Про справи в Грузії - стаття з Forbes (англ.)
01/04/2005 | mpal
http://www.forbes.com/global/2005/0110/076.html
On The Cover/Top Stories
Reform, Caucasus-Style
Matthew Swibel, 01.10.05
A year ago the great new democratic hope in the former Soviet Union was Georgia. Today a young president pursues a revival, but the deep pockets belong to operator Badri Patarkatsishvili.
Before you get too excited over the democracy-seeking throngs in the streets of Kiev, look around. A year earlier a similar-seeming popular movement took place a thousand miles away in the Republic of Georgia. The results there should give pause to anyone who expects the former Soviet empire to be awakening to an era of prosperity and transparency.
Georgia's so-called Rose Revolution, a bloodless coup, was the toast of the West: A handsome, American-schooled young leader named Mikhail Saakashvili, supported by an international democracy lobby and undergirded by the second-biggest per capita U.S. foreign aid program in the world, would shine freedom's light on a benighted piece of the globe, the Caucasus region. To help, a wealthy maverick jetted in from Russia intent on cutting Georgia's economic shackles with a bold round of privatizations.
The story was too good to be true. At the first Rose anniversary, Georgia knows mostly thorns. Rusty old Russian Ladas swerve around gaping potholes on the main airport road to Tbilisi, the capital, while city dwellers grasp for every extra hour of heat, power and running water. Privatization has amounted to attempts to resettle existing accounts among powerful insiders. If the door to prosperity has swung open in this country of 5 million, so far only one opportunist is venturing in: Badri Patarkatsishvili.
At age 51, Badri (as he is widely known) is a bushy-moustached operator with a reputation for getting things done. He had success late in the former regime of Eduard Shevardnadze, during a time when Saakashvili, then justice minister, raised concerns about the influence of "gangster, oligarch capital." It was the beginning of an extended dance between Georgia's young democratic hope and its tainted Daddy Warbucks. Badri, while proud of his humble Jewish roots in Tbilisi--he got into auto repair as a teen in Soviet times--has leveraged ties to Russian oligarchs to amass a fortune that speaks loudly even under a reformist government.
Those Russian ties were cemented in the 1990s after he became the business partner of auto tycoon Boris Berezovsky and then Roman Abramovich, by helping handle the 1997 privatization of Sibneft oil company (sold to Berezovsky for an estimated $100 million, but later found to be worth billions). Abramovich had Badri manage a $3 billion investment in Russian Aluminum soon after.
Badri had landed in Tbilisi from Moscow in 2000--on the run. Around that time Russian President Vladimir Putin cut off the special access Badri and Berezovsky had exploited in Boris Yeltsin's Kremlin. Berezovsky fled to London. Badri "had run out of places to go," explains Richard Miles, U.S. ambassador to Georgia. Months after settling in Tbilisi, Badri was charged in absentia along with Berezovsky by the Russian prosecutor general's office with committing fraud and embezzlement totaling $13 million at Russia's largest car manufacturer, Avtovaz. Both dispute the charges.
Berezovsky is never far behind: Georgian border guards looked the other way last December when Berezovsky flew under an alias on a U.K. passport to visit Badri and his wife in Tbilisi.
Badri in 2002 managed to buy a famed public building, the Wedding Palace, a state-owned Soviet secular cathedral for marriage ceremonies, and make it one of his homes. Tbilisi's new tycoon also got a foothold in Georgian media by acquiring a company that carried a TV broadcasting license--which could have been revoked according to Georgian law because the company hadn't broadcast in more than a year, says Genadi Uchumbegashvili, director of Internews Georgia, an organization that pushes for broader media ownership.
For decades it has been easy to finger powerful business operators cutting corners in this backward region, but such shenanigans are not supposed to be part of Saakashvili's Georgia. The 36-year-old president had studied at Columbia University and practiced law in Manhattan. He spent a stretch under the tutelage of busybody billionaire George Soros, who bankrolled a Saakashvili presidential campaign and subsequent popular putsch with a reported $42 million. (Enough $20s and $50s will get lots of Georgians marching and waving flags in the streets.) Indeed, Saakashvili and his kindergarten cabinet--one-third are under 35--have projected a fresh face of government, drawing headlines for prosecuting a handful of crooked officials and tackling the bribe-laden police force.
