02/26/2003 | Светлана

UKRAINE

Negotiating the News:
Informal State Censorship of Ukrainian Television



The observance of human and citizens’ rights and freedoms is an integral part of Ukraine's integration into Europe and its transformation into a well developed democratic country. As the Guarantor of human rights and freedoms, the President believes that it is vital to develop and expand this priority aspect of his activity.
- Official Website of the President of Ukraine, Statement on Human Rights.

What in every other country is called censorship, here is called ‘editorial policy.’
- Pavlo P., station “F.”




CONTENTS

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3

II. POLITICAL BACKGROUND 4

III. MEDIA BACKGROUND 9
Broadcast Media 9
Print Media 11
Internet Media 11
Limits on Freedom of Expression 12

IV. INFORMAL STATE CENSORSHIP THROUGH TEMNIKI 14
Temniki History 15
Temniki Authorship 16
Temniki Format 16
Temniki Themes 17
Portrayal of Kuchma 17
Freedom of Expression 19
Activities of the SDPU(u) 19
Portrayal of Opposition Politicians 22
Activities of Opposition Parties 25

V. THE IMPACT OF TEMNIKI ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 28
Changes in Editorial Policy and Growing Threats to Journalists 28
Self-Censorship 31
Restriction of Activities Outside of Television Reporting 33

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 34
To the Ukrainian Government 34
To the Council of Europe 34
To the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 35
To the European Union (E.U.) 35
To the United Nations (U.N.) 35
To the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 35
To International Financial Institutions 35

APPENDIX: SAMPLES OF TEMNIKI 36

Acknowledgements 47




I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

While the formal censorship that existed in Ukraine during the Soviet era ended after the country gained its independence in 1991, informal censorship continues. Media outlets expressing views critical of government officials or other prominent figures have been subject to arbitrary tax inspections, denial and revocation of licenses on technicalities, and crippling libel suits, while individual journalists have faced harassment and physical attacks. This report documents one insidious form of informal censorship: secret instructional memoranda prepared and distributed by the Presidential Administration to top managers and editors of national television stations and some newspapers. These memoranda, known as temniki (from the Russian temy nedeli or weekly themes), provide guidelines for the content and nature of news reporting. Editors-in-chief fear repercussions for non-compliance with these directives and thus follow temniki instructions when determining editorial frameworks for journalists’ work.

State officials routinely deny knowledge of or involvement with temniki. However, Ukrainian journalists, media analysts, and prominent politicians consistently report that the instructional documents originate from within the Presidential Administration. Editors receive calls from officials about instructions contained in temniki, and the documents themselves consistently call for news coverage that portrays President Leonid Kuchma and the pro-presidential Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (SDPU(u)) in a favorable light and discredits or marginalizes important opposition politicians and parties.

Human Rights Watch conducted research on informal political censorship in October 2002 through interviews with television station employees, government officials, and media analysts. We focused on the impact of temniki on television news journalism because television is the most widely utilized form of mass media in Ukraine. To this end, we interviewed ten prominent employees from five national television stations and one Kyiv station, including senior editors, program editors, news anchors, program hosts, and correspondents. In addition, we examined seven temniki covering different weeks in late 2001 and in 2002. Human Rights Watch received temniki from sources connected to top editors and managers at prominent stations.

Temniki were first distributed to a limited number of pro-presidential media outlets in September and October 2001 during the campaign period prior to the March 2002 parliamentary (Verkhovna Rada) elections. Editors, journalists, and media analysts reported that by August 2002 distribution of temniki had expanded to all stations, and compliance with the instructions was more vigorously enforced through phone calls and intimidation. Temniki became public in early September 2002, when the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Freedom of Speech and Information, Mykola Tomenko, revealed their existence.

Temniki have eroded freedom of expression in Ukraine. Editors and journalists feel obligated to comply with temniki instructions due to economic and political pressures and fear repercussions for non-cooperation. In the past, media outlets that supported opposition parties or failed to comply with official requests have faced tax inspections, legal actions, or license withdrawals that have threatened their existence or in some cases have shut them completely. Similarly, journalists who have taken independent positions have faced demotion, pay cuts, and dismissal. The harassment and violence journalists experienced even before the appearance of temniki have contributed to an atmosphere of intimidation that impels journalists to comply with the directives. The most shocking of these incidents was the murder of outspoken opposition journalist Heorhii Gongadze in September 2000, in which President Leonid Kuchma and other top officials have since been implicated.

Failed reforms and economic stagnation have left media outlets and journalists vulnerable to the sponsorship of large political-financial blocs that use media as mouthpieces for their interests. This situation is especially pronounced for the major television stations. Of the six national television stations in Ukraine, one is state-owned, two are owned by leaders of the SDPU(u) and influenced by the head of the Presidential Administration, and three are financed in significant part by President Kuchma’s son-in-law. The most influential regulatory and sole licensing body for domestic media, the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, lacks transparency and has been susceptible to paralyzing political pressure.

Temniki and other external pressures on television stations have transformed the news- making process. Whereas in the past, journalists, news anchors, and production editors largely determined the content of the news, now they must negotiate with editors-in-chief or top managers at length over virtually every aspect of every text and program in order to ensure the station’s compliance with the Presidential Administration’s instructions conveyed through temniki, phone calls, and other informal channels. In some cases station managers have removed political programming or analytical shows in order to avoid controversy. Outspoken journalists have been transferred to less prominent positions within television stations where their non-compliance is less significant. Under these conditions journalists routinely resort to self-censorship as they have come to understand which material will be acceptable for broadcast and which will be rejected. Television news is now solidly pro-Kuchma, and, because television is the most widely utilized form of mass media in Ukraine, the government’s censorship effectively denies the Ukrainian public access to a crucial source of objective information.

Because Ukraine is a state party to both the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the government is obligated to protect the right to freedom of expression. Domestic law also guarantees this right. Article 15 of the Ukrainian Constitution prohibits censorship and Article 34 guarantees each citizen “freedom of thought and speech and to the free expression of his or her views and beliefs.” In addition, Ukraine has developed numerous laws to protect the media and journalists and to support free speech and access to information. The failure by the Ukrainian government and the Presidential Administration in particular, to fully implement and enforce these laws and commitments, puts it in breach of its obligation to protect freedom of expression.

