UKRAINE ALARMED BY RUSSIAN MOVE INTO THE KERCH STRAIT(/)
10/27/2003 | Абу
Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies
Washington, D.C.
IASPS Policy Briefings: Geostrategic Perspectives on Eurasia
Date: October 23, 2003
Number: 29
UKRAINE ALARMED BY RUSSIAN MOVE INTO THE KERCH STRAIT
by Vladimir Socor, IASPS Senior Fellow
In a challenge to Ukrainian sovereignty, Russian authorities are building a
dam far out into the Kerch Strait in order to change its geography--and,
thus, its median line--and wrest control over navigation in that Strait,
which connects the Black and Azov seas. Russia's unilateral move has
poisoned relations with Ukraine. It is also being watched with concern by
other post-Soviet countries, with which Russia has refused to sign or ratify
border agreements, potentially leaving the demarcation of borders open to
unilateral Russian challenges such as this. It can, moreover, reach the
point of testing the value of existing U.S.-Ukraine and NATO-Ukraine
consultative mechanisms on security issues.
The political outcry in Ukraine and the international implications
notwithstanding, Russian President Vladimir Putin has not said a word on the
subject thus far. The Russian side launched this massive construction
project on September 29 without notifying Ukraine, and without providing any
serious explanation since then, even as the dam is steadily approaching
Ukrainian territory at a rate of some 100 meters per working day. Advancing
from Russia's Krasnodar Territory into the Kerch Strait, the dam is about to
create a new median line in the Strait, to Russia's advantage and Ukraine's
detriment. The Russian move appears designed to make a contentious issue of
Ukraine's de jure and de facto ownership of the Tuzla islet, by virtue of
which Ukraine owns also the deep navigable channel in the Kerch Strait.
In lieu of any explanations, Russia's Foreign Affairs Ministry last week
officially requested Ukraine "without delay to show documentary evidence on
which Ukraine bases its assumption that Tuzla belongs to Ukraine." The
request and its wording not only sought to shift the onus on Ukraine, but
implicitly challenged its sovereign rights in the area.
On October 20, Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Ministry replied in a note
expressing "deep concern over such a request." It cited the principle
(accepted by all parties including Russia as the basis of the post-Soviet
territorial order, and so codified in international law) that the pre-1991
inter-republican borders are the post-1991 inter-state borders. The
Ukrainian note pointed out that Tuzla had, already before 1991, formed an
administrative part of the municipality of Kerch in the Crimea, thus
belonging to the Ukainian SSR--as shown also on all official maps before
1991--and to independent Ukraine afterward. The note went on to cite the
Russian-Ukrainian "friendship treaty", signed by the presidents in 1997 and
ratified by the parliaments the following year, which enshrined the existing
border between the two countries; this meant that Russia had dropped any
claims to the Crimea or parts thereof. "Any attempts to cast doubt on the
validity of those documents can only be regarded as intended to raise
territorial claims to Ukraine," Kyiv's note observed. Pointing out that the
Russian side was "ignoring the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry's repeated
demarches," the Ukrainian note yet again requested explanations regarding
the aims and scope of construction, along with "assurances that it will not
cross the Russian-Ukrainian state border." (Interfax, October 20).
Those unanswered Ukrainian demarches had begun on September 30 (one day
after the start of construction work on the dam) with a protest and request
for explanations by Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Ministry to Russia's embassy
in Kyiv. The newly appointed Ukrainian minister of foreign affairs,
Kostyantin Hryshchenko, on his first visit to Moscow on October 6, received
assurances from Russia's Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and Foreign Affairs
Minister Igor Ivanov that the building of the dam would not violate
Ukrainian territory; but, as it turned out, Moscow--and specifically
Ivanov's ministry--cast some doubt on what constitutes Ukrainian territory
(see above). Ivanov suggested holding talks on the issue by October 30 --
evidently to allow the Russian builders to create the fait accompli by then.