"We not only had high-profile cases but we changed the role of [corruption] in society," says Saakashvili in an interview. "And now the focus is on the economy."
The clock is ticking on his promise of 11% real economic growth by 2007 (2004 is projected at 6%). Georgia's inflation rate of 10% has offset pension increases of $8 per month. Yes, nearly 400 companies are on the block, including ports and electric generating plants. But proceeds to the government are expected to total only $500 million, and even then offers have been scarce.
The Western press has reported on take-charge Kakha Bendukidze, who ran Russia's largest heavy machinery company before trying his hand as Georgia's privatization czar (he still carries a Russian passport). Since his arrival in June Bendukidze, a portly and pensive man who closes his eyes for long periods when he speaks, has told foreign investors, "Everything can be sold, except conscience." He might want to work on the rest of his pitch. He recently advised potential U.S. and British bidders that most of the country's assets aren't worth much.
And in reality it's an economy replete with the kind of dodgy arrangements better suited to a character like Badri. Georgian officials extract 3% of corporate revenue in bribes, nearly twice as much as in Russia, says a 2004 report by the International Monetary Fund. Georgia ranks 128 out of 133 countries surveyed for corruption by Transparency International. Half of Georgia lives at or below the poverty level. Justice-starved courts hew to a political agenda. Kidnappings for ransom also occur. After spending $275 million over four years on modernizing Tbilisi's electricity distribution plant, AES Corp. pulled out of Georgia in 2003 after its financial manager there was slain following electricity tariff increases. "The conditions here make [potential] Western investors think twice, with long pauses in between," says S. Enders Wimbush, chairman of the America-Georgia Business Council and formerly director of Radio Liberty in Munich.
Yet Badri is at home. Between 2000 and 2003, before Saakashvili's rise, he spent tens of millions of dollars amalgamating widely divergent Georgian assets that included a professional soccer club, a shopping center, a controlling stake in the Borjomi mineral water company, a Black Sea resort and at least one casino. In 2002, as Georgia's politics heated up, Badri's roll-up of newspapers and TV stations into his Imedi media umbrella harked back to the days when, as chairman of Berezovsky's TV6 station in Moscow, he helped exert political pressure on adversaries.
Imedi's TV and radio transmitters are powerful enough to interfere with rivals' broadcasts on neighboring frequencies. "Competitors think the powerful transmitters were installed deliberately to create technical problems for them. The aggrieved regularly appeal to the National Regulatory Commission for Communications, but so far they have failed to succeed," says a European Commission-funded study. Now Badri is angling for deals in soon-to-be-privatized telecom.
But Badri plays public benefactor. He kicked in $2.25 million to cover 80% of the costs of Georgia's Olympics squad in Athens and gave gold medalists a $100,000 purse (Georgia won two). And he made a $1 million three-year loan to Tbilisi's city council (with interest of 5%) in frigid January 2004 to cover natural gas bills from Russia.
Badri's latest deal: a $1 billion investment over six years to develop Georgia's largest oil port, in the Black Sea coastal town of Qulevi. Building a new oil port in such a disadvantaged country might seem heroic. "Everything possible will be done for its construction to finish successfully," gushed the president at a ceremony marking the first $150 million investment in the Qulevi terminal. He vowed later to keep close watch so that Badri doesn't get harassed by tax collectors.
Badri and Saakashvili share a displeasure with the Kremlin, which has refused to close its army bases in Georgia, the birthplace of Josef Stalin but a sovereign state since 1991.
