Відповіді

• 2002.06.25 | Kostya Poroh

  Lagendijk, Wiersma. The ultimate borders of the European Union.

  The ultimate borders of the European Union
  Joost Lagendijk / Jan Marinus Wiersma
  Members of the European Parliament
  
  Joschka Fischer, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, has put the final goal of European integration on the political agenda. He is the first leading politician who has ventured to outline the definitive institutional architecture of the European Union. He calls for a federation with its own constitution, a strong government and strictly defined competences.
  
  The debate about the finality of the integration process that has evolved in the wake of Fischer’s Humboldt speech largely centres around the institutions and competences that should characterise the future EU. However, in the shadow of these two issues there looms a third one that is a logical part of the debate on finality: the question of the ultimate borders of the EU. Where will the EU end? Which countries should be given the prospect of eventual membership, and which should not?
  
  Before long these explosive questions will inevitably turn up as central themes in the debate on the future of Europe. The controversy is fuelled by the current enlargement process. Brussels is conducting membership negotiations with no fewer than ten countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as with Cyprus and Malta. Polls have shown that public support for enlargement is rather meagre. Indeed, in the run-up to the accession of the candidates – the first accession treaties may be signed as early as in 2002 – reluctance among citizens of the present EU is growing. Many fear their prosperity and safety are at risk. Politicians are tempted to allay those fears by setting clear limits to any further enlargement plans.
  
  Geography
  Where does the EU end? The answer presented by geography is obvious: the group of candidates must be restricted to countries that form part of the European continent. It appears that the founders of the EU envisaged such a limitation. In the Treaty of Rome they laid down that 'every European state that observes the principles of the European Union may submit a request for membership.’
  
  The geographical approach imposes a limit on the number of candidates. It torpedoed, in 1987, Morocco's application for membership. Moreover, the text of the treaty clearly states that the EU is under no obligation to admit countries even if they do form part of the European continent. It is up to the current members of the club to decide who can join in and who cannot. The EU would welcome such countries as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland as new members – if their splendid isolation were to become more of a burden to them than a blessing – not just by virtue of their geographical location, but also because their wealth would qualify them as net contributors to EU coffers.
  
  At the same time, however, the geographical argument also strongly favours the impoverished republics of the former Yugoslavia, as well as Albania. By the time the current enlargement process is completed, about a decade from now, the Balkans will be entirely surrounded by EU member states. "One glance at the map is sufficient to see that the EU cannot leave the Balkans out," according to the Dutch State Secretary for European Affairs, Dick Benschop." Indeed, these countries are already being offered the prospect of some kind of membership in the form of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements that the EU is currently negotiating with them."
  
  The EU is investing billions of euros in the Balkans to promote reconstruction and cooperation among former enemies. It is doing so because, due to the proximity of the region, the suffering of its peoples also affects the EU itself. EU countries have had to cope with millions of refugees fleeing from ethnic conflicts in the region. In addition, the civil wars have produced experienced criminals whose sphere of activity now covers the whole of Europe. Neither have Western Europeans remained insensitive to the violations of human rights that accompany each Balkan war. The military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo have even more firmly anchored the Balkans to Europe. "Bombs create obligations," to quote Dutch columnist Paul Scheffer.
  
  The EU has also entered into certain obligations vis-à-vis Turkey. In spite of resistance from Christian Democratic quarters to the accession of this 'Muslim country', the EU government leaders reaffirmed Turkey’s status as a candidate country in 1999. Ankara has not yet come anywhere near meeting the political and economic criteria for accession, however, and it may be another twenty years or more before the EU can welcome Turkey as a member.
  
  This does not alter the fact that by offering Turkey the prospect of accession, the EU has crossed the Bosporus, which forms the border of Europe as a geographical entity. A secular state modelled on Western European states, Turkey is seen by many politicians as a stronghold of the Western world in the Near East. The country was granted NATO membership as early as 1952. Moreover, Turkey is the home country of millions of people who now live in Western Europe. The successful integration of these migrants into European societies partly depends on the integration of Turkey into the EU.
  
  The invitation extended to Turkey has left Morocco with a bitter pill to swallow. After all, some of the considerations that plead in Ankara’s favour also hold true for Rabat. If the EU thinks it can bridge the Bosporus, what keeps it from reaching across the Strait of Gibraltar? Is it geographical bad luck on Morocco’s part, given that not even a small part of its territory is on the European continent? While favoured by many politicians, this argument does not satisfy certain thinkers. Timothy Garton Ash, an expert on Central and Eastern Europe, seems at a loss when asked to indicate the southern border of the EU. 'There’s no denying, I suppose, that there’s more water between the EU and the Maghreb than between the EU and Turkey,' is his hesitant response.
  
  The problem with Morocco is not that it is situated entirely within North Africa, but that there are four other countries north of the Sahara – Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt – that might no less convincingly claim membership. Not to mention Israel. It is inconceivable that the EU can incorporate all of these countries – with a total population of more than 130 million – within a single generation. It would require more than an average dose of optimism to believe that these countries are able to complete the required political and economic transformations within that period of time. The letter of rejection sent by the EU to Morocco on an earlier occasion should not be seen as irrevocable and even less as implying the country's incompetence to share European values. Even so, we should discourage Rabat from focusing exclusively on the EU. Indeed, it is high time that Morocco and its neighbours seriously set about the task of promoting their own regional cooperation so as to increase prosperity and stability in the region. By proving their ability to achieve regional integration, the countries of North Africa will automatically reduce their distance from Europe.
  
  Cultural divide
  There is no need for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldavia to prove that they are part of Europe, as they are all situated on the European continent. By the time the current enlargement process comes to a conclusion, they will all share borders with the EU.
  Nevertheless, many European politicians wonder whether there is not a significant barrier between candidate country Poland and its neighbour Ukraine. An invisible wall between new democrats and political swashbucklers, between a state that is able to conform to the rule of law and the market economy and one beset by autocratic abuse of power and ingrained corruption. These doubts about our future neighbours apply all the more to giant Russia, which is half European and half Asian.
  
  The cultural divide between Central Europe and the former Soviet republics does not merely exist in the minds of politicians, but is a subject of investigation by numerous scholars, who trace the origins of the divide to the schism between Rome and Constantinople in 1054. Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment contributed to the evolution of a value system in the Latin part of Europe that supports such concepts as democracy, rule of law and private initiative. These values even survived in Central European countries that laboured under the yoke of Communism for forty years. In the Byzantine part of Europe, however, these humanistic values proved no match for the centuries-old traditions of serfdom and collectivism. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, says Samuel Huntington, the best-known author in this school of thought, Europe discovered the Velvet Curtain of cultural difference.
  
  The most alarming aspect of this cultural divide is that it also cuts across the current enlargement process. Candidate countries Rumania and Bulgaria are on the wrong, i.e. orthodox side of the divide. This means that the enlargement of the EU may not even reach as far as the Balkan peninsula, in which case there is little hope for other countries aspiring to become candidates.
  
  In the current group of candidate countries, Rumania and Bulgaria are clearly well behind the other candidates, which lends credibility to the theory of a cultural divide. The EU government leaders were generous when they stated, in 1997, that these countries came close to meeting the requirements of democracy, rule of law and protection of minorities. Both in Rumania and Bulgaria serious politicians are no match for populists during elections. The fight against corruption has barely come off the ground. Minorities such as the Roma have every reason to complain.
  
  This raises the question of whether Rumania and Bulgaria would be able to function properly in the legal community that is constituted by the EU. The EU is the most successful of all international organisations for the very reason that its member states usually comply with the rules that have been agreed upon. Thanks to this respect for supranational law, the EU is also a security community in which the distinction between domestic and foreign policy is gradually being lifted: wars between member states have become unthinkable. An ill-considered enlargement process would undermine these foundations of integration, and also seriously jeopardise progress in any of the projects currently under way, including the construction of the political, the social and the ecological communities.
  