Human Rights Watch recommends that the Ukrainian authorities and international bodies take steps to ensure Ukraine’s compliance with domestic and international obligations to uphold freedom of expression. The Presidential Administration should cease immediately the use of temniki and any other form of pressure or formal or informal censorship of news making on television stations and other media. The Office of the Prosecutor General should conduct prompt and thorough investigations of government officials and others implicated in censorship or other abuses against the media and hold accountable those responsible. The Verkhovna Rada should take steps to amend legislation on the definition of censorship, on the definition and practice of defamation, on the establishment of a realistic minimum wage for journalists, and on the increased transparency of the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting.

Human Rights Watch also recommends that the Council of Europe use all available means and mechanisms to address Ukraine’s failure to meet its obligations and implement the recommendations recently set forth by the Committee of Ministers. The Council of Europe should also consider continuing assistance to the Ukrainian authorities through initiatives similar to those set out in the 2001-2002 “Action Plan for the Media in Ukraine.” Similarly, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (U.N.) should ensure adequate implementation of recommendations related to freedom of expression set out in recent reports on Ukraine. Finally, the European Union (E.U.), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and international financial institutions should condition deepening of bilateral relations on measurable progress by Ukraine in guaranteeing freedom of expression.

II. POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The appearance of temniki followed two years of political scandals involving President Leonid Kuchma and coincided with a precipitous decline in the president’s public approval rating as well as with his introduction of new measures to address ongoing battles with the opposition. In 1999 Kuchma won reelection for a second five-year term with more than 56 percent of the vote. Soon after the presidential elections, Kuchma initiated efforts to consolidate his power and exert executive control over the Verkhovna Rada, ostensibly to end the deadlocks between the presidency and the parliament that had plagued the passage of legislation. Kuchma complained that the Rada had wrecked his attempts to secure market reforms and was responsible for prolonging the country’s eight-year economic stagnation. In January 2000, Kuchma initiated a controversial referendum on constitutional amendments designed to reduce the Rada’s powers in favor of increased authority for the president. Although between 80 and 90 percent of the electorate supported all of Kuchma’s proposed changes, with more than 80 percent voter turnout, the Rada failed to ratify amendments that would have significantly reduced its own weight.

Tensions between the executive and legislative branches continued, with the president’s credibility coming under severe attack in November 2000, when Socialist Party of Ukraine leader Oleksandr Moroz revealed the existence of secret tape recordings of conversations involving Kuchma and top political and financial figures made by former presidential security guard Mykola Melnychenko. The tapes implicate Kuchma and other prominent officials in numerous scandals, including the kidnapping and murder of investigative journalist Heorhii Gongadze in September 2000. Gongadze had been investigating corruption and was a vocal critic of President Kuchma’s January referendum and the government’s efforts to restrict press freedoms. The Melnychenko tapes also record Kuchma’s authorization of the sale of sophisticated military radar systems to Iraq in violation of a United Nations arms embargo.

The scandal, dubbed “Kuchmagate,” and growing public concerns about corruption, worsening poverty, and unemployment inspired the development, in late 2000, of the “Ukraine without Kuchma” protest movement. In February and March 2001, students, pensioners, politicians, and others organized rallies throughout the country. Some of these demonstrations ended in violence and the arrest of hundreds of protesters. Sensing this growing antipathy and risk to his government, on March 6, 2001, President Kuchma demanded that all government officials “sever publicly any links to the opposition within the week or submit their resignations.”

In this period President Kuchma also began removing key reform-minded figures from the government. In January 2001, Kuchma dismissed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Energy Yulia Tymoshenko, after the Office of the Prosecutor General opened a criminal case against her on charges of fraud and embezzlement during her leadership of Unified Energy Systems of Ukraine from 1995-1997. She had served as deputy prime minister for just over a year, and became an outspoken critic of the president soon after her removal from office. Analysts believe that the criminal case and subsequent dismissal are linked to Tymoshenko’s efforts to reform the energy sector. Her reforms began to jeopardize the interests of the nation’s oil and gas oligarchs, many of whom are closely associated with Kuchma and who have enjoyed growing political and economic power during Kuchma’s second term. The businessmen most adversely affected by Tymoshenko’s reforms were those connected to the pro-presidential SDPU(u), which controls the majority of district energy distributors. Tymoshenko was arrested and jailed for six weeks before a district court ruled that the charges against her were unfounded. In April 2002, a district court closed all proceedings against Tymoshenko, but in August 2002 the newly appointed prosecutor general, Sviatoslav Piskun, initiated a new criminal case against her on the same charges and in September 2002 opened yet another case against her for illegally calling for the ousting of President Kuchma.

Three months after the dismissal of Tymoshenko, popular reformist Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko also came under attack. Despite Yushchenko’s success in carrying out reforms, important industrial and financial figures believed many of Yushchenko’s policies interfered with lucrative business arrangements. Communist Party deputies formed an alliance with the SDPU(u) and other pro-Kuchma parties representing the interests of leaders of some of Ukraine’s most powerful business conglomerates to oust the Yushchenko government in a vote of no confidence in April 2001. During his sixteenth-month tenure as prime minister, Western analysts credited Yushchenko with curbing inflation, meeting domestic and international debt commitments, paying pension arrears, and overseeing the first period of real economic growth in Ukraine in more than a decade. The Rada replaced Yushchenko with Kuchma’s proposed candidate, Anatolii Kinakh.
In the months following these changes, the Rada and the president fought over the passage of a new election law. Controversy would mar the March 2002 parliamentary elections throughout, with reports of illegal interference by public authorities, abuse of administrative resources, instances of violence, and intimidation of reporters and media outlets. Despite manipulation by the authorities, the pro-presidential bloc “For a United Ukraine” garnered 11.8 percent of the votes gained on party ballots, which account for half of the parliament’s seats. Two opposition parties proved to be more popular in the party balloting; the “Our Ukraine” coalition led by Viktor Yushchenko won 23.57 percent, while the Communist Party of Ukraine secured 20 percent. Only three other parties surpassed the 6 percent minimum for winning seats: the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (7.26 percent), the Socialist Party of Ukraine (6.87 percent) and the SDPU(u) (6.27 percent). In the final composition of the Verkhovna Rada, however, “For a United Ukraine” held the greatest total number of seats, having won heavily in the election of individual pro-presidential candidates in local constituencies voting, which accounts for the other half of the parliament’s seats.