Russia also provides protection for two secessionist regions on Georgia's northern border--Abkhazia and South Ossetia--where smuggling and armed conflict persist. A 2004 study by the Transnational Crime & Corruption Center in Georgia found that at the Abkhazia border in 2002 some 800 detained illegals carried with them 55,000 ammunition cartridges, 19 kilos of explosives and 10 kilos of drugs. Russian "peacekeeping" forces in South Ossetia (close by the mass slaying of Beslan schoolchildren last fall) take $10 bribes to let an estimated 150 light trucks a day move into Tbilisi carrying contraband cigarettes, wheat and fuel, together worth $100 million annually.
Despite, or because of, the trouble spots, the U.S. has lavished foreign aid on tiny Georgia, spending $1.3 billion over the last decade. The U.S. government is also spending $64 million to train and equip 2,000 Georgian border guards to establish an antiterrorism force (some of whom have cut their teeth in postwar Iraq). U.S. military equipment bound for Afghanistan is sent via Georgia's ports.
Georgia is key to the Bush Administration's emphasis on diversifying energy supplies away from the Middle East. Beginning in 2005 Caspian Sea oil from Azerbaijan will snake westward through Georgia (bypassing Russia) to a Turkish port on the Mediterranean. By 2007 a consortium led by BP (and including Unocal and ConocoPhillips as partners) should have fully running the $3.2 billion, 1,100-mile pipeline (the world's longest) taking 1 million barrels a day. Big plus: The pipeline will also generate about $50 million in transit fees annually, or 6% of Georgia's current GDP, during its projected 40-year life span.
Small problem: The pipeline design runs through Georgia's pristine Borjomi mountain gorge, where an oil spill could pollute the quality and damage the reputation of Georgia's third-largest export--Borjomi mineral water, adored in Tbilisi and Moscow the way Parisians cherish Evian, the same Borjomi water now controlled by Badri Patarkatsishvili. In 2003 he took his stake in the Georgian Glass & Mineral Water Co. through his London-based Salford investment arm (a piece of which is owned by Berezovsky). Internal Salford paperwork estimates the stigma from the pipeline's location could amount to $50 million in lost sales.
BP was on site for just one week in Borjomi before Saakashvili's environment minister ordered construction to stop. In October the two parties agreed to concessions from BP totaling--surprise!--at least $50 million. "There were contentious issues, and ultimately much more funds were provided," says Saakashvili, who denies any special handling to suit Badri. On the record BP says the money will go to extra maintenance, security and the funding of social and economic programs. It is unclear what role the Borjomi water company, which extracts water from the land, will have in the programs.
Badri's Qulevi port, meantime, is another reach into the Caspian oil riches. The first stage is set to be completed by the end of 2005, with a goal of handling 200,000 barrels of fuel and crude oil a day with shipments delivered to the port by rail from the Caspian. If Qulevi can crank it up to 300,000 barrels, it would overtake the country's two biggest oil ports, Batumi and Poti.
"The new pipeline will take much of the crude, and our existing port capacity already exceeds demand," says Jemal Inaishvili, a former director of Poti port. "I don't know the real motivation."
For Saakashvili one factor is that Batumi, Georgia's largest oil terminal, is situated in a formerly secessionist territory where rebels blew up bridges and cut off oil exports for a week earlier in 2004. A more competitive Qulevi terminal would also exert pressure on Batumi's private owners, a British consortium that paid an estimated $14 million for the terminal in 1995 and now faces criticism from Tbilisi that the bid--supposedly at one-eighth of fair value--did not follow current Georgian laws. Batumi officials say they followed the law at the time.
Badri's endgame? At least partly to make it harder for Russia to wield its main weapon, energy, in regions of economic competition. In some ways Georgians are still under the thumb of Russian energy: In 2003 the Kremlin-controlled electricity monopoly, Unified Energy Systems, bought a controlling stake in the utility in Tbilisi. The Qulevi terminal, at least, could provide Romania, Bulgaria and Belarus a welcome alternative to the tightfisted pricing of Russian fuel, says Mamuka Tsereteli, a professor of international relations at American University in Washington, D.C. who has consulted with companies in the Georgian transport sectors. (Governments that rile Putin usually risk steep price increases or having the tap turned off entirely, as happened in Belarus and Lithuania.) "At $45, $50 a barrel it could work, but what about at $20?" asks Tsereteli.