  However, there is some hope to be drawn from the example of Greece. After twenty years of EU membership, this country has made considerable progress both politically and economically. While there is no denying that Athens sometimes is a nuisance in Europe, it has now put things in order to such an extent that it has even been admitted to the monetary union. Greek politicians have also begun to realise that there is more to be gained from consultation than from military threats in settling conflicts with arch-rival Turkey. This has been achieved even though Greece is on the wrong, i.e. Byzantine, side of the Huntington divide. This demonstrates that cultural identities and value systems are less immutable than political anthropologists would have us believe.
  
  Geopolitics
  There is no reason, therefore, to assume that the enlargement of the EU will inevitably get stuck in a clash of cultures. This is why the enlargement process should be given a fair chance, even on the Balkans. The success of the process is one of factors that will determine whether Ukraine, Belarus and Moldavia can ever become EU members.
  
  The other factor is Russia. Most politicians find it difficult to conceive of Russia as a member of the EU, if only because of its size. With its 150 million people and its immense surface area, Russia would simply seem too big to fit in. Even as a democratic, constitutional state Russia would obliterate any sense of balance within the EU. At least, this is the view expressed in a joint study completed in June 2000 by a think tank organised by Joschka Fischer’s Ministry and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The authors expressly state that they do not represent the position of any government on this matter and that their study 'may neither be quoted nor reproduced'. Their purpose is to exclude the possibility of Russian EU membership once and for all. Even an EU that comprises Central Europe, the Balkans and Turkey, they argue, would be less heterogeneous than Russia alone. In other words: by taking Russia on board, the EU would import more contradictions than it would be able to cope with.
  
  We too find it hard to imagine an EU that stretches all the way to Vladivostok. In political debates we dismiss pleas for Russian EU membership as naïve, voiced as they so often are by people who are completely ignorant of what EU membership involves. For example, the implementation of eighty thousand pages of legislation, as well as the ability to enforce the laws formulated in those pages. Even so, thinkers such as Timothy Garton Ash and Norman Davies advise us to leave the door to Russian EU membership open. 'Never say never' is their motto.
  
  Davies, historiographer of the European idea, has thought out a scenario that is both ominous and optimistic: "Putin is waging a campaign to restore the Russian Empire, albeit in a different form. This campaign is likely to fail, as Moscow no longer has the means to impose its will on the former Soviet republics. After such a failure, Russia might well disintegrate. Vladivostok is further from Moscow than Madrid. And if the Russian colossus fell apart, a democratic and much smaller Russia would, quite conceivably, initiate the process of accession to the EU. But that would not happen until at least fifty years from now."
  
  The diplomatic sensitivity of the French-German study not quoted above does not arise from the fact that it places a Russian EU membership under a taboo. Many policy makers in Moscow would agree, after all, that EU membership is no more than a thought experiment. The point is that the French-German co-production also states emphatically that the EU should not invite Belarus or Ukraine to become members either. Not because these countries are intrinsically incompatible with the EU, but rather because their membership would create a sense of isolation in Moscow. That would be a geopolitical blunder.
  
  Moreover, the authors claim, public support for the current enlargement process will crumble in proportion to the speed at which EU contours fade. The current candidate countries, the Balkans and Turkey must be enabled to join by expressly ruling out the accession of others. In his Humboldt speech Joschka Fischer resorted to a similar incantation to appease the German Länder that object to their powers being eroded by Brussels. He won their support for his aim to establish a European government by simultaneously pleading for restrictions on the competences of such a government.
  
  In Warsaw politicians view the border issue from a very different perspective than in Berlin or Paris. The Polish debate has taken a remarkable turn. Until some years ago Polish politicians in Brussels invariably stated that their eastern border marked a cultural divide. This was intended to convey the following message: we are true Europeans, while further east barbarism reigns supreme. Now that the Polish accession to the EU is only a matter of time, all the country’s politicians, whatever their political colour, have become very romantic about their connections with neighbouring Ukraine. Again, the reason is clear: Poland does not like the idea of permanently being the EU's frontier state. Polish politicians emphasise in chorus that the EU is an open concept. They are consistent in their defence of this view. In that concept, there is even a place for a democratic Russia, says – amongst others - Bronislaw Geremek, former dissident, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and celebrated historian. Indeed, one of the reasons why Brussels should leave the door open to Ukraine is to support democracy in Russia: 'The fate of Putin’s imperial idea depends on Ukraine. Without Ukraine, there is no Russian Empire.' An independent Ukraine seduced to opt for democracy would prevent Putin and his supporters from establishing a new czarist regime. It would rescue democratic tendencies in Russia. Would Berlin and Paris have the courage to play that card? 'The EU lacks an Ostpolitik,’ says Geremek. ‘Is it Russia first or is it democracy first? In my view a Russian Empire would be dangerous for both the EU and the Russian people.'
  
  Geremek’s opposition to the view that the EU should give up Ukraine so as not to stress relations with Russia is convincing. If Europe were to forsake the few democrats in Kiev it would cast 50 million Ukrainians into outer darkness and abandon them to many more years of suffering under the corrupt regime of president Kuchma – or worse. In Belarus, too, the chances of a democratic, Otpor-like revolt to oust the potentate Lukashenko in Minsk depend on what perspective the EU is prepared to offer the democratic opposition.
  
  Whatever prospect Europe holds out for Ukraine and Belarus, it is clear that it will not include guaranteed EU membership. It may take as much as a generation before these countries, as well as the EU, are suitably prepared for such a step, and before Moscow realises that it too stands to gain more than it stands to lose from stability and prosperity in Ukraine and Belarus. Nonetheless, future European generations should be allowed to make their own choices. History has taught us that no border in the world is as volatile as the eastern border of Europe.
  
  Border regime
  The blueprints drawn up by Joschka Fischer and his advisors for the future of Europe are forcing other politicians to face the challenges that the EU is being confronted with. Nevertheless, it would be pretentious to assume that we could ever produce a definitive design for the architecture, the powers and the borders of the EU, even if only to reassure voters. Finalities do not satisfy the intellect. Even the federation envisaged by Fischer is a snapshot of the current balance of power between Germany and France. Berlin and Paris regard the EU as, respectively, an alternative to, and an extension of, their national ambitions. By proposing a compromise between these two approaches, Fischer has certainly made a daring move, but not one that could ever predetermine future developments. The future must remain open.
  
  Considering the ultimate borders of the EU is a useful exercise, particularly because it highlights a number of gaps, especially in European policy concerning countries that have no chance of becoming member states in the near future. Once Poland is an EU member, that country will close its borders to Ukrainians. For Poland will adopt the Schengen regime, which prevents Ukrainian nationals from entering the EU without a visa. And most Ukrainians can afford neither the money nor the time to apply for a visa and collect it from a Western embassy.
  
  The Schengen regulations are intended to keep contraband, criminals and illegal immigrants out of the EU. The question is whether the adverse consequences of Schengen for the economic, cultural and family ties between Poland and Ukraine should be taken for granted. Can we really improve security in the EU by increasing the isolation of our neighbours in the east? While accepting the stringent EU requirements on customs inspection, Polish politicians also call for prompt and cheap multiple entry visas, at least for inhabitants of the border regions.
  
  Politicians must guard against the reflex to seal off the EU from the big and evil outside world. This has become all the more urgent now that terrorism, after the attacks on the United States, has risen to the top of the European agenda. The most important lesson to be learnt from 11 September is that we cannot afford to allow any blind spots on the world map, and certainly not on the map of Europe. We should redouble our efforts to offer a credible perspective of stability and prosperity to the unstable fringes of Europe. This calls for exchanges rather than isolation, and for porous rather than hermetically sealed borders. For the sake of our own security.
  
  We should try to see our borders not as a form of armour but rather as a skin through which we can breathe. The more successful we are in this respect, the sooner the issue of the EU’s ultimate borders will lose its threatening undertones. That would facilitate a more open-minded and in-depth debate on the issue; one in which thinkers could extend borderlines drawn by politicians. And vice versa.
  
  Joost Lagendijk / Jan Marinus Wiersma
  Members of the European Parliament for GroenLinks and PvdA, respectively
  
  The quotations are from interviews conducted by the authors in preparation for their book 'Brussels – Warsaw – Kiev, in search of the borders of the European Union,' to be published by Balans publishers towards the end of November.
  ISBN 90 5018 565 7
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  • 2002.06.26 | Роман ShaRP

    Re: Цікаві досліди.