Thus, the opposition parties’ popular electoral success did not translate into a strong position in parliament. In May 2002 the “For a United Ukraine” bloc and the SDPU(u) cooperated to secure the Rada chairman and deputy chairman positions. Two key appointments came soon thereafter: Kuchma named SDPU(u) Chairman Viktor Medvedchuk as head of the Presidential Administration in June 2002 and one month later won parliamentary approval of his candidate for prosecutor general, Sviatoslav Piskun. Beginning in this period, pro-presidential parties began to persuade many independent deputies and deputies from other parties and factions to join their ranks. A pro-presidential majority is important for Kuchma in order to facilitate passage of his proposed legislation and to stave off impeachment.

Although Kuchma managed to consolidate his position in parliament and in key executive agencies, during the summer his popularity continued to suffer in the face of ongoing scandals and unresolved social and economic issues. According to a September 2002 poll, just 5.9 percent of Ukrainians expressed complete support for Kuchma and nearly 72 percent supported his resignation. In September and October 2002, opposition parties—the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc and “Our Ukraine”—staged anti-Kuchma protests around the country. The largest of these “Rise Up Ukraine” protests, held on September 16 in the capital, Kyiv, drew more than 20,000 participants.

The Ukrainian government went to great lengths to frustrate the opposition’s actions by banning the protests from Kyiv’s center and demanding that they be held in a stadium on the distant edge of the city. Schedules for Kyiv-bound buses and commuter trains were changed inexplicably for September 16, and traffic police denied cars and buses with non-Kyiv license plates entrance to the capital. As a result, thousands of people did not enter the city that day, irrespective of whether they intended to participate in the demonstrations. In the days prior to the demonstration, the police harassed students and members of opposition parties. The government also initiated an aggressive media campaign designed to dissuade people from participating and to obscure the scale of the protests and demands of the protesters. In addition, for no clear reason, currency exchange offices in many areas of the capital were closed in the days before and on the day of the Kyiv demonstration. The morning after the protest, police violently broke up the demonstrators’ tent camp and arrested several dozen participants.

In the months following the demonstrations, opposition and pro-presidential forces in the Rada jockeyed for position and neither was able to form a stable majority. In response to parliamentary impasses, in November Kuchma dismissed Kinakh and appointed Donetsk Governor Viktor Yanukovych as prime minister, who was able to organize a majority in the Rada by mid-December. The impact of the Kuchmagate scandal on the president intensified in October 2002, after United States experts authenticated the Melnychenko tapes and the U.S. government took steps to isolate Kuchma over his approval of the Iraqi arms deal. Soon thereafter, Kyiv Appeals Court Judge Yurii Vasylenko opened a criminal investigation against Kuchma in connection with these and other charges, but in December the Supreme Court rescinded the orders for an investigation. In February 2003, the Supreme Council of Justice recommended that the Verkhovna Rada dismiss Vasylenko on charges that in initiating the criminal case against Kuchma, the judge violated the constitution.
III. MEDIA BACKGROUND

Ukrainians currently enjoy access to a wide variety of broadcast, print, and Internet news sources. According to the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting, Ukraine has 791 registered television and radio stations. In addition, there are 3,925 print media sources, more than 500 Ukrainian Internet news sites, and thirty-five news agencies. Four percent of television and radio stations and 9 percent of print media outlets are state-owned. There are three state-run news agencies.

The diversity in news sources, large number of independent media outlets, and constitutional and legal guarantees for the media would all suggest that freedom of expression is adequately developed and respected. However, individual journalists and editors have faced physical attacks, crippling libel suits, and informal pay schemes that leave them vulnerable to censorial pressures. Media companies have faced economic obstacles to independent development and have encountered official harassment and arbitrary licensing and tax procedures. For these reasons, in its 2002 Worldwide Press Freedom Index, Reporters without Borders listed Ukraine 112th out of 139 countries in terms of journalistic freedom and government efforts to guarantee freedom of expression. The Committee to Protect Journalists named President Kuchma on its list of the world’s ten worst enemies of the press in 1999 and again in 2001.

Numerous governmental agencies exist to regulate information and the media. The bodies authorized to develop and implement information policy include the Rada Committee for the Freedom of Speech and Information and, within the executive, the State Committee for Information Policy, Television and Radio Broadcasting and the State Committee for Communication and Information. The National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting is responsible for broadcast licensing. In the months following revelations about the Gongadze murder and growing criticism of the authorities’ relationship to the media, in April 2001 President Kuchma established the Information Policy Council, a presidential administration body designed to protect information and media rights and freedoms and to improve relations between media and the authorities. In July 2002, after the appointment of Viktor Medvedchuk, an additional department within the presidential administration, the Department of Information Policy, was created.

Broadcast Media
Of Ukraine’s 791 licensed television and radio companies, twenty-eight are state owned. Five hundred twenty-two of them (63 percent) either do not broadcast or are barely solvent. There are fifty-nine cable television companies, which maintain about two million subscribers. The vast majority of television and radio stations are regional or local, including 322 television stations, 417 radio stations, and forty-four combined television and radio broadcasting stations. The state-owned Ukrainian National Radio Company is the only station to have 100 percent national coverage. Other major stations included Nashe Radio [Our Radio], with 46 percent coverage, Dovira [Trust], with 33 percent, and Gala-Radio with 28 percent. Ukrainian radio stations transmit foreign radio programs from the BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe, Radio Canada, and Voice of America.

In recent years, two of Ukraine’s wealthiest individuals and prominent political figures have come to directly control or heavily influence all major Ukrainian television stations, except UT-1, which is state-owned. Viktor Pinchuk, son-in-law of President Kuchma and a Labor Party parliamentary deputy, maintains heavy investment in Novyy Kanal, STB, and ICTV, as well as the Dnipropetrovsk Channel 11. Pinchuk’s other media holdings include Ukraine’s largest daily newspaper, Fakty i komentarii [Facts and Comments], and the Ukrainian News news service. Novyy Kanal and STB both also receive significant Russian investment. SDPU(u) figure Oleksandr Zinchenko owns Inter, and SDPU(u) figures also own Studio 1+1. Head of the Presidential Administration Viktor Medvedchuk also maintains financial commitments and influence over these stations, as well as UT-1. An SDPU(u) leader, Hryhorii Surkis, owns TET, an important Kyiv local and regional station which reaches 12 percent of the nation.

