Time for Yushchenko to "stand up"
09/18/2002 | Спостерігач
The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review
Volume VII, Number 13 (11 September 2002)
Time for Yushchenko to "stand up" Since their country declared independence
11 years ago, Ukrainians have been disappointed regularly by those who would
lead them. Charges of corruption, criminality, oppression and incompetence
have plagued most public officials, disillusioning those who originally
backed them, and leading to a loss of support for the political system that
produced them. In the last two years, the country, among other things, has
seen its former parliamentary speaker arrested in the United States for
large-scale embezzlement and its current president accused of murder.
By just about every Western measurement, Ukraine is sliding backward toward
authoritarianism. Freedom House continuously has noted a steady decline in
democratization, while Transparency International recently found Ukraine to
be one of the most corrupt countries in the world -- ahead of Zimbabwe,
Nicaragua, and Argentina, to name a few. (For further information, see
www.freedomhouse.org and www.transparency.org) It is no surprise then that
Ukrainians, in survey after survey, say they do not trust any political
leader -- any political leader, that is, except former Prime Minister Viktor
Yushchenko.
For two years, the former prime minister has been the most trusted, liked
and publicly supported politician in Ukraine. This reputation was earned.
During his brief two-and-one-half-year tenure beginning in 1998, Yushchenko
created an economic policy that resulted in the eradication of wage arrears
in most sectors, resumption of international aid, reduction of energy
shortages, and an increase in agricultural production. Most controversially,
he also attempted to rein in the "oligarchs" who have, according to many
observers, criminally profited while controlling the country's major
industries. As a result of all of this activity, Ukraine's gross domestic
product grew for the first time under Yushchenko's cabinet and its standard
of living increased (albeit only moderately). With competent leadership, the
country finally was headed in the right direction.
Then, tapes appeared that reportedly contained a conversation implicating
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma in the death of investigative journalist
Georgiy Gongadze. Kuchma became an international pariah, internal unrest
skyrocketed and Yushchenko's popularity became a threat to the besieged
president. In April 2001, after a long political battle between the
presidential administration and the parliament, Yushchenko was ousted.
Leaders of the newly formed, Gongadze-inspired Ukrainian opposition quickly
rallied around the former premier, and Yushchenko seemed to embrace their
ideas. When asked at the time about the future of Ukraine, Yushchenko
responded easily. "I am optimistic," he said. "Today democratic forces were
able to hear the bell they couldn't hear before. You have to fight for
transparent politics and a non-criminal economy and democracy. If we want to
have it, we have to fight for it." (WASHINGTON POST, 29 April 01; via
lexis-nexis) The statement seemed to signal a new era in Ukrainian politics,
when leading opposition figures would unite to fight for a more
democratically oriented Ukraine.
Yushchenko, however, was hesitant to criticize personally the man who had
orchestrated his ouster. The opposition, he suggested, should be "mainly
oriented at a unifying notion and not against somebody." (IBID.) That
somebody, of course, was President Kuchma.
He followed the same principle at the start of his campaign during the
parliamentary elections of 31 March 2002. In fact, he worked to separate his
bloc, Our Ukraine, from the more radical opposition parties of Yulia
Tymoshenko and Oleksandr Moroz, which included Kuchma's impeachment in their
platforms. But, as Yushchenko's access to the media was cut off and law
enforcement officials began to target him regularly, he began vigorously
criticizing administration-supported candidates in the election, and lashed
out at Kuchma's interference in the electoral process. The tactic worked.
When all was said and done, Our Ukraine had won the clear majority of party
list seats in the chamber. More important, Viktor Yushchenko had
demonstrated his status as the most significant political leader in the
country, and appeared able to challenge President Kuchma if he chose to do
so.
It seems he did not. Six months after its victory in the parliamentary
elections, Yushchenko's Our Ukraine has been reduced to a minority by
Kuchma's back-room maneuvering. Despite the fact that voters wholeheartedly
rejected the parties backing him during the election, Kuchma now boasts the
support of 231 deputies in the 450-person body. Opposition members accuse
the president of using bribery and blackmail to "convince" deputies elected
on their party lists, as well as those elected as independents, to support
the "majority." Regardless of the methods used, the result has been the
installation of a pro-Kuchma speaker of parliament and control of the major
parliamentary committees. All the while, Yushchenko has occasionally
complained, but acted very little.
Tymoshenko and Moroz, on the other hand, have formed a strong partnership
and have worked to keep the opposition movement united, active and as
effective as possible in the face of enormous pressure from the authorities.