    Що я зрозумів, так це те, що Україні закидається авторитарний, а не демократичний стиль керівництва, корупція, але то тільки по-друге.
    
    Робиться цікааааааааааааааве припущення, що головний "культурний кордон" -- ... у православ*ї.
    
    Себто, автор статті, посилаючись на якогось теоретика, намагається довести, що саме по розподілу "православ*я-католицізм" і полягає та межа, що поділяє Європу від не-Європи.
    
    "Православним" країнам приписується зовсім інакший, неєвропейський, недемократичний стиль життя (це пов*язується з буцімто превалюванням колективізму над персональними свободами) ...
    
    Щось він там навіть про Грецію (бо православна!) городить, але заявляє, що надія таки є.
    
    Пробачте, на більше мого інгліша поки не вистачає. Там ще про Рашу було, але мені то вже не цікаво.
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    • 2002.06.26 | Kostya Poroh

      Отож і кажу.

      До чого тут православ"я? Це інсинуації для того, щоб ми відчули себе приниженими, *проблемними*, не тими, не*европейцями*, казлами. Це не можна залищати, треба прямо казати, що не релігія, ні історія не мають відношення до принципів закладених прабатьками ЕС Монне і ін. Переважна релігія не є пунктом угод ЕС, немає цього і в Е. Парламенті, немає у принципах Ради Европи. Крім того, ніхто не може змінити історію, тому це не є *фактором* при вирішенні европейських питань. Наостаннє, українці не завинили перед країнами ЕС, а врятовували їх від навал і навіть визволяли. Наша континентальність не є гріхом.

    • 2002.06.29 | АВ

      Андрей Буковский...

      "Россия, которой не было - 2".
      
      Там так и пишется, православие - тормоз.
      
      А как по мне, то католичество - тормоз, а протестантство, православие и иудаизм - двигатели.

  • 2002.06.26 | VJ

    Re: European Union.

    Дуже важливим на мою думку є розуміння ,що від вибору України залежить майбутнє не тільки українців ,але і народів Европи у цілому, а також Росії.
    >Indeed, one of the reasons why Brussels should leave the door open to Ukraine is to support democracy in Russia: 'The fate of Putin’s imperial idea depends on Ukraine. Without Ukraine, there is no Russian Empire.' An independent Ukraine seduced to opt for democracy would prevent Putin and his supporters from establishing a new czarist regime. It would rescue democratic tendencies in Russia.>
    
    Прагнення запобігти відновленню Імперії ,і тим самим забезпечити спокій на континенті для наступних поколінь,без сумніву подолає ті релігійні і соціяльні відмінності.
    Авторитаризм і імперські тенденції Росії тільки поліпшують шанси України у справі долучення до EU.
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    • 2002.06.26 | Kostya Poroh

      Чи є релігійні вілмінності перешкодою?

      Закиди про "культурні відмінності" безглузді. Німеччина до 50х років була ДУЖЕ БІДНОЮ країною. Румунія зараз ДУЖЕ бідна (і православна), а вони на це не звертають уваги. Ці інсинуації про історію і *історичні* відмінності перекладаються для мене так:
      
      WE DON'T CARE!
      WE DON'T WANT YOU!
      DON'T BOTHER US!
      
      А щодо Росії, так це теж нецікаво: Яке відношення має інтеграція з ЕС до розвитку в Росії? Ці закиди я перекладаю так:
      
      MIND YOU OWN RUSSIAN BUSINESS!
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      • 2002.06.26 | VJ

        Яке відношення має інтеграція з ЕС до розвитку в Росії? ?

        Саме про це говориться у статті, приведеній Вами.
        Правда, Україна виступає тут не як гравець, а як "козирна карта" у грі з Росією.
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        • 2002.06.26 | Kostya Poroh

          Я не хочу щоб моя країна гралася.

          Нам кажуть, "ви козирна карта", а ми не карта. Для мене це означало б посилання нас далеко. Або так: европейці хочуть нас створити заслоном, яких прикривав би їх заднє місце (східні кордони). При чому я не кажу, що східні кордони це заднє місце, але з їх риторики це випливає.
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          • 2002.06.26 | VJ

            Кожен грає за себе..

            Европейці(росіяни і американці також) роблять так, щоб було добре їм.
            Тільки ці дивні українці "хочуть"..., але хочуть також щоб те зробив за них хтось інший.Так не буває.
            Беззубість української зовнішньої просто дратує.:-(((((((((((((((((
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            • 2002.06.26 | Kostya Poroh

              Як на мене, то це просто відволікання уваги..

              Кожен грає за себе, але не кожен каже "милі, давайте ми вами покористуємось, якщо вам так вже хочеться з нами спілкуватись!"
              
              "Проевропейський вибір" це створення міфу. Такої опції як ЕС немає. Міф цікавий правда.
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              • 2002.06.27 | Andrij

                Re: Як на мене, то це просто відволікання уваги..

                Kostya Poroh писав(ла):
                > Кожен грає за себе, але не кожен каже "милі, давайте ми вами покористуємось, якщо вам так вже хочеться з нами спілкуватись!"
                
                З нами розмовлятимуть так, як ми самі того хочемо. Як би ви розмовляли з країною, що разів у 20 бідніша за вас та хоче до вас приєднатись? ЕС ще дуже добре до нас ставляться. Гляньте на ту ж Прибалтику. Ті ж самі початкові умови, але вони вже скоро будуть членами ЄС. Українці навіть не помічають, наскільки злочинною є їхня влада, що довела їх до такого стану. І знов голосують за ту ж саму владу. Ну не дебіли? Треба дійсно забути про ЄС за таких умов.
                
                >
                > "Проевропейський вибір" це створення міфу. Такої опції як ЕС немає. Міф цікавий правда.
                
                Така опція є, але за умови некримінального уряду. Україна мала такий уряд 18 місяців з майже 11 років. При цьому прокуратура, міліція, СБУ так і залишались кримінальними усі 11 років.

      • 2002.06.27 | Роман ShaRP

        Re: Про Румунію та Болгарію у оригіналі згадується

        Автор сумнівається, чи зможуть вони стати "справжньою Європою".

• 2002.06.25 | Kostya Poroh

  J. Fischer. From Confederacy to Federation. (2000)

  "From Confederacy to Federation - Thoughts on the finality of European integration"
  Speech by Joschka Fischer at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 12 May 2000
  
  Fifty years ago almost to the day, Robert Schuman presented his vision of a "European Federation" for the preservation of peace. This heralded a completely new era in the history of Europe. European integration was the response to centuries of a precarious balance of powers on this continent which again and again resulted in terrible hegemonic wars culminating in the two World Wars between 1914 and 1945. The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a rejection which took the form of closer meshing of vital interests and the transfer of nation-state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions.
  
  Fifty years on, Europe, the process of European integration, is probably the biggest political challenge facing the states and peoples involved, because its success or failure, indeed even just the stagnation of this process of integration, will be of crucial importance to the future of each and every one of us, but especially to the future of the young generation. And it is this process of European integration that is now being called into question by many people; it is viewed as a bureaucratic affair run by a faceless, soulless Eurocracy in Brussels at best boring, at worst dangerous.
  
  Not least for this reason I should like to thank you for the opportunity to mull over in public a few more fundamental and conceptional thoughts on the future shape of Europe. Allow me, if you will, to cast aside for the duration of this speech the mantle of German Foreign Minister and member of the Government a mantle which is occasionally rather restricting when it comes to reflecting on things in public although I know it is not really possible to do so. But what I want to talk to you about today is not the operative challenges facing European policy over the next few months, not the current intergovernmental conference, the EU's enlargement to the east or all those other important issues we have to resolve today and tomorrow, but rather the possible strategic prospects for European integration far beyond the coming decade and the intergovernmental conference.
  
  So let's be clear: this is not a declaration of the Federal Government's position, but a contribution to a discussion long begun in the public arena about the "finality" of European integration, and I am making it simply as a staunch European and German parliamentarian. I am all the more pleased, therefore, that, on the initiative of the Portuguese presidency, the last informal EU Foreign Ministers' Meeting in the Azores held a long, detailed and extremely productive discussion on this very topic, the finality of European integration, a discussion that will surely have consequences.
  