UT-1, owned by the National Television Company of Ukraine, is the only truly national television station, with coverage of more 98 percent of Ukrainian territory. The five other major stations broadcast over a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and are thus considered ‘national’: Studio 1+1 has 95 percent coverage; Inter has 62 percent coverage; and Novyy Kanal, STB, and ICTV each maintain about 25 percent coverage. The three stations with largest coverage, UT-1, Studio 1+1, and Inter, account for nearly 90 percent of television advertising profits, with the remaining 10 percent divided among the other 828 stations. According to AGB, a television audience data collection company, for July to September 2002, Studio 1+1 enjoyed 27 percent of the average market share, Inter 26.7 percent, Novyy Kanal 8.3 percent, ICTV 5.8 percent, STB 5 percent, and UT-1 4.6 percent. Regional stations enjoy a much smaller market share and largely broadcast programs relevant to local interests. Russian channels such as ORT, RTR, NTV, and TV-6 air via cable and satellite and some programs are retransmitted on Inter and other regional companies. Western Ukraine receives Polish, Czech, and Hungarian television programs.

According to a November 2001 report by the National Broadcasting Council, feature films and soap operas dominate television programming. Both Novyy Kanal and ICTV dedicate more than 66 percent of broadcast time to this content, and Inter more than 50 percent. Films and soap operas are less frequent on UT-1, which offers more news and current affairs programs. About 20 percent of broadcasts on Studio 1+1, STB, and Inter are dedicated to news. On weekdays, Studio 1+1 offers between five and seven thirty-minute news programs a day at varying times, including a morning combined news-entertainment program, with the rest of programming largely dedicated to comedy shows, soap operas, films, and cartoons. STB’s news program Windows airs four times daily and has additional business and crime news programs. Other typical programs include a comedy show, imported programs including Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous and Fantasy Island, as well as frequent feature films. Inter airs eight short news programs during morning and daytime hours, two evening news programs at 8:00 p.m. and 11:40 p.m., and varied entertainment programming, including the soap operas In The Name of Your Love and Isabella. Novyy Kanal also presents numerous serial dramas and feature films, as well as two five-minute morning news programs interspersed in its Waking Up morning show, one afternoon broadcast and two twenty-five minute evening broadcasts at 7:00 p.m. and 11:15 p.m. All stations offer fewer news programs and more feature films on weekends.

Print Media
As of October 2002, there were 355 national, 464 regional, and 1732 local newspapers registered in Ukraine, as well as 1,374 magazines. The European Journalism Center determined that, compared to twenty-six other European countries, Ukraine has the smallest total number of print media. Overall circulation is also quite low due to low incomes. The newspaper Fakty i komentarii has the largest circulation, selling 1,019,000 copies per day, followed by Silski visti [The Village News], which sells 476,000 copies per day, and the state paper Golos Ukrainy [The Voice of Ukraine] with a daily circulation of 180,000 copies. The national weekly Dzerkalo tyzhnia [The Weekly Mirror], known for its objective reporting, has a circulation of 48,000, just eight thousand more than the national daily Den [The Day]. Uriadovyi kurier [The Official Courier] and Golos Ukrainy are the main state-funded newspapers. During the 2002 parliamentary elections Fakty i komentarii, Segodna [Today], Den and Kievskie vedomosti [The Kiev Gazette] supported pro-presidential parties. Silski visti, Ukraina moloda [The Youth of Ukraine], and Yulia Tymoshenko’s Vechernie vesti [The Evening Gazette] were the main papers supporting the opposition. Most Ukrainian newspapers have large local or regional, rather than national, distribution. Most magazines do not enjoy wide circulation and are oriented towards specialized audiences.

Ukrainian-language publications media comprise nearly 38 percent of registered print media, Russian-language publications, 22 percent, and bilingual publications, 20 percent. The daily circulation of Russian language press is about twenty-five million copies per day, compared to sixteen million copies of Ukrainian language press, concentrated largely in western Ukraine. Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea maintains numerous Crimean-Tatar language editions, although Russian-language print press dominates.

Internet Media
Ukraine has experienced an Internet boom in recent years, and currently over 500 different media sources can be accessed online. Most of these news sources are independent and are not associated with political parties or other interest groups. More than half (55 percent) of Ukrainian websites are run by media outlets and news agencies, 23 percent belong to political parties, 14 percent host forums and news sites, and eight percent are personal pages. Ukraine has more than 320 online newspapers and journals, and most major print media have online versions. The most popular Internet media source is the virtual magazine Korrespondent.net. While the total number of users in Ukraine has also grown to more than two million, only 750,000 people regularly use the Internet, the majority of them being men (83 percent) between the ages of 20 and 29 (48.9 percent).

Limits on Freedom of Expression
Despite the large number and variety of news sources, the abolition of the pre-publication state censorship of the Soviet era, and the decriminalization of libel in 2001, numerous factors limit freedom of expression for journalists and editors of Internet, print, and television media alike. Violent attacks on journalists, which many believe to have been politically motivated, are common. The most infamous of these were the murders of two journalists investigating corruption among political officials, Heorhii Gongadze in 2000 and Ihor Oleksansdrov in 2001. Defamation suits against media outlets and individual journalists are frequent. Irrespective of the merits of individual cases, the enormous sums regularly claimed and often awarded in defamation actions threaten the survival of media critical of local and national political figures. Most media outlets keep the official pay of journalists very low and supplement this salary through undocumented, under-the-table “envelope” payments, beyond the notice of the tax authorities. In these circumstances journalists can be easily coerced through the threat of elimination of the bulk of their pay. No less importantly, journalists, particularly those based outside of the capital, also complain of the lack of government transparency and access to government information, despite a recent presidential decree designed to guarantee this right.