"I must admit the investment carries a certain risk," Badri told a journalist on his payroll at Georgian Imedi TV in mid-October 2004. "However, my position is that if we do not do it, who will?"
Much the same line came from his Salford men when asked about Badri's curious welcome amid the new president's anticorruption drive. "What matters is that he's the biggest investor in Georgia," demurs an associate in Tbilisi. (Badri himself dodged repeated requests for an interview.)
Alternatively it might be asked: If one man--indeed, if this man--has such an in on the spoils of the new Georgia, who else would want to be part of the mix? For his part, Saakashvili acknowledges he's aware of appearances in seeking investment in Georgia. He tells us, "We want to make sure any money is clean money."
On The Cover/Top Stories
Reform, Caucasus-Style
Matthew Swibel, 01.10.05
A year ago the great new democratic hope in the former Soviet Union was Georgia. Today a young president pursues a revival, but the deep pockets belong to operator Badri Patarkatsishvili.
Before you get too excited over the democracy-seeking throngs in the streets of Kiev, look around. A year earlier a similar-seeming popular movement took place a thousand miles away in the Republic of Georgia. The results there should give pause to anyone who expects the former Soviet empire to be awakening to an era of prosperity and transparency.
Georgia's so-called Rose Revolution, a bloodless coup, was the toast of the West: A handsome, American-schooled young leader named Mikhail Saakashvili, supported by an international democracy lobby and undergirded by the second-biggest per capita U.S. foreign aid program in the world, would shine freedom's light on a benighted piece of the globe, the Caucasus region. To help, a wealthy maverick jetted in from Russia intent on cutting Georgia's economic shackles with a bold round of privatizations.
The story was too good to be true. At the first Rose anniversary, Georgia knows mostly thorns. Rusty old Russian Ladas swerve around gaping potholes on the main airport road to Tbilisi, the capital, while city dwellers grasp for every extra hour of heat, power and running water. Privatization has amounted to attempts to resettle existing accounts among powerful insiders. If the door to prosperity has swung open in this country of 5 million, so far only one opportunist is venturing in: Badri Patarkatsishvili.
At age 51, Badri (as he is widely known) is a bushy-moustached operator with a reputation for getting things done. He had success late in the former regime of Eduard Shevardnadze, during a time when Saakashvili, then justice minister, raised concerns about the influence of "gangster, oligarch capital." It was the beginning of an extended dance between Georgia's young democratic hope and its tainted Daddy Warbucks. Badri, while proud of his humble Jewish roots in Tbilisi--he got into auto repair as a teen in Soviet times--has leveraged ties to Russian oligarchs to amass a fortune that speaks loudly even under a reformist government.
Those Russian ties were cemented in the 1990s after he became the business partner of auto tycoon Boris Berezovsky and then Roman Abramovich, by helping handle the 1997 privatization of Sibneft oil company (sold to Berezovsky for an estimated $100 million, but later found to be worth billions). Abramovich had Badri manage a $3 billion investment in Russian Aluminum soon after.
Badri had landed in Tbilisi from Moscow in 2000--on the run. Around that time Russian President Vladimir Putin cut off the special access Badri and Berezovsky had exploited in Boris Yeltsin's Kremlin. Berezovsky fled to London. Badri "had run out of places to go," explains Richard Miles, U.S. ambassador to Georgia. Months after settling in Tbilisi, Badri was charged in absentia along with Berezovsky by the Russian prosecutor general's office with committing fraud and embezzlement totaling $13 million at Russia's largest car manufacturer, Avtovaz. Both dispute the charges.
Berezovsky is never far behind: Georgian border guards looked the other way last December when Berezovsky flew under an alias on a U.K. passport to visit Badri and his wife in Tbilisi.