  Ten years after the end of the cold war and right at the start of the age of globalization one can literally almost feel that the problems and challenges facing Europe have wound themselves into a knot which will be very hard to undo within the existing framework: the introduction of the single currency, the EU's incipient eastern enlargement, the crisis of the last EU Commission, the poor acceptance of the European Parliament and low turn-outs for European elections, the wars in the Balkans and the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy not only define what has been achieved but also determine the challenges still to be overcome.
  
  Quo vadis Europa? is the question posed once again by the history of our continent. And for many reasons the answer Europeans will have to give, if they want to do well by themselves and their children, can only be this: onwards to the completion of European integration. A step backwards, even just standstill or contentment with what has been achieved, would demand a fatal price of all EU member states and of all those who want to become members; it would demand a fatal price above all of our people. This is particularly true for Germany and the Germans.
  
  The task ahead of us will be anything but easy and will require all our strength; in the coming decade we will have to enlarge the EU to the east and south-east, and this will in the end mean a doubling in the number of members. And at the same time, if we are to be able to meet this historic challenge and integrate the new member states without substantially denting the EU's capacity for action, we must put into place the last brick in the building of European integration, namely political integration.
  
  The need to organize these two processes in parallel is undoubtedly the biggest challenge the Union has faced since its creation. But no generation can choose the challenges it is tossed by history, and this is the case here too. Nothing less than the end of the cold war and of the forced division of Europe is facing the EU and thus us with this task, and so today we need the same visionary energy and pragmatic ability to assert ourselves as was shown by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman after the end of the Second World War. And like then, after the end of this last great European war, which was as almost always also a Franco-German war, this latest stage of European Union, namely eastern enlargement and the completion of political integration, will depend decisively on France and Germany.
  
  Two historic decisions in the middle of last century fundamentally altered Europe's fate for the better: firstly, the USA's decision to stay in Europe, and secondly France´s and Germany's commitment to the principle of integration, beginning with economic links.
  
  The idea of European integration and its implementation not only gave rise to an entirely new order in Europe to be more exact, in Western Europe but European history underwent a fundamental about-turn. Just compare the history of Europe in the first half of the 20th century with that in the second half and you will immediately understand what I mean. Germany's perspective in particular teaches a host of lessons, because it makes clear what our country really owes to the concept and implementation of European integration.
  
  This new principle of the European system of states, which could almost be called revolutionary, emanated from France and her two great statesmen Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet. Every stage of its gradual realization, from the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community to the creation of the single market and the introduction of the single currency, depended essentially on the alliance of Franco-German interests. This was never exclusive, however, but always open to other European states, and so it should remain until finality has been achieved.
  
  European integration has proved phenomenally successful. The whole thing had just one decisive shortcoming, forced upon it by history: it was not the whole of Europe, but merely its free part in the West. For fifty years the division of Europe cut right through Germany and Berlin, and on the eastern side of the Wall and barbed wire an indispensable part of Europe, without which European integration could never be completed, waited for its chance to take part in the European unification process. That chance came with the end of the division of Europe and Germany in 1989/90.
  
  Robert Schuman saw this quite clearly back in 1963: "We must build the united Europe not only in the interest of the free nations, but also in order to be able to admit the peoples of Eastern Europe into this community if, freed from the constraints under which they live, they want to join and seek our moral support. We owe them the example of a unified, fraternal Europe. Every step we take along this road will mean a new opportunity for them. They need our help with the transformation they have to achieve. It is our duty to be prepared."
  
  Following the collapse of the Soviet empire the EU had to open up to the east, otherwise the very idea of European integration would have undermined itself and eventually selfdestructed. Why? A glance at the former Yugoslavia shows us the consequences, even if they would not always and everywhere have been so extreme. An EU restricted to Western Europe would forever have had to deal with a divided system in Europe: in Western Europe integration, in Eastern Europe the old system of balance with its continued national orientation, constraints of coalition, traditional interest-led politics and the permanent danger of nationalist ideologies and confrontations. A divided system of states in Europe without an overarching order would in the long term make Europe a continent of uncertainty, and in the medium term these traditional lines of conflict would shift from Eastern Europe into the EU again. If that happened Germany in particular would be the big loser. The geopolitical reality after 1989 left no serious alternative to the eastward enlargement of the European institutions, and this has never been truer than now in the age of globalization.
  
  In response to this truly historic turnaround the EU consistently embarked upon a far-reaching process of reform:
  - In Maastricht one of the three essential sovereign rights of the modern nation-state currency, internal security and external security was for the first time transferred to the sole responsibility of a European institution. The introduction of the euro was not only the crowning-point of economic integration, it was also a profoundly political act, because a currency is not just another economic factor but also symbolizes the power of the sovereign who guarantees it. A tension has emerged between the communitarization of economy and currency on the one hand and the lack of political and democratic structures on the other, a tension which might lead to crises within the EU if we do not take productive steps to make good the shortfall in political integration and democracy, thus completing the process of integration.
  
  - The European Council in Tampere marked the beginning of a new far-reaching integration project, namely the development of a common area of justice and internal security, making the Europe of the citizens a tangible reality. But there is even more to this new integration project: common laws can be a highly integrative force.
  
  - It was not least the war in Kosovo that prompted the European states to take further steps to strengthen their joint capacity for action on foreign policy, agreeing in Cologne and Helsinki on a new goal: the development of a Common Security and Defence Policy. With this the Union has taken the next step following the euro. For how in the long term can it be justified that countries inextricably linked by monetary union and by economic and political realities do not also face up together to external threats and together maintain their security?
  
  - Agreement was also reached in Helsinki on a concrete plan for the enlargement of the EU. With these agreements the external borders of the future EU are already emerging. It is foreseeable that the European Union will have 27, 30 or even more members at the end of the enlargement process, almost as many as the CSCE at its inception.
  
  Thus we in Europe are currently facing the enormously difficult task of organizing two major projects in parallel:
  1. Enlargement as quickly as possible. This poses difficult problems of adaptation both for the acceding states and for the EU itself. It also triggers fear and anxiety in our citizens: are their jobs at risk? Will enlargement make Europe even less transparent and comprehensible for its citizens? As seriously as we must tackle these questions, we must never lose sight of the historic dimension of eastern enlargement. For this is a unique opportunity to unite our continent, wracked by war for centuries, in peace, security, democracy and prosperity. Enlargement is a supreme national interest, especially for Germany. It will be possible to lastingly overcome the risks and temptations objectively inherent in Germany's dimensions and central situation through the enlargement and simultaneous deepening of the EU. Moreover, enlargement consider the EU's enlargement to the south is a pan-European programme for growth. Enlargement will bring tremendous benefits for German companies and for employment. Germany must therefore continue its advocacy of rapid eastern enlargement. At the same time, enlargement must be effected carefully and in accordance with the Helsinki decision.
  
  2. Europe's capacity to act. The institutions of the EU were created for six member states. They just about still function with fifteen. While the first step towards reform, to be taken at the upcoming intergovernmental conference and introducing increased majority voting, is important, it will not in the long term be sufficient for integration as a whole. The danger will then be that enlargement to include 27 or 30 members will hopelessly overload the EU's ability to absorb, with its old institutions and mechanisms, even with increased use of majority decisions, and that it could lead to severe crises. But this danger, it goes without saying, is no reason not to push on with enlargement as quickly as possible; rather it shows the need for decisive, appropriate institutional reform so that the Union's capacity to act is maintained even after enlargement. The consequence of the irrefutable enlargement of the EU is therefore erosion or integration.
  
  Fulfilling these two tasks is at the heart of the current intergovernmental conference. The EU has pledged to be able to admit new members by 1 January 2003. Following the conclusion of Agenda 2000, the aim now is to put in place the institutional preconditions for the next round of enlargement. Resolving the three key questions the composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council and particularly the extension of majority decisions is indispensable for the smooth continuation of the process of enlargement. As the next practical step these three questions now have absolute priority.
  