The weakness of the Ukrainian economy limits the ability of independent media outlets to thrive as profit-generating businesses that rely exclusively on advertising and sales revenue. Journalists face little opportunity for job mobility and steady income. Economic instability has forced the majority of media outlets and journalists to accept sponsorship from major industrial or political interests in exchange for financial security. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as international and domestic media monitoring groups have noted that the concentration of media ownership frequently limits objectivity in news reporting and that personal or group interests and opinions dominate most media sources. Regional media are most vulnerable to pressure by owners and very often reflect the interests of local business and political interests. Print and broadcast media with a national scope are frequently owned or controlled by individuals close to President Kuchma and therefore most often follow a pro-Kuchma line.

Media outlets’ weak financial positions also leave them vulnerable to political pressure. While the law guarantees equal entry into the market for all potential participants, state-run or pro-presidential media outlets receive favorable rates for newsprint, state-owned offices, and distribution and postal services. Endemic corruption and arcane tax and accounting regulations for businesses lead to falsification of financial records as a necessary tool for survival. As a consequence, most media owners face selective state harassment or closure “under the guise of perfectly legitimate law enforcement.” In addition, the OSCE, international and domestic monitoring groups, and several analysts have noted the government’s use of arbitrary and harassing tax, fire, and health inspections to paralyze and close independent media outlets. In one high-profile case, Taki Spravi [So It Goes], one of Ukraine’s top three publishing firms, was subject to some thirty raids by the tax police between March and November 2002 after the publication of a biography of opposition leader and former Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, Unfulfilled Orders. Several prominent television and radio stations, including the Kyiv-based UTAR television station, Studio 1+1, and Radio Kontinent, all lost their broadcast licenses in recent years in controversial decisions by the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting (NCTRB).

During the March 2002 election period there were numerous reports of direct action against media outlets. In January 2002, printers refused to publish the socialist newspaper Rubezh [The Border], prompting a hunger strike by the publication’s journalists. In February and March 2002, Kyiv printing houses cancelled contracts to publish the opposition newspapers Slovo batkivshchyny [The Word of the Fatherland] and Vechernie vesti, forcing the owners to relocate their printing operation to western Ukraine. In September 2002, fake copies of Vechernie vesti were circulated, calling on Kyiv residents not to join the protests. One week before the elections, unidentified policemen stopped a truck carrying 107,000 copies of the Svoboda opposition newspaper and dropped them in a river. The police subsequently confiscated the reprinted edition at the publisher.

IV. INFORMAL STATE CENSORSHIP THROUGH TEMNIKI

On September 3, 2002, the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee for Freedom of Speech and Information, Mykola Tomenko, made public the existence of an unsigned instructional memorandum, alleged to have originated in the Presidential Administration, which contained detailed instructions for national television station managers concerning the portrayal of political events during news broadcasts. Tomenko had received the document from a top manager at a national television station. These secret directives, known as temniki, originally were sent to a few stations closely associated with the SDPU(u) in the autumn of 2001, in the pre-campaign period prior to the 2002 parliamentary elections. Editors, journalists, and media analysts reported that by August 2002 distribution of temniki had expanded to all stations, and compliance with the instructions was more vigorously enforced through phone calls and intimidation on the part of members of the Presidential Administration.

Production editors and journalists normally encounter temnik instructions and other external directives as delivered to them by top station editors. They reported having seen the clearly identifiable documents in the hands of their supervisors. However, only the most senior station managers and editors-in-chief receive temniki; they are expected to determine an editorial policy in accordance with temniki guidelines and take necessary measures to ensure that they are fulfilled. Journalists from some stations reported that top editors openly discuss with production editors and newsmakers the existence of guidelines and the pressure they feel to guarantee compliance. Editors and journalists fear that failure to comply could result in potentially devastating inspections or withdrawals for the station, or demotion, salary cuts, or job loss for individuals.

Journalists reported that temniki have transformed the news-making process on national television. While Human Rights Watch could not confirm that temniki guided the presentation of all material appearing on news broadcasts, our research did confirm the existence of several clear trends in news programming across all television stations that are consistent with temnik guidelines. Both temniki available to Human Rights Watch and journalists’ statements confirmed that temnik instructions direct television editors and journalists to cover events in ways that portray President Kuchma and the SDPU(u) favorably and that minimize or eliminate negative or controversial information about pro-presidential figures. In addition, the guidelines instruct newsmakers to present negative or misleading information about opposition politicians and parties, or ignore them altogether. The dominance of these trends in programming suggests that television editors and journalists have been induced to tailor their news broadcasts to the narrow framework established by the temnik guidelines. This editorial agenda is not simply attributable to the particular interests of individual station owners, managers, or editors, but rather is imposed by the government and expressed through subtle but effective coercion. Despite government denials of authorship or the existence of temniki, the instructions they carry clearly promote reporting biased in favor of Kuchma and the SDPU(u).

Temniki History
A few newspapers and the two television channels most closely controlled by the SDPU(u) were the first to receive guidelines outlining news broadcasts in late 2001 during the lead-up to the March 2002 parliamentary elections. According to editors and journalists interviewed by Human Rights Watch, these stations’ leaders responded by formulating editorial policy and supervising subordinates according to the instructions presented in the temniki guidelines. According to a major news figure working for one of these stations, the instructions from station leadership in this period, “were …concentrated and clear, so that no one could say, ‘I don’t understand how the news should be presented.’” Newsmakers soon became accustomed to editors’ frequent instructions on political reporting that seemed to them to “depend[] on the mood of the president.” Although journalists were expected to comply with these instructions, a number of them told Human Rights Watch that they nevertheless felt free to include certain information prohibited by the instructions and produce balanced political news without facing negative repercussions.

Political pressure expanded from SDPU(u)-controlled channels to other television stations in the summer of 2002, not long after the appointment of Viktor Medvedchuk as the head of the Presidential Administration and the creation of the Department for Information Policy within the Presidential Administration in mid-2002. As a major news figure from a leading television station told Human Rights Watch, “In this period, systematic censorship on all channels emerged.” Not only were temniki being sent to all national stations, but editors and journalists felt increased pressure to comply with the directives’ instructions. An editor from one station confirmed that after returning from a vacation in the summer 2002, he “immediately felt a sharp difference” in the pressure to edit news in accordance with the outside directives.