On October 14, Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada adopted across party lines a
statement calling for a stop to the dam's construction, and requesting
Russia's bicameral parliament to support the call. The statement warned that
neighborly relations would be seriously damaged if the construction
continues, and that the Rada would in that case initiate measures under
international law to defend Ukrainian sovereignty. (UNIAN, October 14).
On October 17, President Leonid Kuchma described the situation as "a strain
on Russian-Ukrainian relations." "These actions cannot but be termed
unfriendly; good neighbors don't behave this way." Dismissing a claim that
the dam construction was an initiative of Krasnodar Territory authorities,
Kuchma said that it was Russia's central government who had taken the
decision to launch the project. (One Plus One Television, October 17).
On October 18 at his inaugural press conference, Hryshchenko cautioned
Moscow that its moves jeopardize Ukrainian parliamentary ratification of the
recently signed agreements on the Single Economic Space. (UNIAN, October
18).
Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council discussed the situation at
its sessions on October 6 and October 20. It approved measures--not
specified publicly--"to prevent damage to Ukraine's national interests and
encroachment on its territorial integrity". The Council's communique also
expressed hope that "Russia wll understand and agree to a civilized
solution, in accordance with international law and in spirit of
good-neighborliness and mutual respect." (Interfax, October 20).
Its massive size and high political visibility notwithstanding, the dam
project is surrounded by an atmosphere of secrecy and uncertainty,
apparently designed to deflect from Russia the direct political
responsibility while creating a fait accompli. Thousands of workers, with
hundreds of trucks and earth-moving machines, are engaged in constructing a
dam at least 30 meters wide, advancing far into the Kerch Strait, by now
rapidly approaching the Tuzla islet. Tuzla is 7 kilometers long and 500
meters wide, inhabited by a dozen families of fishermen who are Ukrainian
citizens. Also on the islet are a unit of Ukrainian border guards, some
communications installations, and several holiday homes owned by the Kerch
municipality. The Ukrainian port authority in Kerch is in charge of
administering and maintaining the deep navigable channel. (Zerkalo Nedeli,
October 11; Ukrainian Monitor (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Kyiv), October
19).
Officials in Moscow informally suggest that the dam is being built by
decision of an assembly of Russian Cossacks in Krasnodar Territory, using
their own funds. Both Moscow and Krasnodar officials claim that the dam is
necessary to protect that territory's Taman peninsula from erosion. But
Ukrainian scientists, as well as Ukraine's Kerch municipality (situated
opposite Taman) say that the dam, if built as intended, would obstruct the
circulation of water currents between the Black and Azov seas, and ruin the
fishing grounds at either end of the Strait. The Kerch municipality has
appealed to Presidents Putin and Kuchma to use their authority in averting
such damage.
Moscow's priority, however, appears to be obtaining control of navigation
through the Kerch Strait and--related to that--imposing on Ukraine a "common
use" regime for the Strait and the Azov Sea. Because Ukraine owns the deep
navigation channel and the Tuzla islet, Russia seeks either joint control,
or legal and physical changes that would permit Russia to transgress the
median line and create another deep channel. Meanwhile, Russia seeks "common
use" of the Azov Sea as well, because Ukraine owns some 70 percent of that
sea's coastal line, and would therefore be entitled to a corresponding
percentage of the sea area by sectoral division. Such division would be
proper under international law, because Azov is an open sea (connected via
the Kerch Strait with the Black Sea, and through that with the world ocean).
Moscow, however, wants the Azov treated as a closed sea, and thus subject to
"common use."
For almost a decade, Russia and Ukraine have disagreed on these sectors of
their maritime borders. In January 2003, Putin and Kuchma signed a treaty
delineating the land border between the two countries. That treaty awaits
ratification. Meanwhile, an agreement on the maritime border is not in
sight. One way to bring it closer is by artificially bringing Russia's
shore closer to the Ukrainian shore in the Kerch Strait, even if the move
triggers an interstate political crisis.
But any Russian territorial gain in the Kerch Strait would be dwarfed by
Moscow's political gain, if Ukraine's Western partners--the United States,
the European Union, NATO--continue to look away from the situation, leaving
Ukraine alone to face this Russian encroachment.