They have enlisted the support of the Communist Party, which is also
staunchly anti-administration. The Communists will support the opposition,
Party leader Petro Symonenko said, "until we get answers to the main
questions of Kuchma's dismissal and the adoption of laws to boost democracy
in this country." (INTERFAX, 31 Aug 02; via lexis-nexis) As a result, for
the first time, Ukraine truly does have a diverse, active and
self-sustaining opposition movement. Yushchenko, however -- the man with the
best ability to reach and mobilize the public -- seems to be nowhere in
sight. As human rights come under attack more aggressively than ever before,
Yushchenko remains remarkably inactive.
This is nowhere more evident than in the preparations for the "Stand Up,
Ukraine!" demonstrations to be held throughout the country. On 2 September,
Tymoshenko, Moroz and Symonenko called on the country to join them in
commemorating the second anniversary of the disappearance of Georgiy
Gongadze, calling for democratic reforms, and urging that early presidential
elections be held (Kuchma's term expires in 2004). The three then departed
for a national tour, where as many as 10,000 persons met them at each stop
along the way. The tour will culminate in Kyiv on 16 September, the date
that Gongadze went missing.
Instead of participating in this action, however, Yushchenko chose to
release an "open letter" to the president. In it, he called upon Kuchma to
"support Our Ukraine's initiative for the formation of a parliamentary
majority based on the political force that was the leader in the
parliamentary elections," and "appoint a coalition government formed by the
parliamentary majority," among nine total points. The letter also reiterated
"the readiness of the political forces making up Viktor Yushchenko's Our
Ukraine bloc for a broad dialogue," since, no doubt, dialogue had worked so
well in the past. (KYIV POST, 6 Sep 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)
Yushchenko then promised not to make any decision about whether to take part
in the 16 September protest action until he received an answer from the
president.
This answer came quickly, and was not exactly a surprise. "As president, I
will not accept the demands," Kuchma announced. (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 6 Sep 02;
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) And that was that. Yushchenko's decision,
however, has not been as swift. In fact, he has remained indecisive and
noncommittal. As a result, he has undermined the protest action, and left
his three most important allies on their own.
Tymoshenko must feel Yushchenko's distance more than anyone, since she once
again is being targeted by administration officials in questionable criminal
probes. This time, Kuchma's prosecutor-general, Sviatoslav Pyskun, plans to
charge Tymoshenko with embezzlement. The charge is just the latest in
several years-worth of failed attempts to convict Tymoshenko of something --
anything. Authorities are proceeding, however, with renewed vigor following
the recent formation of the pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority. On 21 August,
in fact, Pyskun sent a letter to parliament asking that the body revoke
Tymoshenko's parliamentary immunity. Although it is unlikely, one of the
benefits of the new majority could be an agreement to do just that. Even
though this decision could affect an ally, however, Yushchenko has followed
his now familiar pattern and remained silent.
Most important, the former prime minister has been muted in his response to
Kuchma's offer to limit his own power. The president suggested in a
nationally televised address on Ukraine's Independence Day that the country
must move from a presidential to a parliamentary republic. While this
technically would limit Kuchma's authority, in reality, it would very
efficiently remove most power from the next president and place it in the
hands of the pro-Kuchma parliamentary group. This would allow Kuchma to
continue influencing political events even in the years following his
retirement -- in essence, a form of the Yel'tsin scenario. Additionally, it
would barely affect Kuchma currently, since he now effectively controls
parliament.
Observers have suggested numerous reasons for Yushchenko's inactivity, from
simply an aversion to confrontation to a secret agreement with Kuchma. If,
for example, Yushchenko remains silent about the persecution of Tymoshenko
and does not participate in the 16 September protest, will he be given the
soon-to-be-vacant post of prime minister? Or does he truly believe that
compromise and appeasement will achieve his goals? Likely, a combination of
these two approaches is closer to the truth. It seems that Viktor Yushchenko
may be attempting to maintain as much neutrality as possible in order to
preserve what little remaining influence he has in the administration, or
possibly to increase his influence in the near future. Perhaps he hopes to
use this influence to accomplish what Tymoshenko and
Moroz are attempting to achieve through protest. Yushchenko has, after all,
never been one to confront; throughout his career, he has relied on his
ability to compromise and form coalitions. Until recently, that ability
served him well. But to form coalitions genuinely, there must be more than
one side willing to compromise. Unfortunately, it seems likely that
compromise on Yushchenko's part at this point would accomplish little more
than legitimizing a corrupt administration, while undermining the
opposition. Perhaps Viktor Yuschenko understands this, perhaps he does not.
But either way, it seems that the people of Ukraine may be on the road to
yet another disappointment from a once promising political leader.
