Ïðîãíîç â³ä Economist Intelligence Unit- 2 ñöåíàð³¿
10/15/2004 | Englishman
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The departure of the president, Leonid Kuchma, from power following the October 31st 2004 presidential election will remove a major source of political tension and provide new momentum to policymaking—particularly as the reformist former prime minister, Viktor Yushchenko, is his most likely successor. However, political instability in Ukraine will remain extremely high in 2005-06: the strength of vested interests in parliament will constrain the new president's room for manoeuvre; ongoing inter-institutional wrangling will remain a significant source of friction; and a parliamentary election will raise political tensions in the first half of 2006. Moreover, some key questions concerning the shape of the political landscape following the presidential election are still far from settled. Most importantly, Mr Yushchenko could fail to convert his popularity into an election victory, given Ukraine's history of electoral abuses and the rising poll ratings of his chief rival, the prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych.
Serious questions also surround ongoing efforts to strengthen parliament at the expense of the presidency, by means of constitutional amendments. Although the election is now only weeks away, Mr Kuchma has not yet publicly abandoned this goal, which he sees as a way to protect his interests once he leaves office. Since parliamentary deputies voted down his initial set of proposed amendments in April, he and his allies have secured parliament’s preliminary approval of a new set of amendments. However, the likelihood that a two-thirds majority will form in parliament in time for a final vote before the presidential election is increasingly remote. As expected, the approach of the presidential poll has deepened divisions in the pro-Kuchma camp in parliament, such that it no longer even controls a simple majority of seats.
Even though constitutional amendments are unlikely to be approved before the election, questions over the institutional balance of power will stay on the agenda after the presidential poll, and could remain a subject of controversy even at the time of the parliamentary election in 2006. At the very least, a large body of parliamentary deputies will attempt to undo the new proportional parliamentary electoral law, which Mr Kuchma signed earlier in 2004 in return for left-wing support for his proposed constitutional changes.
The prolonged political fight over institutional powers will limit the extent to which Mr Yushchenko can deliver on his ambitious election programme. His electoral rhetoric has called for an overhaul of the current regime, with the goal of ensuring better functioning and more transparent institutions in all three branches of power. He is an experienced politician, and his approach will be more moderate than his pre-election statements suggest. He will attempt to establish a reform-oriented consensus and will install a reform-minded government, in which his outspoken opposition partner Yuliya Tymoshenko will play a prominent role. However, he will also compromise with oligarchic factions in parliament, and will attempt to draw their deputies into his camp. Although many will join him, others will strenuously resist the shift in the balance of power, thereby prolonging existing tension between the executive and legislature. Mr Yushchenko is unlikely to try to confront the oligarchs in parliament head on, even if he resists their pressure to agree to grant Mr Kuchma immunity from prosecution. Questions over Mr Kuchma’s future will almost certainly feature prominently in the post-election period.
Alternative scenario
With the prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, now almost within striking distance of Viktor Yushchenko in the polls, there is a growing possibility that he will be declared the winner of a run-off vote in mid-November. The consequences of this could be far-reaching. Over the short term, much would depend on perceptions of the degree of fraud involved in his election. It is still possible, for instance, that Mr Yanukovych’s advantages in terms of resources will allow him to pull ahead in the polls, and that he will win with no greater degree of fraud than occurred in past elections. Although this would prompt some opposition protests as well as criticism from the West, it would be unlikely to paralyse the political system or bring Belarus-style isolation.
However, it is more likely that opposition supporters would accuse the authorities of large-scale ballot-box stuffing in the event of a Yanukovych victory. They would be backed up at least in part by international observers, and would take to the streets in large numbers. Given the stakes involved, they would face a harsh response from the authorities. The Russian government would say very little, but Western governments and institutions would apply immense pressure, although their leverage is questionable.
Given the passivity showed by Ukrainians in the past—most notable in the only limited protests sparked by apparent abuses of power during the current term in office of the outgoing president, Leonid Kuchma—it is hard to imagine popular pressure forcing the results of the election to be overturned. Although a more determined response might emerge this time around, on the part of both ordinary Ukrainians and Western political leaders, the more likely scenario is that the election results would stand. However, Mr Yanukovych would enter office with an unprecedentedly divided populace and cold relations with the West, and would probably face months of concerted efforts by the parliamentary opposition to paralyse the political system.
From the perspective of Mr Kuchma and his allies in parliament, this might still be a far more desirable outcome than a Yushchenko victory. Most importantly for Mr Kuchma, he would be granted immunity outright, or else be able to move into a new political post, either in the parliament or cabinet, which would have the same effect. Mr Kuchma has denied having his eye on the prime minister’s post, but this option cannot be ruled out.