Washington, D.C.
IASPS Policy Briefings: Geostrategic Perspectives on Eurasia
Date: October 23, 2003
Number: 29
UKRAINE ALARMED BY RUSSIAN MOVE INTO THE KERCH STRAIT
by Vladimir Socor, IASPS Senior Fellow
In a challenge to Ukrainian sovereignty, Russian authorities are building a
dam far out into the Kerch Strait in order to change its geography--and,
thus, its median line--and wrest control over navigation in that Strait,
which connects the Black and Azov seas. Russia's unilateral move has
poisoned relations with Ukraine. It is also being watched with concern by
other post-Soviet countries, with which Russia has refused to sign or ratify
border agreements, potentially leaving the demarcation of borders open to
unilateral Russian challenges such as this. It can, moreover, reach the
point of testing the value of existing U.S.-Ukraine and NATO-Ukraine
consultative mechanisms on security issues.
The political outcry in Ukraine and the international implications
notwithstanding, Russian President Vladimir Putin has not said a word on the
subject thus far. The Russian side launched this massive construction
project on September 29 without notifying Ukraine, and without providing any
serious explanation since then, even as the dam is steadily approaching
Ukrainian territory at a rate of some 100 meters per working day. Advancing
from Russia's Krasnodar Territory into the Kerch Strait, the dam is about to
create a new median line in the Strait, to Russia's advantage and Ukraine's
detriment. The Russian move appears designed to make a contentious issue of
Ukraine's de jure and de facto ownership of the Tuzla islet, by virtue of
which Ukraine owns also the deep navigable channel in the Kerch Strait.
In lieu of any explanations, Russia's Foreign Affairs Ministry last week
officially requested Ukraine "without delay to show documentary evidence on
which Ukraine bases its assumption that Tuzla belongs to Ukraine." The
request and its wording not only sought to shift the onus on Ukraine, but
implicitly challenged its sovereign rights in the area.
On October 20, Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Ministry replied in a note
expressing "deep concern over such a request." It cited the principle
(accepted by all parties including Russia as the basis of the post-Soviet
territorial order, and so codified in international law) that the pre-1991
inter-republican borders are the post-1991 inter-state borders. The
Ukrainian note pointed out that Tuzla had, already before 1991, formed an
administrative part of the municipality of Kerch in the Crimea, thus
belonging to the Ukainian SSR--as shown also on all official maps before
1991--and to independent Ukraine afterward. The note went on to cite the
Russian-Ukrainian "friendship treaty", signed by the presidents in 1997 and
ratified by the parliaments the following year, which enshrined the existing
border between the two countries; this meant that Russia had dropped any
claims to the Crimea or parts thereof. "Any attempts to cast doubt on the
validity of those documents can only be regarded as intended to raise
territorial claims to Ukraine," Kyiv's note observed. Pointing out that the
Russian side was "ignoring the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry's repeated
demarches," the Ukrainian note yet again requested explanations regarding
the aims and scope of construction, along with "assurances that it will not
cross the Russian-Ukrainian state border." (Interfax, October 20).
Those unanswered Ukrainian demarches had begun on September 30 (one day
after the start of construction work on the dam) with a protest and request
for explanations by Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Ministry to Russia's embassy
in Kyiv. The newly appointed Ukrainian minister of foreign affairs,
Kostyantin Hryshchenko, on his first visit to Moscow on October 6, received
assurances from Russia's Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and Foreign Affairs
Minister Igor Ivanov that the building of the dam would not violate
Ukrainian territory; but, as it turned out, Moscow--and specifically
Ivanov's ministry--cast some doubt on what constitutes Ukrainian territory
(see above). Ivanov suggested holding talks on the issue by October 30 --
evidently to allow the Russian builders to create the fait accompli by then.
On October 14, Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada adopted across party lines a
statement calling for a stop to the dam's construction, and requesting
Russia's bicameral parliament to support the call. The statement warned that
neighborly relations would be seriously damaged if the construction
continues, and that the Rada would in that case initiate measures under
international law to defend Ukrainian sovereignty. (UNIAN, October 14).