In this period top station managers and editors also received more frequent phone calls from figures within the Presidential Administration insisting on compliance and threatening repercussions for stations and individuals who disobeyed the instructions. As a result, leading editors no longer simply established editorial limits but also exercised stricter oversight of the news content and pressured journalists to produce one-sided news, threatening them with negative consequences for non-compliance. Vadim V., an editor from a leading station, reported that by autumn 2002 temniki were no longer used exclusively by the station leadership to determine editorial policy, but also occasionally appeared in the newsroom, where journalists and production editors worked to determine broadcast materials. Journalists noted that the expanded influence of temniki and increased outside pressure coincided with opposition parties’ preparation for nationwide anti-Kuchma demonstrations and efforts by leading politicians to lay the preliminary groundwork in advance of the 2004 presidential elections.

Temniki Authorship
According to editors and journalists, temniki typically arrive via fax or email on blank paper rather than on official letterhead and have no signatures or official stamps that could allow their origins or author(s) to be traced. Journalists speculate that individuals within the Presidential Administration write the temniki, under the tutelage of public relations specialists, and in some cases in cooperation with station managers or top editors. The anonymous nature of the temniki makes their existence easy to deny by both those responsible for their production and those within the executive responsible for media policy. The Head of the Presidential Administration’s Department for Information Policy, Serhii Vasiliev, announced, “We have not said… what issues the media is allowed to examine.” An official at the State Committee for Information Policy, Television, and Radio Broadcasting, the executive body responsible for regulating the media and guaranteeing freedom of expression, told Human Rights Watch, “There is no state policy that condones censorship.” He also denied the existence of the temniki.

Ukrainian authorities attribute perceived censorship in the media to the undue influence of owners and managers or foreign governments, but not the state. They further seek to shift the blame by accusing journalists or politicians who have openly discussed censorship or temniki of engaging in negative publicity, or political or financial opportunism. In a September 13, 2002 press conference, President Kuchma stated that Ukraine’s negative image in terms of freedom of speech was considerably exaggerated for political purposes. In early October, Viktor Medvedchuk claimed that the first politician to publicly confirm the existence of temniki, opposition politician Mykola Tomenko, is himself the author of the temniki. In response to the Verkhovna Rada’s hearings on censorship on December 5, 2002, Serhii Vasiliev stated that the journalists who spoke out against political censorship are all, “representatives and directors of mass media, which are funded by foreign grant makers… Thus, it is necessary to approach the leaders of those countries, which finance these projects, with requests to end censorship immediately.”

Temniki Format
The standard temnik is an eight- to ten-page Russian language document sent weekly to television stations and some newspapers with detailed instructions related to the week’s political events. Additional temniki with further instructions elaborating on specific political developments may also be distributed. Of the instructional documents available to Human Rights Watch, those issued in 2001 were titled “Temnik,” whereas those issued in 2002 were titled “Press release” or “Additional commentary,” but informally all are known as temniki.

Each temnik presents explicit and detailed instructions about which political topics should be covered, how this news should be interpreted, and in which order material should be presented during broadcasts. The tone of the guidelines is straightforward and civil. The standard temnik format consists of several subheadings, which include Theme of the week, Fundamental themes of the week, Ongoing themes, Controversy, Additional themes, and Potential themes. The Additional themes section includes information on topics that should be covered or ignored on specific days of the week. Under each of these subheadings, a particular theme is listed and then followed by one of three phrases—Interpretation, commentary, or the abbreviation FIU (for internal use)—after which explicit instructions are set forth for how each theme included under a subheading should be interpreted.

For the topics acceptable for broadcast, the interpretation, commentary, and FIU section of the temnik includes additional guidelines often requesting that certain aspects of events be highlighted or downplayed, to ensure the emergence of a pro-Kuchma and pro-SDPU(u) perspective. Sometimes these sections state that additional information will follow or that a certain theme will be further clarified. Temniki from 2001 occasionally gave the names of the people responsible for supplying this additional information. Additional information comes in separate temniki and may also come through other means, such as phone calls. Instructions may also include directives specific to certain types of media (newspapers or television stations) or specific media outlets. Instructions also may direct readers’ attention to attachments of additional texts or press releases that sometimes accompany temniki.

Temniki Themes
The temniki include instructions for newsmakers to portray President Kuchma favorably and avoid discussion of events that question his credibility. If a potentially controversial news item is deemed acceptable for inclusion in news broadcasts, the directives typically include instructions to avoid implicating the president. The activities of the SDPU(u) also figure prominently in the temniki. Many of the directives also address news topics related to freedom of expression. Temnik instructions often place a “request to ignore” under topics related to the opposition or call for a distortion in the presentation of the opposition to emphasize controversy, conflicts, and corruption.

Portrayal of Kuchma
Some temnik “requests” regarding coverage of Kuchma appear unrelated to specific political controversy, but instead depict events with the aim of promoting the president’s standing at a time when his domestic and international reputation had been damaged by scandals. A temnik titled “Additional commentary on events of week 36,” issued for the first week of September 2002, includes under the Fundamental themes of the week section the topic: “President L. Kuchma’s participation in the Global summit on sustainable development in Johannesburg (RSA).” The instructions request that news broadcasts emphasize Kuchma’s interactions with powerful European leaders and downplay his contact with African government authorities. “For presentation of the two sides of the meetings—a request to accent the President’s discussions with representatives of the European political elite. A request to portray meetings with leaders of African states in an international economic context based on additional agreement.”

Some temniki seek to clarify Kuchma’s position on controversial issues and others explicitly aim to shield the president from criticism. A temnik titled “Press release” and dated September 13 was issued shortly after Kuchma delivered his televised Independence Day public address. The speech drew negative public reaction, as many concluded that Kuchma intended to change the constitution in order to seek a third term or create conditions for transferring the presidency to his chosen successor. The document opens with the request “to cover the day’s events in the following order on all this evening’s news bulletins,” and lists as the second point, “President Leonid Kuchma took part in an Internet Conference” with the commentary:

During the Internet Conference, President made several important announcements. Their basic theses:
-L. Kuchma will step down as president in 2004;
-L. Kuchma is convinced that Ukraine does not need a dictatorship anymore than any other country;
-L. Kuchma considers that his government is ready for dialogue with the public, but society is not ready for this. ‘Open government is a two-way street.’