  Crucial as the intergovernmental conference is as the next step for the future of the EU, we must, given Europe's situation, already begin to think beyond the enlargement process and consider how a future "large" EU can function as it ought to function and what shape it must therefore take. And that's what I want to do now.
  
  **
  Permit me therefore to remove my Foreign Minister's hat altogether in order to suggest a few ideas both on the nature of this so-called finality of Europe and on how we can approach and eventually achieve this goal. And all the Eurosceptics on this and the other side of the Channel would be well advised not to immediately produce the big headlines again, because firstly this is a personal vision of a solution to the European problems. And, secondly, we are talking here about the long term, far beyond the current intergovernmental conference. So no one need be afraid of these ideas.
  
  Enlargement will render imperative a fundamental reform of the European institutions. Just what would a European Council with thirty heads of state and government be like? Thirty presidencies? How long will Council meetings actually last? Days, maybe even weeks? How, with the system of institutions that exists today, are thirty states supposed to balance interests, take decisions and then actually act? How can one prevent the EU from becoming utterly intransparent, compromises from becoming stranger and more incomprehensible, and the citizens' acceptance of the EU from eventually hitting rock bottom?
  
  Question upon question, but there is a very simple answer: the transition from a union of states to full parliamentarization as a European Federation, something Robert Schuman demanded 50 years ago. And that means nothing less than a European Parliament and a European government which really do exercise legislative and executive power within the Federation. This Federation will have to be based on a constituent treaty.
  
  I am well aware of the procedural and substantive problems that will have to be resolved before this goal can be attained. For me, however, it is entirely clear that Europe will only be able to play its due role in global economic and political competition if we move forward courageously. The problems of the 21st century cannot be solved with the fears and formulae of the 19th and 20th centuries.
  
  Of course, this simple solution is immediately criticized as being utterly unworkable. Europe is not a new continent, so the criticism goes, but full of different peoples, cultures, languages and histories. The nation-states are realities that cannot simply be erased, and the more globalization and Europeanization create superstructures and anonymous actors remote from the citizens, the more the people will cling on to the nation-states that give them comfort and security.
  
  Now I share all these objections, because they are correct. That is why it would be an irreparable mistake in the construction of Europe if one were to try to complete political integration against the existing national institutions and traditions rather than by involving them. Any such endeavour would be doomed to failure by the historical and cultural environment in Europe. Only if European integration takes the nation-states along with it into such a Federation, only if their institutions are not devalued or even made to disappear, will such a project be workable despite all the huge difficulties. In other words: the existing concept of a federal European state replacing the old nation-states and their democracies as the new sovereign power shows itself to be an artificial construct which ignores the established realities in Europe. The completion of European integration can only be successfully conceived if it is done on the basis of a division of sovereignty between Europe and the nation-state. Precisely this is the idea underlying the concept of "subsidiarity", a subject that is currently being discussed by everyone and understood by virtually no one.
  
  So what must one understand by the term "division of sovereignty"? As I said, Europe will not emerge in a political vacuum, and so a further fact in our European reality is therefore the different national political cultures and their democratic publics, separated in addition by linguistic boundaries. A European Parliament must therefore always represent two things: a Europe of the nation-states and a Europe of the citizens. This will only be possible if this European Parliament actually brings together the different national political elites and then also the different national publics.
  
  In my opinion, this can be done if the European parliament has two chambers. One will be for elected members who are also members of their national parliaments. Thus there will be no clash between national parliaments and the European parliament, between the nation-state and Europe. For the second chamber a decision will have to be made between the Senate model, with directly-elected senators from the member states, and a chamber of states along the lines of Germany's Bundesrat. In the United States, every state elects two senators; in our Bundesrat, in contrast, there are different numbers of votes.
  
  Similarly, there are two options for the European executive, or government. Either one can decide in favour of developing the European Council into a European government, i.e. the European government is formed from the national governments, or taking the existing Commission structure as a starting-point one can opt for the direct election of a president with far-reaching executive powers. But there are also various other possibilities between these two poles.
  
  Now objections will be raised that Europe is already much too complicated and much too intransparent for the citizen, and here we are wanting to make it even more complicated. But the intention is quite the opposite. The division of sovereignty between the Union and the nation-states requires a constituent treaty which lays down what is to be regulated at European level and what has still to be regulated at national level. The majority of regulations at EU level are in part the result of inductive communitarization as per the "Monnet method" and an expression of inter-state compromise within today's EU. There should be a clear definition of the competences of the Union and the nation-states respectively in a European constituent treaty, with core sovereignties and matters which absolutely have to be regulated at European level being the domain of the Federation, whereas everything else would remain the responsibility of the nation-states. This would be a lean European Federation, but one capable of action, fully sovereign yet based on self-confident nation-states, and it would also be a Union which the citizens could understand, because it would have made good its shortfall on democracy.
  
  However, all this will not mean the abolition of the nation-state. Because even for the finalized Federation the nation-state, with its cultural and democratic traditions, will be irreplaceable in ensuring the legitimation of a union of citizens and states that is wholly accepted by the people. I say this not least with an eye to our friends in the United Kingdom, because I know that the term "federation" irritates many Britons. But to date I have been unable to come up with another word. We do not wish to irritate anyone.
  
  Even when European finality is attained, we will still be British or German, French or Polish. The nation-states will continue to exist and at European level they will retain a much larger role than the Länder have in Germany. And in such a Federation the principle of subsidiarity will be constitutionally enshrined.
  
  These three reforms the solution of the democracy problem and the need for fundamental reordering of competences both horizontally, i.e. among the European institutions, and vertically, i.e. between Europe, the nation-state and the regions - will only be able to succeed if Europe is established anew with a constitution. In other words: through the realization of the project of a European constitution centred around basic, human and civil rights, an equal division of powers between the European institutions and a precise delineation between European and nation-state level. The main axis for such a European constitution will be the relationship between the Federation and the nation-state. Let me not be misunderstood: this has nothing whatsoever to do with a return to renationalisation, quite the contrary.
  
  The question which is becoming more and more urgent today is this: can this vision of a Federation be achieved through the existing method of integration, or must this method itself, the central element of the integration process to date, be cast into doubt?
  
  In the past, European integration was based on the "Monnet method" with its communitarization approach in European institutions and policy. This gradual process of integration, with no blueprint for the final state, was conceived in the 1950s for the economic integration of a small group of countries. Successful as it was in that scenario, this approach has proved to be of only limited use for the political integration and democratization of Europe. Where it was not possible for all EU members to move ahead, smaller groups of countries of varying composition took the lead, as was the case with Economic and Monetary Union and with Schengen.
  
  Does the answer to the twin challenge of enlargement and deepening, then, lie in such a differentiation, an enhanced cooperation in some areas? Precisely in an enlarged and thus necessarily more heterogeneous Union, further differentiation will be inevitable. To facilitate this process is thus one of the priorities of the intergovernmental conference.
  
  However, increasing differentiation will also entail new problems: a loss of European identity, of internal coherence, as well as the danger of an internal erosion of the EU, should ever larger areas of intergovernmental cooperation loosen the nexus of integration. Even today a crisis of the Monnet method can no longer be overlooked, a crisis that cannot be solved according to the method's own logic.
  
  That is why Jacques Delors, Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing have recently tried to find new answers to this dilemma. Delors' idea is that a "federation of nation-states", comprising the six founding states of the European Community, should conclude a "treaty within the treaty" with a view to making far-reaching reforms in the European institutions. Schmidt and Giscard's ideas are in a similar vein, though they place the Euro-11 states at the centre, rather than just the six founding states. As early as 1994 Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble proposed the creation of a "core Europe", but it was stillborn, as it were, because it presupposed an exclusive, closed "core", even omitting the founding state Italy, rather than a magnet of integration open to all.
  
  So if the alternative for the EU in the face of the irrefutable challenge posed by eastern enlargement is indeed either erosion or integration, and if clinging to a federation of states would mean standstill with all its negative repercussions, then, under pressure from the conditions and the crises provoked by them, the EU will at some time within the next ten years be confronted with this alternative: will a majority of member states take the leap into full integration and agree on a European constitution? Or, if that doesn't happen, will a smaller group of member states take this route as an avant-garde, i.e. will a centre of gravity emerge comprising a few member states which are staunchly committed to the European ideal and are in a position to push ahead with political integration? The question then would simply be: when will be the right time? Who will be involved? And will this centre of gravity emerge within or outside the framework provided by the treaties? One thing at least is certain: no European project will succeed in future either without the closest Franco-German cooperation.
  