On October 17, President Leonid Kuchma described the situation as "a strain
on Russian-Ukrainian relations." "These actions cannot but be termed
unfriendly; good neighbors don't behave this way." Dismissing a claim that
the dam construction was an initiative of Krasnodar Territory authorities,
Kuchma said that it was Russia's central government who had taken the
decision to launch the project. (One Plus One Television, October 17).
On October 18 at his inaugural press conference, Hryshchenko cautioned
Moscow that its moves jeopardize Ukrainian parliamentary ratification of the
recently signed agreements on the Single Economic Space. (UNIAN, October
18).
Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council discussed the situation at
its sessions on October 6 and October 20. It approved measures--not
specified publicly--"to prevent damage to Ukraine's national interests and
encroachment on its territorial integrity". The Council's communique also
expressed hope that "Russia wll understand and agree to a civilized
solution, in accordance with international law and in spirit of
good-neighborliness and mutual respect." (Interfax, October 20).
Its massive size and high political visibility notwithstanding, the dam
project is surrounded by an atmosphere of secrecy and uncertainty,
apparently designed to deflect from Russia the direct political
responsibility while creating a fait accompli. Thousands of workers, with
hundreds of trucks and earth-moving machines, are engaged in constructing a
dam at least 30 meters wide, advancing far into the Kerch Strait, by now
rapidly approaching the Tuzla islet. Tuzla is 7 kilometers long and 500
meters wide, inhabited by a dozen families of fishermen who are Ukrainian
citizens. Also on the islet are a unit of Ukrainian border guards, some
communications installations, and several holiday homes owned by the Kerch
municipality. The Ukrainian port authority in Kerch is in charge of
administering and maintaining the deep navigable channel. (Zerkalo Nedeli,
October 11; Ukrainian Monitor (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Kyiv), October
19).
Officials in Moscow informally suggest that the dam is being built by
decision of an assembly of Russian Cossacks in Krasnodar Territory, using
their own funds. Both Moscow and Krasnodar officials claim that the dam is
necessary to protect that territory's Taman peninsula from erosion. But
Ukrainian scientists, as well as Ukraine's Kerch municipality (situated
opposite Taman) say that the dam, if built as intended, would obstruct the
circulation of water currents between the Black and Azov seas, and ruin the
fishing grounds at either end of the Strait. The Kerch municipality has
appealed to Presidents Putin and Kuchma to use their authority in averting
such damage.
Moscow's priority, however, appears to be obtaining control of navigation
through the Kerch Strait and--related to that--imposing on Ukraine a "common
use" regime for the Strait and the Azov Sea. Because Ukraine owns the deep
navigation channel and the Tuzla islet, Russia seeks either joint control,
or legal and physical changes that would permit Russia to transgress the
median line and create another deep channel. Meanwhile, Russia seeks "common
use" of the Azov Sea as well, because Ukraine owns some 70 percent of that
sea's coastal line, and would therefore be entitled to a corresponding
percentage of the sea area by sectoral division. Such division would be
proper under international law, because Azov is an open sea (connected via
the Kerch Strait with the Black Sea, and through that with the world ocean).
Moscow, however, wants the Azov treated as a closed sea, and thus subject to
"common use."
For almost a decade, Russia and Ukraine have disagreed on these sectors of
their maritime borders. In January 2003, Putin and Kuchma signed a treaty
delineating the land border between the two countries. That treaty awaits
ratification. Meanwhile, an agreement on the maritime border is not in
sight. One way to bring it closer is by artificially bringing Russia's
shore closer to the Ukrainian shore in the Kerch Strait, even if the move
triggers an interstate political crisis.
But any Russian territorial gain in the Kerch Strait would be dwarfed by
Moscow's political gain, if Ukraine's Western partners--the United States,
the European Union, NATO--continue to look away from the situation, leaving
Ukraine alone to face this Russian encroachment.