Badri in 2002 managed to buy a famed public building, the Wedding Palace, a state-owned Soviet secular cathedral for marriage ceremonies, and make it one of his homes. Tbilisi's new tycoon also got a foothold in Georgian media by acquiring a company that carried a TV broadcasting license--which could have been revoked according to Georgian law because the company hadn't broadcast in more than a year, says Genadi Uchumbegashvili, director of Internews Georgia, an organization that pushes for broader media ownership.
For decades it has been easy to finger powerful business operators cutting corners in this backward region, but such shenanigans are not supposed to be part of Saakashvili's Georgia. The 36-year-old president had studied at Columbia University and practiced law in Manhattan. He spent a stretch under the tutelage of busybody billionaire George Soros, who bankrolled a Saakashvili presidential campaign and subsequent popular putsch with a reported $42 million. (Enough $20s and $50s will get lots of Georgians marching and waving flags in the streets.) Indeed, Saakashvili and his kindergarten cabinet--one-third are under 35--have projected a fresh face of government, drawing headlines for prosecuting a handful of crooked officials and tackling the bribe-laden police force.
"We not only had high-profile cases but we changed the role of [corruption] in society," says Saakashvili in an interview. "And now the focus is on the economy."
The clock is ticking on his promise of 11% real economic growth by 2007 (2004 is projected at 6%). Georgia's inflation rate of 10% has offset pension increases of $8 per month. Yes, nearly 400 companies are on the block, including ports and electric generating plants. But proceeds to the government are expected to total only $500 million, and even then offers have been scarce.
The Western press has reported on take-charge Kakha Bendukidze, who ran Russia's largest heavy machinery company before trying his hand as Georgia's privatization czar (he still carries a Russian passport). Since his arrival in June Bendukidze, a portly and pensive man who closes his eyes for long periods when he speaks, has told foreign investors, "Everything can be sold, except conscience." He might want to work on the rest of his pitch. He recently advised potential U.S. and British bidders that most of the country's assets aren't worth much.
And in reality it's an economy replete with the kind of dodgy arrangements better suited to a character like Badri. Georgian officials extract 3% of corporate revenue in bribes, nearly twice as much as in Russia, says a 2004 report by the International Monetary Fund. Georgia ranks 128 out of 133 countries surveyed for corruption by Transparency International. Half of Georgia lives at or below the poverty level. Justice-starved courts hew to a political agenda. Kidnappings for ransom also occur. After spending $275 million over four years on modernizing Tbilisi's electricity distribution plant, AES Corp. pulled out of Georgia in 2003 after its financial manager there was slain following electricity tariff increases. "The conditions here make [potential] Western investors think twice, with long pauses in between," says S. Enders Wimbush, chairman of the America-Georgia Business Council and formerly director of Radio Liberty in Munich.
Yet Badri is at home. Between 2000 and 2003, before Saakashvili's rise, he spent tens of millions of dollars amalgamating widely divergent Georgian assets that included a professional soccer club, a shopping center, a controlling stake in the Borjomi mineral water company, a Black Sea resort and at least one casino. In 2002, as Georgia's politics heated up, Badri's roll-up of newspapers and TV stations into his Imedi media umbrella harked back to the days when, as chairman of Berezovsky's TV6 station in Moscow, he helped exert political pressure on adversaries.
Imedi's TV and radio transmitters are powerful enough to interfere with rivals' broadcasts on neighboring frequencies. "Competitors think the powerful transmitters were installed deliberately to create technical problems for them. The aggrieved regularly appeal to the National Regulatory Commission for Communications, but so far they have failed to succeed," says a European Commission-funded study. Now Badri is angling for deals in soon-to-be-privatized telecom.
But Badri plays public benefactor. He kicked in $2.25 million to cover 80% of the costs of Georgia's Olympics squad in Athens and gave gold medalists a $100,000 purse (Georgia won two). And he made a $1 million three-year loan to Tbilisi's city council (with interest of 5%) in frigid January 2004 to cover natural gas bills from Russia.