--by Miriam Lanskoy
Volume VII, Number 13 (11 September 2002)
Time for Yushchenko to "stand up" Since their country declared independence
11 years ago, Ukrainians have been disappointed regularly by those who would
lead them. Charges of corruption, criminality, oppression and incompetence
have plagued most public officials, disillusioning those who originally
backed them, and leading to a loss of support for the political system that
produced them. In the last two years, the country, among other things, has
seen its former parliamentary speaker arrested in the United States for
large-scale embezzlement and its current president accused of murder.
By just about every Western measurement, Ukraine is sliding backward toward
authoritarianism. Freedom House continuously has noted a steady decline in
democratization, while Transparency International recently found Ukraine to
be one of the most corrupt countries in the world -- ahead of Zimbabwe,
Nicaragua, and Argentina, to name a few. (For further information, see
www.freedomhouse.org and www.transparency.org) It is no surprise then that
Ukrainians, in survey after survey, say they do not trust any political
leader -- any political leader, that is, except former Prime Minister Viktor
Yushchenko.
For two years, the former prime minister has been the most trusted, liked
and publicly supported politician in Ukraine. This reputation was earned.
During his brief two-and-one-half-year tenure beginning in 1998, Yushchenko
created an economic policy that resulted in the eradication of wage arrears
in most sectors, resumption of international aid, reduction of energy
shortages, and an increase in agricultural production. Most controversially,
he also attempted to rein in the "oligarchs" who have, according to many
observers, criminally profited while controlling the country's major
industries. As a result of all of this activity, Ukraine's gross domestic
product grew for the first time under Yushchenko's cabinet and its standard
of living increased (albeit only moderately). With competent leadership, the
country finally was headed in the right direction.
Then, tapes appeared that reportedly contained a conversation implicating
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma in the death of investigative journalist
Georgiy Gongadze. Kuchma became an international pariah, internal unrest
skyrocketed and Yushchenko's popularity became a threat to the besieged
president. In April 2001, after a long political battle between the
presidential administration and the parliament, Yushchenko was ousted.
Leaders of the newly formed, Gongadze-inspired Ukrainian opposition quickly
rallied around the former premier, and Yushchenko seemed to embrace their
ideas. When asked at the time about the future of Ukraine, Yushchenko
responded easily. "I am optimistic," he said. "Today democratic forces were
able to hear the bell they couldn't hear before. You have to fight for
transparent politics and a non-criminal economy and democracy. If we want to
have it, we have to fight for it." (WASHINGTON POST, 29 April 01; via
lexis-nexis) The statement seemed to signal a new era in Ukrainian politics,
when leading opposition figures would unite to fight for a more
democratically oriented Ukraine.
Yushchenko, however, was hesitant to criticize personally the man who had
orchestrated his ouster. The opposition, he suggested, should be "mainly
oriented at a unifying notion and not against somebody." (IBID.) That
somebody, of course, was President Kuchma.
He followed the same principle at the start of his campaign during the
parliamentary elections of 31 March 2002. In fact, he worked to separate his
bloc, Our Ukraine, from the more radical opposition parties of Yulia
Tymoshenko and Oleksandr Moroz, which included Kuchma's impeachment in their
platforms. But, as Yushchenko's access to the media was cut off and law
enforcement officials began to target him regularly, he began vigorously
criticizing administration-supported candidates in the election, and lashed
out at Kuchma's interference in the electoral process. The tactic worked.
When all was said and done, Our Ukraine had won the clear majority of party
list seats in the chamber. More important, Viktor Yushchenko had
demonstrated his status as the most significant political leader in the
country, and appeared able to challenge President Kuchma if he chose to do
so.
It seems he did not. Six months after its victory in the parliamentary
elections, Yushchenko's Our Ukraine has been reduced to a minority by
Kuchma's back-room maneuvering. Despite the fact that voters wholeheartedly
rejected the parties backing him during the election, Kuchma now boasts the
support of 231 deputies in the 450-person body. Opposition members accuse
the president of using bribery and blackmail to "convince" deputies elected
on their party lists, as well as those elected as independents, to support
the "majority." Regardless of the methods used, the result has been the
installation of a pro-Kuchma speaker of parliament and control of the major
parliamentary committees. All the while, Yushchenko has occasionally
complained, but acted very little.
Tymoshenko and Moroz, on the other hand, have formed a strong partnership
and have worked to keep the opposition movement united, active and as
effective as possible in the face of enormous pressure from the authorities.