Similarly, “Additional commentary for events of week 36” states in the Additional themes section for September 3 that, “A ‘round table’ discussion of political reforms in Ukraine begins at 15:00. FIU: Request to exclude from broadcasts any theses placing under doubt the seriousness of the president’s initiatives.” Ironically, it was at the September 3 roundtable discussion on political reform that Mykola Tomenko first revealed the existence of temniki and used the temnik, “Additional commentary for events of week 36,” as evidence.

“Additional commentary for events of week 36” contained directives to eliminate information about other cases in which Kuchma had been implicated in possible wrongdoing. In late July 2002, eighty-three people had been killed and more than one hundred people injured when a military aircraft crashed into a crowd of spectators at an air show at the Skniliv airfield in Lviv. Kuchma and military officials came under attack for safety failures that may have contributed to the accident. In relation to this, the final point of the Additional themes for September 3 states, “Forty days have passed since the airplane accident at the Skniliv airfield. FIU: A request to ignore the attempts of political parties to turn the fortieth-day [anniversary] of the tragedy into a political show.”

While Human Rights Watch is not aware of any temnik instructions on initial coverage of the criminal investigation of Kuchma announced in October 2002, the response by television news programs when the story broke followed a clear pattern, indicating external pressure. In what one journalist described as a “day of shame for Ukrainian television” on October 15, channels either ignored or reported only in midnight broadcasts on the decision of a Kyiv appellate court judge to open a criminal case against President Kuchma on charges of corruption and abuse of power. In response to this important event, on its prime time evening news program, Studio 1+1 “simply was silent. Not a single word. Zero reaction.” The station broadcast some information on a late night show starting just before midnight. Similarly, both STB and Novyy Kanal included the opening of the criminal case against the president as a news item only in late night programming; it received no mention on the main evening newscasts. The state channel UT-1 did not comment on the initiation of the case in its main evening news broadcast at 9:00 p.m. When UT-1 did describe the event in its late night news program, the text focused on the unfairness of the case. On Inter’s prime time news program, the topic appeared eighth in the news order, well after other material, including the arrival of the Estonian president in Odessa. ICTV proved to be the only station that covered the criminal case in its standard evening news program, but as the fifth item of news. In contrast, the case received attention in major international newspapers, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Berliner Zeitung, as well as Polish and Russian press.

Freedom of Expression
Controversial issues related to freedom of expression are also a topic of concern for temnik authors. For example, the temnik “Additional commentary for events of week 36” included reference to a press conference to be held by the publishing house Taki Spravi, which had recently come under the scrutiny of the tax authorities after the publication of a controversial biography of Yulia Tymoshenko. The press conference’s stated theme was: “The tax police began concrete actions directed towards the illegal seizure of ‘Taki Spravi’ property. They should answer for their violations of the law.” Temnik instructions requested that news broadcasts ignore this press conference. Two other Additional theme items related to freedom of expression also included “request to ignore” instructions. These were points 13 and 19, which read, respectively: “At 10.00 a ceremony will begin for the opening of the Arpad Gense Ukrainian-Hungarian Institute for Informational Technology,” and “The commission for journalistic ethics and the non-governmental organization ‘Charter-4’ are resuming their trip through Ukraine. On September 2-3 representatives of the commission will visit Lviv.”

Some events related to freedom of speech are deemed appropriate for coverage, albeit with a particular interpretation. “Temnik 11” from December 2001 noted that local and international organizations were planning an Internet conference for December 10 entitled “Media and Elections.” The interpretation of this event lists specific questions for journalists to ask participants, including a question for Yulia Mostovaia, the editor of Zerkalo nedeli, a publication known for its independent stance. The temnik requested specifically that journalists should ask Mostovaia, “[Articles]… that function as political advertising have appeared in your newspaper. Will you continue to support this practice? If yes, then go ahead and say, which party will your newspaper support during the elections?”

“Temnik 10” and “Temnik 11” addressed other media issues. The Controversy section of both documents includes a topic entitled “Negative discussion of the SDPU(u) in the mass media. The basic accusation is monopolization of the media.” The interpretation was not elaborated in either temnik, but was to “be distributed additionally” with a contact person specified. Point 21 of “Temnik 10” under Additional themes described parliamentary activities for December 5 and attempted to portray debate on the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting as simple political infighting:

The Verkhovna Rada committee of freedom of speech and information is holding a conference at which they will examine amendments to the current legislation on television and radio, which aim to increase the inspectorate functions of the NCTR. The relationship of parliament to the report of the National Council of Ukraine for television and radio broadcasting (NCTR) may be biased by the proximity of the elections, announced chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on freedom of speech and information [and top SDPU(u) official] Aleksandr Zinchenko. In his words, the committee is analyzing ‘the exceptional professional activities of the NCTR, and the [parliamentary] hall divides according to political tastes, passionately, without analysis of the essence of the questions.’

Activities of the SDPU(u)
Temnik instructions also concentrate on activities of the SDPU(u) and its leader Viktor Medvedchuk. “Temniki” 10, 11, and 12 covering the final three weeks of December each contained instructions related to various national events that presented opportunities for the SDPU(u) to receive positive coverage. These temniki also conveyed instructions for describing events related to the dismissal of Viktor Medvedchuk from the post of deputy chairman of the Verkhovna Rada.

The Fundamental themes of the week for “Temnik 10” included first “the activities of the SDPU(u)” and the theme: “presentation of the revitalized SDPU(u) [web]site.” The temnik made clear that this event was to be interpreted as follows:

The SDPU(u) is using the internet not only as a means for information (here it is obvious that Our Newspaper+ is better at this), but as a means of communication in the system: Leader [and] party members, party [and] supporters, press group [and] journalists, public archive [and] analysts. The SDPU(u) invites even the harshest statements into debates on its forums. In the near future personal sites of leaders and a forum for questions about social democracy will be added. On December 5, a press conference with A. Zinchenko is planned (press release attached).

Other domestic events also presented opportunities for the SDPU(u) and its members to receive positive news coverage. For December 4, 2001 the Additional themes of “Temnik 10” noted:

The national academy of science of Ukraine together with the Fund for intellectual cooperation ‘Ukraine XXI’ is holding a presentation of the first two volumes of the five-volume publication, “History of Ukrainian Culture…. Interpretation: Present [this theme] fully, show a picture. SDPU(u) member […] cares about culture.