Much of the Kuchma camp would nevertheless view a Yanukovych presidency with some trepidation. The oligarchs who currently dominate parliament and much of the executive branch are far from united. Many of their business interests compete directly with the Donetsk-based clan closely linked to Mr Yanukovych. Compared with his predecessor, Mr Yanukovych would be in a weaker position to balance the different oligarchs’ interests, and he would struggle to control the Kiev-based clan around Viktor Medvedchuk and the Dnipropetrovsk clan around Viktor Pinchuk. Ukraine’s political scene under Mr Yanukovych’s presidency would therefore be more openly divided than under Mr Kuchma, or even than under Mr Yushchenko.
In terms of policies, the practical achievements of a Yanukovych presidency would not necessarily differ starkly from those of a Yushchenko presidency, even if the tone would be strikingly different. Much of the tenor set by a Yushchenko presidency—in terms of vocal and consistent support for deeper political reforms, increased transparency and media freedoms—would be absent under Mr Yanukovych. However, at a practical level the difference would be far less, as Mr Yushchenko would struggle to translate his rhetoric into concrete results. This is also true with regard to economic reforms. Given the strength of vested interests in parliament, Mr Kuchma’s departure will result in only moderately faster reform progress, regardless of who wins the election.
Unresolved institutional issues would similarly remain a significant distraction under either election scenario. Mr Yanukovych would be no more interested than Mr Yushchenko in carrying out Mr Kuchma’s proposed constitutional reforms to weaken the presidency. However, he too would need to deal with the current dysfunctional distribution of power. As there is no consensus in favour of the existing institutional configuration, ongoing efforts to reshape the balance of power are very likely.
In terms of external policies, Mr Yanukovych would find it far more difficult to deepen ties with the West. Even assuming that he repaired the rifts opened up as a result of the conduct of the election, he would find it more difficult than Mr Yushchenko to escape the isolation inherited from the Kuchma period. In practical terms, the EU would hold back the “market economy” status that Ukraine has long sought, and the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) would progress more slowly. However, existing forms of co-operation with the EU, most notably the partnership and co-operation agreement (PCA), would remain in place. More generally, Mr Yanukovych would be unlikely to abandon the European vector of Ukraine’s foreign policy altogether, notwithstanding his increasingly pro-Russian electoral rhetoric.
The departure of the president, Leonid Kuchma, from power following the October 31st 2004 presidential election will remove a major source of political tension and provide new momentum to policymaking—particularly as the reformist former prime minister, Viktor Yushchenko, is his most likely successor. However, political instability in Ukraine will remain extremely high in 2005-06: the strength of vested interests in parliament will constrain the new president's room for manoeuvre; ongoing inter-institutional wrangling will remain a significant source of friction; and a parliamentary election will raise political tensions in the first half of 2006. Moreover, some key questions concerning the shape of the political landscape following the presidential election are still far from settled. Most importantly, Mr Yushchenko could fail to convert his popularity into an election victory, given Ukraine's history of electoral abuses and the rising poll ratings of his chief rival, the prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych.
Serious questions also surround ongoing efforts to strengthen parliament at the expense of the presidency, by means of constitutional amendments. Although the election is now only weeks away, Mr Kuchma has not yet publicly abandoned this goal, which he sees as a way to protect his interests once he leaves office. Since parliamentary deputies voted down his initial set of proposed amendments in April, he and his allies have secured parliament’s preliminary approval of a new set of amendments. However, the likelihood that a two-thirds majority will form in parliament in time for a final vote before the presidential election is increasingly remote. As expected, the approach of the presidential poll has deepened divisions in the pro-Kuchma camp in parliament, such that it no longer even controls a simple majority of seats.
Even though constitutional amendments are unlikely to be approved before the election, questions over the institutional balance of power will stay on the agenda after the presidential poll, and could remain a subject of controversy even at the time of the parliamentary election in 2006. At the very least, a large body of parliamentary deputies will attempt to undo the new proportional parliamentary electoral law, which Mr Kuchma signed earlier in 2004 in return for left-wing support for his proposed constitutional changes.