They have enlisted the support of the Communist Party, which is also
staunchly anti-administration. The Communists will support the opposition,
Party leader Petro Symonenko said, "until we get answers to the main
questions of Kuchma's dismissal and the adoption of laws to boost democracy
in this country." (INTERFAX, 31 Aug 02; via lexis-nexis) As a result, for
the first time, Ukraine truly does have a diverse, active and
self-sustaining opposition movement. Yushchenko, however -- the man with the
best ability to reach and mobilize the public -- seems to be nowhere in
sight. As human rights come under attack more aggressively than ever before,
Yushchenko remains remarkably inactive.
This is nowhere more evident than in the preparations for the "Stand Up,
Ukraine!" demonstrations to be held throughout the country. On 2 September,
Tymoshenko, Moroz and Symonenko called on the country to join them in
commemorating the second anniversary of the disappearance of Georgiy
Gongadze, calling for democratic reforms, and urging that early presidential
elections be held (Kuchma's term expires in 2004). The three then departed
for a national tour, where as many as 10,000 persons met them at each stop
along the way. The tour will culminate in Kyiv on 16 September, the date
that Gongadze went missing.
Instead of participating in this action, however, Yushchenko chose to
release an "open letter" to the president. In it, he called upon Kuchma to
"support Our Ukraine's initiative for the formation of a parliamentary
majority based on the political force that was the leader in the
parliamentary elections," and "appoint a coalition government formed by the
parliamentary majority," among nine total points. The letter also reiterated
"the readiness of the political forces making up Viktor Yushchenko's Our
Ukraine bloc for a broad dialogue," since, no doubt, dialogue had worked so
well in the past. (KYIV POST, 6 Sep 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)
Yushchenko then promised not to make any decision about whether to take part
in the 16 September protest action until he received an answer from the
president.
This answer came quickly, and was not exactly a surprise. "As president, I
will not accept the demands," Kuchma announced. (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 6 Sep 02;
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) And that was that. Yushchenko's decision,
however, has not been as swift. In fact, he has remained indecisive and
noncommittal. As a result, he has undermined the protest action, and left
his three most important allies on their own.
Tymoshenko must feel Yushchenko's distance more than anyone, since she once
again is being targeted by administration officials in questionable criminal
probes. This time, Kuchma's prosecutor-general, Sviatoslav Pyskun, plans to
charge Tymoshenko with embezzlement. The charge is just the latest in
several years-worth of failed attempts to convict Tymoshenko of something --
anything. Authorities are proceeding, however, with renewed vigor following
the recent formation of the pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority. On 21 August,
in fact, Pyskun sent a letter to parliament asking that the body revoke
Tymoshenko's parliamentary immunity. Although it is unlikely, one of the
benefits of the new majority could be an agreement to do just that. Even
though this decision could affect an ally, however, Yushchenko has followed
his now familiar pattern and remained silent.
Most important, the former prime minister has been muted in his response to
Kuchma's offer to limit his own power. The president suggested in a
nationally televised address on Ukraine's Independence Day that the country
must move from a presidential to a parliamentary republic. While this
technically would limit Kuchma's authority, in reality, it would very
efficiently remove most power from the next president and place it in the
hands of the pro-Kuchma parliamentary group. This would allow Kuchma to
continue influencing political events even in the years following his
retirement -- in essence, a form of the Yel'tsin scenario. Additionally, it
would barely affect Kuchma currently, since he now effectively controls
parliament.
Observers have suggested numerous reasons for Yushchenko's inactivity, from
simply an aversion to confrontation to a secret agreement with Kuchma. If,
for example, Yushchenko remains silent about the persecution of Tymoshenko
and does not participate in the 16 September protest, will he be given the
soon-to-be-vacant post of prime minister? Or does he truly believe that
compromise and appeasement will achieve his goals? Likely, a combination of
these two approaches is closer to the truth. It seems that Viktor Yushchenko
may be attempting to maintain as much neutrality as possible in order to
preserve what little remaining influence he has in the administration, or
possibly to increase his influence in the near future. Perhaps he hopes to
use this influence to accomplish what Tymoshenko and
Moroz are attempting to achieve through protest. Yushchenko has, after all,
never been one to confront; throughout his career, he has relied on his
ability to compromise and form coalitions. Until recently, that ability
served him well. But to form coalitions genuinely, there must be more than
one side willing to compromise. Unfortunately, it seems likely that
compromise on Yushchenko's part at this point would accomplish little more
than legitimizing a corrupt administration, while undermining the
opposition. Perhaps Viktor Yuschenko understands this, perhaps he does not.
But either way, it seems that the people of Ukraine may be on the road to
yet another disappointment from a once promising political leader.
--by Miriam Lanskoy