  Given this situation, one could imagine Europe's further development far beyond the coming decade in two or three stages:
  First the expansion of reinforced cooperation between those states which want to cooperate more closely than others, as is already the case with Economic and Monetary Union and Schengen. We can make progress in this way in many areas: on the further development of Euro-11 to a politico-economic union, on environmental protection, the fight against crime, the development of common immigration and asylum policies and of course on the foreign and security policy. In this context it is of paramount importance that closer cooperation should not be misunderstood as the end of integration.
  
  One possible interim step on the road to completing political integration could then later be the formation of a centre of gravity. Such a group of states would conclude a new European framework treaty, the nucleus of a constitution of the Federation. On the basis of this treaty, the Federation would develop its own institutions, establish a government which within the EU should speak with one voice on behalf of the members of the group on as many issues as possible, a strong parliament and a directly elected president. Such a centre of gravity would have to be the avant-garde, the driving force for the completion of political integration and should from the start comprise all the elements of the future federation.
  
  I am certainly aware of the institutional problems with regard to the current EU that such a centre of gravity would entail. That is why it would be critically important to ensure that the EU acquis is not jeopardized, that the union is not divided and the bond holding it together are not damaged, either in political or in legal terms. Mechanisms would have to be developed which permit the members of the centre of gravity to cooperate smoothly with others in the larger EU.
  
  The question of which countries will take part in such a project, the EU founding members, the Euro-11 members or another group, is impossible to answer today. One thing must be clear when considering the option of forming a centre of gravity: this avant-garde must never be exclusive but must be open to all member states and candidate countries, should they desire to participate at a certain point in time. For those who wish to participate but do not fulfil the requirements, there must be a possibility to be drawn closer in. Transparency and the opportunity for all EU member states to participate would be essential factors governing the acceptance and feasibility of the project. This must be true in particular with regard to the candidate countries. For it would be historically absurd and utterly stupid if Europe, at the very time when it is at long last reunited, were to be divided once again.
  
  Such a centre of gravity must also have an active interest in enlargement and it must be attractive to the other members. If one follows Hans-Dietrich Genscher's tenet that no member state can be forced to go farther than it is able or willing to go, but that those who do not want to go any farther cannot prevent others from doing so, then the centre of gravity will emerge within the treaties. Otherwise it will emerge outside them.
  
  The last step will then be completion of integration in a European Federation. Let's not misunderstand each other: closer cooperation does not automatically lead to full integration, either by the centre of gravity or straight away by the majority of members. Initially, enhanced cooperation means nothing more than increased intergovernmentalization under pressure from the facts and the shortcomings of the "Monnet Method". The steps towards a constituent treaty - and exactly that will be the precondition for full integration - require a deliberate political act to reestablish Europe.
  
  This, ladies and gentlemen, is my personal vision for the future: from closer cooperation towards a European constituent treaty and the completion of Robert Schuman's great idea of a European Federation. This could be the way ahead!
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  • 2002.06.26 | Nimec'

    Той самий документ німецькою мовою

    Той самий документ німецькою мовою
    http://www.aussenministerium.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/reden/2000/r000512a.pdf

  • 2002.06.26 | Augusto

    А де тут в виступі тов. Фішера взагалі згадується Україна?

    Я не думаю, що тов. Фішер має якісь особливі симпатії/антіпатії до України взагалі.
    Це Вірсма згадував про якусь іншу нагоду (або згадка зашифрована і може бути прочитана лише з застосуванням ***** (підставити самому)).

• 2002.06.26 | Andrij

  Re: Хороше висвітлення, дякую

  Kostya Poroh писав(ла):
  > Більше того, як видно зі статей Йошки Фішера і інших політиків Союзу, нам закидають "культурну" несумісність. Тобто, дискусія починаєтся з історичних (нібито) передумов, і закінчується тим, що українці якісь не такі. У той же час, є своєрідна доброзичливість, але бачення України як інтегрованого партнера ЕС немає.
  
  НУ що ви хочете від німецького евро-бюрократа?
  
  По-перше, він є типовий соціаліст. В Німеччині соціалістична традиція тягнеться не тільки з соціал-демократів, а й націонал-соціалістів. Тобто, для мислення Йошки Фішера расизм та всілякі "культурні" відмінності є істотна засада його соціалістичного виховання. Для німців, та й для європейців загалом, дуже важливі дрібнички вашого походження.
  
  По-друге, Україна й дійсно відмінна від решти Європи. Це ж прикіл, коли опозицію треба вмовляти "попротестувати" проти незаконного захоплення влади. Ну дорогенькі, ось, ось, захопили в вас там владу в парламенті, бачте? Давайте, всі разом, скажімо "ні" такому зухвальству. А воно не йде.
  
  По-третє, Україна є найбідніша країна Європи. Хоча це може бути наслідком пункту 2. В Росії (!) середня платня вже майже $140. В Україні -- трохи більше $60. Це ж яким тупим народом треба бути, аби заробляти 1/20 від якоїсь Іспанії.
  згорнути/розгорнути гілку відповідей

  • 2002.06.26 | Адвокат ...

    Дарма Ви так про Іспанію...

    Їй бо, іспанці не винні у наших негараздах. Вони цікаві й приємні люди, до речі.
    
    ... А Ваш побіжно- зверхній спомин про них свідчить лише про те, що не такі вже інші українці від европейців...

  • 2002.06.26 | Kostya Poroh

    Вони всі такі.

    А кучмісти кажуть про інтеграцію УКРАЇНИ В ЕС! Це невигідна національна політика. Можна казати про інтеграцію З країнами ЕС, але не про входження, про яке нам може і не треба взагалі казати. Це може класний міф у противагу *інтегратоам* з Росією (бо дуже багато інтеграторів серед українців), але европейці нас посилають, і це хвакт.

  • 2002.06.26 | Patriot

    про Йошку Фішера

    Він належить до парттії "Зелених". Він так само не раз висловлювався щодо важливості Росії для німецької економіки. Тому питання вичерпане.
    Німещина історично орієнтувалася на Росію, так буде і в майбутНьому.
    як на мене, треба розвивати тісніші зв"язки з креаїнами, які більш прихильно ставляться до України (Італія, Австрія, Нідерланди). Нам треба самим хотіти в Европу, інакше ніхто нас туди тягнути не буде, а про нашу багатовекторність вже анекдоти слкадають.
    згорнути/розгорнути гілку відповідей

    • 2002.06.26 | Augusto

      Де ж вона летить, та галушка????

      Patriot писав(ла):
      
      > як на мене, треба розвивати тісніші зв"язки з креаїнами, які більш прихильно ставляться до України (Італія, Австрія, Нідерланди). Нам треба самим хотіти в Европу, інакше ніхто нас туди тягнути не буде, а про нашу багатовекторність вже анекдоти слкадають.
      
      Ніяка країна апріорно не ставиться з симпатією до України, Голандія нічим НЕ відрізняється тут від Німеччини і я маю великі сумніви, що Австрії Україна нащо небудь потрібна (найбільший жах для австріяка це угорці, це якщо хто думає, що ідеї К-К продовжують когось займати окрім пліснявих істориків), тому зовнішня політика повинна бути активною, а не просто стояння в сторонці, афуєвшими від власної крутості і чекання, що хто-небудь сам прийде. Все написане є суцільним ІМХО.
      згорнути/розгорнути гілку відповідей

      • 2002.06.26 | Patriot

        Re: Де ж вона летить, та галушка????

        я не говорив про Габсбургів. Історично Німеччина завжди орієнтувалась на Росію. В майбутньому буде вона робити те ж саме, незалежно від політики України. Ми не можемо дати німцям того що їм потрібно - нафти і газу. А про Австрію і Голандію зе було сказано до прикладу. Принайми там у пресі образ України не такий негативний , як в німецькій. Найбільш позитивним він залишається поки що в Італії.
        А про те що не треба стояти, я також говорив. Коли згадував нашу багатовекторність
        згорнути/розгорнути гілку відповідей

        • 2002.06.26 | Augusto

          І все ж десь вона кружляє.