The prolonged political fight over institutional powers will limit the extent to which Mr Yushchenko can deliver on his ambitious election programme. His electoral rhetoric has called for an overhaul of the current regime, with the goal of ensuring better functioning and more transparent institutions in all three branches of power. He is an experienced politician, and his approach will be more moderate than his pre-election statements suggest. He will attempt to establish a reform-oriented consensus and will install a reform-minded government, in which his outspoken opposition partner Yuliya Tymoshenko will play a prominent role. However, he will also compromise with oligarchic factions in parliament, and will attempt to draw their deputies into his camp. Although many will join him, others will strenuously resist the shift in the balance of power, thereby prolonging existing tension between the executive and legislature. Mr Yushchenko is unlikely to try to confront the oligarchs in parliament head on, even if he resists their pressure to agree to grant Mr Kuchma immunity from prosecution. Questions over Mr Kuchma’s future will almost certainly feature prominently in the post-election period.
Alternative scenario
With the prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, now almost within striking distance of Viktor Yushchenko in the polls, there is a growing possibility that he will be declared the winner of a run-off vote in mid-November. The consequences of this could be far-reaching. Over the short term, much would depend on perceptions of the degree of fraud involved in his election. It is still possible, for instance, that Mr Yanukovych’s advantages in terms of resources will allow him to pull ahead in the polls, and that he will win with no greater degree of fraud than occurred in past elections. Although this would prompt some opposition protests as well as criticism from the West, it would be unlikely to paralyse the political system or bring Belarus-style isolation.
However, it is more likely that opposition supporters would accuse the authorities of large-scale ballot-box stuffing in the event of a Yanukovych victory. They would be backed up at least in part by international observers, and would take to the streets in large numbers. Given the stakes involved, they would face a harsh response from the authorities. The Russian government would say very little, but Western governments and institutions would apply immense pressure, although their leverage is questionable.
Given the passivity showed by Ukrainians in the past—most notable in the only limited protests sparked by apparent abuses of power during the current term in office of the outgoing president, Leonid Kuchma—it is hard to imagine popular pressure forcing the results of the election to be overturned. Although a more determined response might emerge this time around, on the part of both ordinary Ukrainians and Western political leaders, the more likely scenario is that the election results would stand. However, Mr Yanukovych would enter office with an unprecedentedly divided populace and cold relations with the West, and would probably face months of concerted efforts by the parliamentary opposition to paralyse the political system.
From the perspective of Mr Kuchma and his allies in parliament, this might still be a far more desirable outcome than a Yushchenko victory. Most importantly for Mr Kuchma, he would be granted immunity outright, or else be able to move into a new political post, either in the parliament or cabinet, which would have the same effect. Mr Kuchma has denied having his eye on the prime minister’s post, but this option cannot be ruled out.
Much of the Kuchma camp would nevertheless view a Yanukovych presidency with some trepidation. The oligarchs who currently dominate parliament and much of the executive branch are far from united. Many of their business interests compete directly with the Donetsk-based clan closely linked to Mr Yanukovych. Compared with his predecessor, Mr Yanukovych would be in a weaker position to balance the different oligarchs’ interests, and he would struggle to control the Kiev-based clan around Viktor Medvedchuk and the Dnipropetrovsk clan around Viktor Pinchuk. Ukraine’s political scene under Mr Yanukovych’s presidency would therefore be more openly divided than under Mr Kuchma, or even than under Mr Yushchenko.
In terms of policies, the practical achievements of a Yanukovych presidency would not necessarily differ starkly from those of a Yushchenko presidency, even if the tone would be strikingly different. Much of the tenor set by a Yushchenko presidency—in terms of vocal and consistent support for deeper political reforms, increased transparency and media freedoms—would be absent under Mr Yanukovych. However, at a practical level the difference would be far less, as Mr Yushchenko would struggle to translate his rhetoric into concrete results. This is also true with regard to economic reforms. Given the strength of vested interests in parliament, Mr Kuchma’s departure will result in only moderately faster reform progress, regardless of who wins the election.
Unresolved institutional issues would similarly remain a significant distraction under either election scenario. Mr Yanukovych would be no more interested than Mr Yushchenko in carrying out Mr Kuchma’s proposed constitutional reforms to weaken the presidency. However, he too would need to deal with the current dysfunctional distribution of power. As there is no consensus in favour of the existing institutional configuration, ongoing efforts to reshape the balance of power are very likely.
In terms of external policies, Mr Yanukovych would find it far more difficult to deepen ties with the West. Even assuming that he repaired the rifts opened up as a result of the conduct of the election, he would find it more difficult than Mr Yushchenko to escape the isolation inherited from the Kuchma period. In practical terms, the EU would hold back the “market economy” status that Ukraine has long sought, and the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) would progress more slowly. However, existing forms of co-operation with the EU, most notably the partnership and co-operation agreement (PCA), would remain in place. More generally, Mr Yanukovych would be unlikely to abandon the European vector of Ukraine’s foreign policy altogether, notwithstanding his increasingly pro-Russian electoral rhetoric.