HISTORY

- Information service of “Ukraine without Kuchma” protests since December 20 2000
- Documenting protest movements since 2001
- Defending political prisoners since 2001
- Cradle of civic journalism in Ukraine since 2001
- Information support of cultural and educational events since 2001
- Civic lobbying campaigns since 2001
- Communication platform for civil movements since 2002
- Developing strategies for social changes since 2005
- Campaign for disclosure of illegally classified government documents since 2005
- Social psychology research since 2006
- Monitoring the constitutional freedoms since 2007
- Twitter diplomacy since 2010
- Education of adults since 2014

PROJECTS

- Monitoring the observance of political rights in Ukraine, focusing on the right to peaceful assembly, freedom from discrimination, access to information
- Documenting human rights violations in occupied Crimea and Donbas
- Educational and integration programs for children and internally displaced persons
- Open universities for adults
- Leaders of Transformations School
- Information Security School
- [Ukrainian Peacebuilding School](#)
- Social Intermediaries School
- Peacebuilding Journalism School
- Research into new technologies in the field of information and human security
- Research in the field of humanities and political science
- Forecasting and developing strategic vision of the future for Ukraine and the world
- Organization of broad public debates on controversial topics



**Ukrainian
Peacebuilding
School**

MEMBERS

- The organization has 75+ members who live in 16 regions of Ukraine including Crimea, Poland, Slovenia, U.S. and Canada.
- 750+ volunteers in all corners of Ukraine and all over the world.
- Member are physicists, programmers, lawyers, political scientists, psychologists, historians, culturologists, linguists, system administrators, engineers, journalists, security professionals, anthropologists, entrepreneurs, economists, educators, geophysicists and biologists.
- Members are fluent in a variety of languages: Ukrainian, Polish, English, Czech, Slovenian, Slovak, Croatian, Bulgarian, Belarussian, French, German, Spanish, Russian and Arabic.

KEY PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS

- **National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (Ukrainian State institution)**
- **Institute of National Memory (Ukrainian State institution)**
- **Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (Ukrainian State institution)**
- **Supreme Audit Office of Poland (Polish State institution)**
- Association of Middle East Studies, AMES (Ukrainian NGO)
- Europe XXI Foundation (Ukrainian NGO)
- Najwyższa Izba Kontroli (NIK) (Polish State institution)
- Prague Security Studies Institute (Czech Republic NGO)
- Wikimedia Ukraine (Ukrainian NGO)
- NGO “Promotion of Intercultural Cooperation” (Ukrainian NGO)



[National Security
and Defense
Council of Ukraine](#)

Український
Інститут
Національної
Пам'яті

[Institute of
National Memory](#)



[Ministry of
Education and
Science of Ukraine](#)



[Supreme Audit
Office of Poland
\(NIK\)](#)

CONCLUSION

For our conclusion and recommendations we turn back to the community driven framework we established built on leadership, policy and strategy, and laws.

COMMUNITY RECOMMENDATIONS

- Teach the community:
 - to understand its information needs and ways to meet them;
 - to navigate private, business and public life;
 - to understand and realize social roles;
 - and to nurture a culture of privacy.
- Develop and implement a long-term training program of information culture in formal education (upper, middle and elementary school), which will include:
 - formal resources (textbooks, etc.),
 - statistical methods of processing information flows,
 - the rules of scientific debate,
 - behavioral economics,
 - promoting democracy and understanding a responsive and tolerant government with transparent political mechanisms.
- With the collaboration of experts from the European Union and the U.S., develop cybersecurity courses for groups of society, e.g. children, state employees and retirees.
- Train local community workers:
 - to share information on events to local communities and tourists;
 - to form a large network of communication and serve as ombudsmen for the community; and
 - to become part of public safety networks for early warning of conflicts and rumors.
- Provide the community with:
 - trainings on effective dialogue and approaches to arguments, and
 - trainings on presentations to improve the quality of public communication and to disseminate practices of good dialogue as a factor to prevent conflict and promote peaceful transformation.

LEADERSHIP RECOMMENDATIONS

- Promote building resilient communities as a national strategy as a means to counter threats to Ukrainian language and human values.
- Prioritize national communications reform.
- Address environmental vulnerability to information and communication security such as acoustic violence.

- Pursue a national resilience index.
- Champion development and fundraising efforts for, and global engagement with, a national reform campaign to increase Ukraine information and communication security and nation to nation knowledge sharing.

POLICY AND STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS: BUILDING RESILIENT CITIES

The resilient city is fundamentally part of the human security discourse that focuses on efforts that promote tolerance and enhances conflict resilience. The idea is we should prioritize human security thinking and involve communities in development planning process as this will enable communities to share their local assets, protect and guide investment, look out for each other and contribute to the safety of people living in their localities.

It is not about elites deciding what is good for communities but jointly doing things that help bridge the divide among our people and building community capacities to absorb and recover from any shock or stress while maintaining their essential functions, structures, and identity as well as adapting and thriving in the face of contemporary challenges.

The model of building resilient communities could be a cornerstone of a robust national security and counterterrorism, the U.S. as an example. Building resilient communities is first nature for Ukraine. MMIC employs the learned principles in its approach to building a community in Ukraine that is resilient to Russian hybrid warfare and terrorism.

Our recommendation is to adopt this model nationally as well as other terms and principles featured in this document.

Ancillary to the building on the resilient cities model in Ukraine, significant policy and strategy efforts are required to create an open and competitive mass media market. Democratization of the media in Ukraine in tandem with anti-corruption efforts and reforms, a market free of the aggressor's dominance and hybrid warfare operations, is imperative to Ukraine's national security.

LAW RECOMMENDATIONS

- Responsive and complete government and military communications
- Increased standards and awareness of cybersecurity
- Zoning noise control – ban acoustic violence
- New national standards of public services – roads, bridges and transportation
- Nationwide access to the Internet
- Prioritize Ukrainian and English languages