          Patriot писав(ла):
          > Принайми там у пресі образ України не такий негативний , як в німецькій.
          
          Я читаю-читаю ту пресу, які там позітивні образи? Соціал-демократа Вірсму можна вважати палким другом України, інші цивільні так і мислять залізобетонним блоком: "Україна є житницею Росії". Більшість і не чула про існування України. На диво вихиляси тов. Кучми вивели Україну трошки з тіні, бо при всьому тому був позитивний момент: не всі погоджуються жити в умовах східної деспотії кримінально-корпоративної "держави", сильний сигнал. Другий позітив був Папа Римський, який трохи тому гамериканському мудрагелю показав, що кордони існують там, де їх проводять люди і не мають сакральної цінності, лише псіхологичну.
          Що за дивна пасивна позиція по відношенні до Заходу? Нафти нема, газу нема, гаплик? Ну і нема, що з того? В Угорщині і моря нема, а ніхто не плаче. Шлях України в Європу все ж залежить від самої України, простий приклад РФ в совіцькому дусі просуває себе в Європі: балет, виставки ікон, філармонічні гастролі, мафія, п'яні бійки, злодюжки, проституція, а з України взагалі ніякого позітиву не видно: придурок Льоня К. дає вказівку пропагувати виступ "особи схожої на президента" в Верховній Зраді закордоном! Так таких виступів в Африці двадцять штук за три цента і ще "спасибі, містер!".

    • 2002.06.26 | Kostya Poroh

      Знову, "історично"

      Patriot писав(ла):
      > Німещина історично орієнтувалася на Росію, так буде і в майбутНьому.
      *** Там що, у вас в Європі, всі так історію боготворять?
      Історія поганий прогнозист, хлоці.
      
      
      "Україна історично була часткою Росії, так буде і в майбутНьому."
      "США історично зневажали афроамериканців, так буде і в майбутНьому"
      "Польша історично мала короля, так буде і в майбутНьому."
      ...

• 2002.06.26 | VJ

  Доречі..

  Interfax Ukrainian News
  English
  (c) 2002 by Interfax International, Ltd
  
  Kyiv, June 25 (Interfax-Ukraine) - Kyiv expects conceptual changes of the EU's attitude towards Ukraine, but one should not expect too much from the forthcoming Ukraine-EU summit in Copenhagen slated for July 4-5, said Borys Tarasiuk, head of the parliamentary committee on the issues of eurointegration. In the course of the round table discussions held in Kyiv Tuesday, having marked positive changes in the EU's attitude towards Ukraine, the former Ukraine's foreign minister expressed his surprise in regard to decision to provide Ukraine with the status of the EU's neighbor together with such outsiders, as he called them, as Belarus and Moldova. According to him, this is not a well-considered invention of the EU, which bears concern and a lot questions. The Ukrainian diplomacy should undertake resolute steps in respond to the EU's actions. According to Tarasiuk, Ukraine's membership in the EU is determined by the inner conditions of Ukraine's development.
  
  Having marked the pro-European moods of the Ukrainian people and of the majority in Verkhovna Rada, Borys Tarasiuk pointed out that Ukraine needs to bring its legislation in accordance with requirements and norms existing in the EU.

• 2002.06.26 | журнал "Ї"

  Re: Висвітлення позиції ЕС щодо інтеграції України

  дозволю собі непогодитися з песимізмом щодо інтеграції в ЄС. Це Україні вирішувати, де хй бути, і саме над цим ми в журналі "Ї" працюємо. А щодо нечіткого бачення в ЄС, то вони з початку заснування Союзу і досі не знають що воно таке Європейський Союз - федерація, союз чи конфедерація.
  Як тільки кордон наблизиться до нас, то їм доведеться з нами працювати.
  згорнути/розгорнути гілку відповідей

  • 2002.06.26 | Kostya Poroh

    Україна і ЕС

    Якось один грузинський консул мені сказав свою думку, що ми і Польша, а тим більше Грузія, для них завжди будемо "сірою зоною". Я мав можливість трошки спілкуватися з французами, які в Києві працюють, і та сама риторика про культурну різницю. Чув як консультанти ТАСІС офіційно казали, що їх місія принести навчити українців культурі.
    
    Скільки я з західняками спілкуюсь, не бучу я якихось суттєвих культурних факторів. Не знаю я чому нас можуть навчити французи і німці культурного, чого ми і самі не знаємо.
    
    Тому ЕС це добрий міф, але ЕС це консенсус, тому їхня позиція важить багато. І їхня позиція не на нашу користь.
    
    Погано, якщо інтеграція з країнами ЕС підштовхне інтеграторські насторої ("куди б віддатися?"). Добре, коли це дасть альтернативу росссіянським інтеграцілністам.
    згорнути/розгорнути гілку відповідей

    • 2002.06.26 | VJ

      Re: Україна ,Польшa і ЕС

      Неварто ставити Україну і Польшу в один ряд в контексті близькосьти до ЕС(хіба що той Ваш знайомий грузин говорив Вам то 10 років тому):
      Польша підписала Угоду про співпрацю з ЕС 16.12.91,
      внесок про вступ до ЕС зробила 08.04.94
      Від початку переговорів про вступ до ЕС (31.03.98) до підписання Трактату,що має відбутись 12-13 грудня у Копенгагені мине ще 4 роки.А вже тоді буде референдум з питанням про вступ і ,накінець- вступ до ЕС(ще десь 6-10 місяців).
      Україна ,наразі, має підписану Угоду про співпрацю (1994),що почала діяти тільки у 1998році, а все інше- попереду.

• 2002.06.27 | юрко

  Re: переклад статті (ч. 1)

  Встиг перекласти частину, наступна буде завтра.
  
  Остаточні кордони Європейської Спільноти
  Joost Lagendijk / Jan Marinus Wiersma
  члени Європейського парламенту
  
  Йошка Фишер, німецький міністер закордонних справ висунув на політичний порядок денний кінцеву мету європейської інтеграції. Він є першим ведучим політиком, що зважився посунутися так далеко, щоб окреслити остаточну інституційну архітектуру ЄС. Він закликав до федерації зі своєю власною конституцією, сильним урядом та чітко визначеними обов’язками.
  
  Дебати про остаточність інтеграційного процесу, що виникли в результаті промови Фишера, в основному концентруються навколо інституцій та компетенцій, що повинні характеризувати майбутнє ЄС. Проте, стосовно тих двох питань, виникає третє, що є логічною частиною дебатів: питання кінцевих кордонів ЄС. Де вони повинні закінчитися? Які країни повинні мати надію на можливе включення, а які – ні?
  
  Незабаром ці вибухонебезпечні питання безумовно стануть центральними темами в дебатах про майбутнє Європи. Суперечка є підтримувана сучасним процесом розширення. Брюссель провадить переговори про членство з не менш, ніж десятьма країнами в Центральній та Східній Європі, а також з Кіпром та Мальтою. Опитування показують, що громадська підтримка розширення є радше такою собі. Справді, в перегляді кандидатів – перші угоди щодо цього можуть бути підписані вже 2002 році – показують, що вагання серед громадян ЄС зростає. Багато хто побоюється, що їх добробут та безпека є під загрозою. Політики намагаються заспокоювати ці побоювання встановленням ясних лімітів на будь-які подальші плани розширення.
  
  Географія
  Де ЄС закінчується? Відповідь представлена географією є очевидною: група кандидатів має бути обмежена до країн, що формують частину європейського континенту. Виглядає, що засновники ЄС передбачали таке обмеження. В Римській угоді вони виклали, що “кожна європейська країна, що дотримується принципів ЄС може подати прохання про членство”.
  