Badri's latest deal: a $1 billion investment over six years to develop Georgia's largest oil port, in the Black Sea coastal town of Qulevi. Building a new oil port in such a disadvantaged country might seem heroic. "Everything possible will be done for its construction to finish successfully," gushed the president at a ceremony marking the first $150 million investment in the Qulevi terminal. He vowed later to keep close watch so that Badri doesn't get harassed by tax collectors.
Badri and Saakashvili share a displeasure with the Kremlin, which has refused to close its army bases in Georgia, the birthplace of Josef Stalin but a sovereign state since 1991.
Russia also provides protection for two secessionist regions on Georgia's northern border--Abkhazia and South Ossetia--where smuggling and armed conflict persist. A 2004 study by the Transnational Crime & Corruption Center in Georgia found that at the Abkhazia border in 2002 some 800 detained illegals carried with them 55,000 ammunition cartridges, 19 kilos of explosives and 10 kilos of drugs. Russian "peacekeeping" forces in South Ossetia (close by the mass slaying of Beslan schoolchildren last fall) take $10 bribes to let an estimated 150 light trucks a day move into Tbilisi carrying contraband cigarettes, wheat and fuel, together worth $100 million annually.
Despite, or because of, the trouble spots, the U.S. has lavished foreign aid on tiny Georgia, spending $1.3 billion over the last decade. The U.S. government is also spending $64 million to train and equip 2,000 Georgian border guards to establish an antiterrorism force (some of whom have cut their teeth in postwar Iraq). U.S. military equipment bound for Afghanistan is sent via Georgia's ports.
Georgia is key to the Bush Administration's emphasis on diversifying energy supplies away from the Middle East. Beginning in 2005 Caspian Sea oil from Azerbaijan will snake westward through Georgia (bypassing Russia) to a Turkish port on the Mediterranean. By 2007 a consortium led by BP (and including Unocal and ConocoPhillips as partners) should have fully running the $3.2 billion, 1,100-mile pipeline (the world's longest) taking 1 million barrels a day. Big plus: The pipeline will also generate about $50 million in transit fees annually, or 6% of Georgia's current GDP, during its projected 40-year life span.
Small problem: The pipeline design runs through Georgia's pristine Borjomi mountain gorge, where an oil spill could pollute the quality and damage the reputation of Georgia's third-largest export--Borjomi mineral water, adored in Tbilisi and Moscow the way Parisians cherish Evian, the same Borjomi water now controlled by Badri Patarkatsishvili. In 2003 he took his stake in the Georgian Glass & Mineral Water Co. through his London-based Salford investment arm (a piece of which is owned by Berezovsky). Internal Salford paperwork estimates the stigma from the pipeline's location could amount to $50 million in lost sales.
BP was on site for just one week in Borjomi before Saakashvili's environment minister ordered construction to stop. In October the two parties agreed to concessions from BP totaling--surprise!--at least $50 million. "There were contentious issues, and ultimately much more funds were provided," says Saakashvili, who denies any special handling to suit Badri. On the record BP says the money will go to extra maintenance, security and the funding of social and economic programs. It is unclear what role the Borjomi water company, which extracts water from the land, will have in the programs.
Badri's Qulevi port, meantime, is another reach into the Caspian oil riches. The first stage is set to be completed by the end of 2005, with a goal of handling 200,000 barrels of fuel and crude oil a day with shipments delivered to the port by rail from the Caspian. If Qulevi can crank it up to 300,000 barrels, it would overtake the country's two biggest oil ports, Batumi and Poti.
"The new pipeline will take much of the crude, and our existing port capacity already exceeds demand," says Jemal Inaishvili, a former director of Poti port. "I don't know the real motivation."
For Saakashvili one factor is that Batumi, Georgia's largest oil terminal, is situated in a formerly secessionist territory where rebels blew up bridges and cut off oil exports for a week earlier in 2004. A more competitive Qulevi terminal would also exert pressure on Batumi's private owners, a British consortium that paid an estimated $14 million for the terminal in 1995 and now faces criticism from Tbilisi that the bid--supposedly at one-eighth of fair value--did not follow current Georgian laws. Batumi officials say they followed the law at the time.