Similarly, in “Temnik 11,” the Additional themes for December 10 described another opportunity for SDPU(u) activities to be highlighted. Point sixteen reads:

[International] Human Rights Day. On December 10, 1948 the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal declaration on human rights. It has been celebrated throughout the world since 1950. Interpretation: Connect this to the Law on Languages. In this way, the SDPU(u) defends human rights.

In the Controversy section of “Temnik 10,” point 10 recognizes, “the appearance [in parliament] of projects, analogous to SDPU(u) projects.” This event was to be interpreted to suggest that:

The projects begun by the SDPU(u) find support from other parties. There it is—leadership. Of ideas. The return of the possibility of a social-democratic majority in the future parliament. They have joined our initiatives. What may this stand for but that Medvedchuk will become not only the Leader of the SDPU(u)…


For December 6, “Temnik 10” offers instructions regarding the relevance of international diplomatic events to the SDPU(u)’s political projects. Point 22 suggests that if Ukrainians chose to elect the social democrats in the March elections, the country would have the unique potential to achieve political and social conditions approaching those found in one of Europe’s most economically and politically powerful countries, Germany:

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder will visit [Ukraine]. The fourth round of high-level Ukrainian-German talks will take place…. Interpretation: Schroeder is the head of a country in which the social democrats and greens created a [coalition] government. Try to imagine what kind of Ukrainian government might exist if it was created by the social democrats and the greens.

The December temniki also included detailed instructions for covering events related to the dismissal of SDPU(u) leader Medvedchuk from his post as vice chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. “Temnik 10” begins its Fundamental themes of the week with: “[The SDPU(u)] collected signatures for the VR’s [Verkhovna Rada] passage of the ‘law on languages.’” The ‘interpretation’ suggested that any attempt to oust Medvedchuk should be linked to his position on the language law. It stated:

Fundamental interpretation is based on the text of [then-Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Freedom of Speech and Information and prominent SDPU(u) politician] Zinchenko’s presentation in the VR (text in attachment). It is necessary to present the issue such that the SDPU(u) members are the main initiators. There were many versions [of the law], but [the version proposed by] Medvedchuk prevailed, [and] the signatures were collected. Accentuate all seven languages (Hungarian, Romanian) in a list not starting with Russian. If the law will be passed, then the so-called “Russian Block” may self-destruct and the communists will lose not less than 5% percent of the total number of voters. As a result [of these political losses], a collection of signatures for the dismissal of Medvedchuk began.

The Theme of the Week of “Temnik 11” also addresses “The collection of signatures for the dismissal of Viktor Medvedchuk,” and offers a detailed interpretation:

We are concerned that the right and the left are collecting signatures. It is necessary to protect Medvedchuk—to remember his promotion to the post of first vice speaker, how many important laws the Rada has passed in this time, etc. Connect all positive aspects of the parliament during the session conducted by Medvedchuk to him personally….

After Medvedchuk’s dismissal on December 13, 2001, “Temnik 12” addressed the topic and its repercussions in one-and-half pages of Interpretation. The Theme of the week was “The Dismissal of V. Medvedchuk from the post of first vice speaker of the VR.” Additional commentary follows: “Numerous parties and individual politicians evaluated this event as ‘a strong PR step for the SDPU(u).’ There are suggestions that for the party, new perspectives for strengthening the effectiveness of its pre-election campaign are opening.” The interpretation of these events instructed newsmakers to emphasize that:

… unless Medvedchuk himself had not forced the vote, then it is possible to say with great certainty that the dismissal would not have occurred …What took place on December 13 was an impulsive gesture by a proud man, ‘You don’t trust me? Then vote.’ … In the end they have gotten themselves an unmanageable and ineffective parliament for the next three months …

The text that follows interpreted the political context that precipitated the dismissal:

Nationalists and the Communists joined forces for the vote [on the dismissal] in order to deliver a blow to the center. This is a very worrying symptom … This alliance can become a destructive force, the actions of which will lead to unpredictable consequences.

Specific instructions are included for media outside of the capital:

Separate line for regional media- a source within the PA [Presidential Administration] revealed that the dismissal of Medvedchuk was constructed by Bankova [the central Kyiv street where the Presidential Administration is located] in order to replace Kinakh with Medvedchuk in the post of premier … That is why Kinakh is so scared. Medvedchuk is now considering [the offer], but judging from everything, he will doubtfully agree. It is not advantageous for him; his hands will be tied. For regional media—the line ‘develop courage, vote for Medvedchuk.’

And the final interpretation discusses other ways in which to present Medvedchuk:

For all media: Widely discuss ‘Who is Medvedchuk?’ Use the information line about his dismissal in order to show him not only as a politician, but as a Personality. Offer a portrait, appraisals of Medvedchuk by people close to him. Begin to accent the changes in Medvedchuk’s demeanor. He appears with out a tie, playing golf, he’s changed the color of his suit, frequently smiles, jokes. The man is changing.

Portrayal of Opposition Politicians
Temniki instructions also offer detailed information for covering the activities of opposition figures and parties, in particular the most popular politician in Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko and vocal opposition politician, Yulia Tymoshenko. The events related to the September 16 opposition protest, described above, also received significant attention in the temniki. Journalists confirmed that editors pressured them to comply with the instructions.

Journalists told Human Rights Watch that top management consistently requested that they “change the context” in which Viktor Yushchenko appears and that Yushchenko and his “Our Ukraine” bloc are to be portrayed as mired in internecine conflict or in disagreement with other members of the opposition. The temniki call for precisely such coverage. In its discussion of the forthcoming 2002 parliamentary elections, “Temnik 10,” listed an item called “Yushchenko’s Activities,” which addressed the removal of some members from the “Our Ukraine” party. It proposed an interpretation that “… ‘ethnic cleansing’ is taking place. … Altogether, incomprehensible things are happening with their party list. … A big scandal is in the works for the party conference.”

“Temnik 11” addresses similar themes. “The activities of Yushchenko and ‘Our Ukraine’” are included under the Fundamental themes of the week section, with a long interpretation that states “it is important to show that Yushchenko’s supporters, who want to get into parliament on the party list, won’t make it” due to complications in bloc and party quotas. In addition, the conferences of three parties that pa