  Географічний підхід висуває ліміт на кількість кандидатів. Він відкинув в 1987 році подання Марокко. Крім того, текст угоди явно вказує, що ЄС не має жодного зобов’язання приймати країни, навіть якщо вони вони формують частину європейського континенту. Лише існуючі члени клубу можуть вирішувати, хто може приєднатися, а хто – ні. ЄС запросила б такі країни, як Швейцарію, Норвегію та Ісландію як новий членів – якщо б їх чудова ізоляція стала для них більше обтяжливою, ніж благословенною – не тому, що вони відповідно географічно розташовані, але тому, що їх багатство робить їх донорами казни ЄС.
  
  В той сам час, географічний аргумент також сильно фаворизує збіднілі республіки колишньої Югославії, так само, як і Албанії. До часу коли сучасний процес розширення є завершений, десь протягом наступного десятиліття, Балкани будуть цілковито оточені ЄС країнами. “Один погляд на мапу вистачає, щоб побачити, що ЄС не може полишити Балкани, - як каже голландський державний секретар європейських стосунків Dick Benschop, - справді, цим країнам вже запропоновано можливість членства певного типу у формі Стабілізаційних та Асоціативних договорів, що їх ЄС зараз переговорює з ними.”
  
  ЄС інвестує мільярди євро в Балкани, що посунути реконструкцію та кооперацію між колишніми ворогами. ЄС робить це задля близькості регіону, бо страждання цих людей також зачепить і ЄС. ЄС країни мусять мати справу з мільйонами біженців, що втекли від етнічних конфліктів в регіоні. На додаток громадянські війни утворили досвідчених кримінальників, сфера діяльності яких зараз охоплює цілу Європу. Також не залишилися західні європейці байдужими до порушень прав людини, котрі супроводжували кожну балканську війну. Військове втручання в Боснію та Косово ще більше причепили Балкани до Європи. “Бомби створюють зобов’язання” – сказав голландський журналіст Paul Scheffer.
  
  
  ЄС також ввійшла в певні зобов’язання один на один з Туреччиною. Всупереч опору християнських демократів щодо прийняття цієї “мусульманської країни”, ЄС лідери підтвердили статус Туреччини, як країни-кандидата в 1999 році. Але Анкара ще навіть близько не стоїть біля сповнення політичних та економічних критеріїв щодо вступу, і може пройде ще наступних двадцять років чи більше, перед тим, як ЄС запросить Туреччину як члена.
  
  
  Це не змінює факту, що пропонуючи Туреччині можливість вступу, ЄС перейшла Босфор, котрий формує кордон Європи, як географічної частини. Секулярна країна, що модельована на зразок західно-європейських країн, Туреччина розглядається багатьма політиками, як твердиня Західного світу на Близькому Сході. Країна отримала членство в NATO на ще в 1952 році. Крім того, Туреччина є країною походження мільйонів людей, котрі проживають в Західній Європі. Успішна інтеграція цих мігрантів в європейські суспільства частково залежить від інтеграції Туреччини в ЄС.
  
  
  Запрошення, запропоноване Туреччині, залишило Марокко з гіркою пілюлею. Адже те, що приймалося до уваги на користь Анкари, також стосується і Рабату. Якщо ЄС думає перекинути міст через Босфор, то що стримує її від цього ж щодо Гібралтару? Чи є географічним невезінням Марокко, що навіть найменша частина його не знаходиться на європейському континенті? Хоч часто він задовольняє політиків, цей аргумент не задовольняє інтелектуалів. Timothy Garton Ash, експерт на Центральну та Східну Європи також виглядає розгубленим, коли його запитують показати кордон ЄС на півдні. “Ніхто не заперечує, я так думаю, що є більше води між ЄС та Магребом, ніж між ЄС та Туреччиною” є його нерішуча відповідь.
  
  
  Проблема з Марокко не в тому, що воно розташоване цілковито в Північній Африці, але в тому, що тут є інші чотири країни на півночі від Сагари – Алжір, Тунісія, Лівія та Єгипет – котрі також могли не менш переконливо вимагати своє членство. Це не згадуючи Ізраїль. Є неможливо навіть подумати, що ЄС може інкорпорувати всі ці країни – з загальним населенням понад 130 мільйонів – протягом одного покоління. Це вимагатиме більше, ніж середньої дози оптимізму вірити, що ці країни є здатними закінчити потрібні політичні та економічні перетворення протягом такого періоду часу. Листа заперечення, надісланого Марокко раніше, не варто сприймати як невідкличного і тим більше, як такого, що означає нездатність країни поділяти європейські вартості. Але також ми повинні знеохотити Рабат фокусуватися виключно на ЄС. Справді, прийшов найвищий час для Марокко та його сусідів серйозно встановити завдання розвитку їх власної регіональної кооперації, що приведе до зросту добробуту та стабільності в регіон. Цією інтеграцією країни Північної Африки автоматично зменшать своє віддалення від Європи.
  
  
  Культурний поділ
  
  Немає потреби для України, Білорусі та Молдавії доводити, що вони є частиною Європи, бо знаходяться на європейському континенті. До часу поки сучасне розширення закінчиться, вони всі почнуть мати спільні кордони з ЄС. Проте багато європейських політиків сумнівається, чи не існує занадто великий бар’єр між країною-кандидатом Польщею та її сусідою Україною. Є невидима стіна між новими демократіями та політичними бандитами, між країною, що може підпорядковуватися правилам закону і ринкової економіки та такою, що обложена автократичним зловживанням владою і вкоріненою корупцією. Ці сумніви про майбутніх сусідів також стосуються ще більше гігантської Росії, яка є на половину європейською і на половину азійською.

• 2002.06.28 | Kostya Poroh

  Ющ сказав все про інтеграцію з ЕС!

  Український народ мусить отримати змогу зробити свою державу міцною економічно, демократичною європейською державою.
  
  Отже, процес реформ ми бачимо перш за все як шанс на власне оновлення; шанс на власну відбудову; зрештою, як шанс на інтеграцію до світової спільноти.
  
  Багато популістів звичайно, намагаються намалювати цей процес у інших фарбах. Вони підозрюють нас у тому, що інтеграцію до ЄС ми бачимо лише як можливість отримувати якісь дивіденди для себе.
  
  Це зовсім не так. І якщо на світовому ринку з’явиться ще декілька виробників з України, які є конкурентоспроможними, то від цього лише виграють усі.
  
  Ми будемо набиратися досвіду власної демократичної державності так довго, поки не відчуємо, що ми вже настільки сильні, а процеси відбудови настільки стабільні й безповоротні, що ми можемо замінити частину наших національних повноважень на право бути членами ЄС.
  
  Членство України в ЄС має зміст лише тоді, коли ми зможемо в Україні реформувати стару радянську політичну систему; забезпечити сучасні стандарти соціального й медичного забезпечення. І все це можливе лише тоді, коли Україна стане іншою. Демократичною, правовою соціальною державою вільних громадян. Але це велика робота.
  
  Ми можемо твердо обіцяти тільки одне – якщо в Україні переможе демократія, то усі рішення в тому числі й щодо вступу до тієї чи іншої міжнародної організації прийматиме тільки український народ. Ніхто не має права ставити себе вище його волі, чи нав’язувати йому її.
  
  Ми намагаємося зробити все для того, щоб процес оновлення й відбудови України, став підставою для країн-членів Євросоюзу ще раз переосмислити свої погляди щодо нашої держави.
  
  Повірте, не за горами той час, коли нашу оновлену, демократичну Україну із її величезним людським, промисловим потенціалом та природними ресурсами будуть бажати бачити рівноправним членом великої європейської родини народів, що прагнуть миру, справедливості й щастя для всіх людей.
  
  http://maidan.org.ua/n/mai/1025239819
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  • 2002.06.29 | Роман ShaRP

    Re: Шануючи вміння розповідати такі гарні казки, пропоную

    Ввести титул "діда панасЮщенка" і запровадити передачу його щоденних казочок "на добраніч, громадяни" замість отіх дурних жахів, що показує Магнолія-ТБ.
    
    Може, процес входження до Європи то й не прискорить, зате спати всі будуть добре.
    
    Чи й зараз вже сплять?
    згорнути/розгорнути гілку відповідей

    • 2002.06.29 | Kostya Poroh

      Ну ви і сказали!

      Може, щось конкретніше? Яке ваше бачення/Які ваші "сказочки"?