Badri's endgame? At least partly to make it harder for Russia to wield its main weapon, energy, in regions of economic competition. In some ways Georgians are still under the thumb of Russian energy: In 2003 the Kremlin-controlled electricity monopoly, Unified Energy Systems, bought a controlling stake in the utility in Tbilisi. The Qulevi terminal, at least, could provide Romania, Bulgaria and Belarus a welcome alternative to the tightfisted pricing of Russian fuel, says Mamuka Tsereteli, a professor of international relations at American University in Washington, D.C. who has consulted with companies in the Georgian transport sectors. (Governments that rile Putin usually risk steep price increases or having the tap turned off entirely, as happened in Belarus and Lithuania.) "At $45, $50 a barrel it could work, but what about at $20?" asks Tsereteli.
"I must admit the investment carries a certain risk," Badri told a journalist on his payroll at Georgian Imedi TV in mid-October 2004. "However, my position is that if we do not do it, who will?"
Much the same line came from his Salford men when asked about Badri's curious welcome amid the new president's anticorruption drive. "What matters is that he's the biggest investor in Georgia," demurs an associate in Tbilisi. (Badri himself dodged repeated requests for an interview.)
Alternatively it might be asked: If one man--indeed, if this man--has such an in on the spoils of the new Georgia, who else would want to be part of the mix? For his part, Saakashvili acknowledges he's aware of appearances in seeking investment in Georgia. He tells us, "We want to make sure any money is clean money."
Відповіді
2005.01.05 | Mult
ееееееее... а переклад???:)) (-)
2005.01.05 | ilia25
Власть должна быть под контролем с самого первого дня
А в Грузии, кстати, после победы революции первым делом перекроили конституцию на российский манер, чтобы сделать власть тов. Саакашвили как можно более полной и как можно более бесконтрольной.2005.01.05 | Михайло Свистович
Re: Власть должна быть под контролем с самого первого дня
ilia25 пише:> А в Грузии, кстати, после победы революции первым делом перекроили конституцию на российский манер, чтобы сделать власть тов. Саакашвили как можно более полной и как можно более бесконтрольной.
Це не зовсім так. Ви ж її не читали, правда? Ні стару, ні нову.
2005.01.05 | ilia25
Re: Власть должна быть под контролем с самого первого дня
Михайло Свистович пише:> ilia25 пише:
> > А в Грузии, кстати, после победы революции первым делом перекроили конституцию на российский манер, чтобы сделать власть тов. Саакашвили как можно более полной и как можно более бесконтрольной.
>
> Це не зовсім так. Ви ж її не читали, правда? Ні стару, ні нову.
А якщо читав?
Предыдущая конституция явно определяла президента главой исполнительной власти. Что делало его по крайней мере ответственным за ее действия. Новая конституция вводит пост премьера, который якобы является главой исполнительной власти, но на деле подчиняется президенту. Т.е. ситуация как в России или Украине -- президент де факто руководит страной, но за херовую подготовку к зиме отвечает не он, а премьер.
Я не могу понять, зачем еще нужен пост премьера в президентской республике, кроме как для назначения туда официального стрелочника. Это, и еще как место для подготовки преемника в управляемой демократии (Путин, с Януковичем не прошло).
2005.01.05 | Михайло Свистович
Re: Власть должна быть под контролем с самого первого дня
ilia25 пише:>
> А якщо читав?
То б не писали того, що Ви пишете про Конституцію Грузії.
2005.01.05 | Ukropithecus (robustus)
Re: Власть должна быть под контролем с самого первого дня
Насправді пост прем'єра створили в Грузії не під стрєлочніка, а під Жванію. Все інше - правда, в президентській республіці пост прем'єра є зайвим (США), бо тоді це вже не президентська республіка, а монархія.2005.01.05 | Moron
Lessons. PM: No Poroshenko. No Tymoshenko. No Letvin...
... Yekhanurov or a lower key person. Maybe Kinah.You gave your money for campaign; good for you. You got security: let all have a level playing ground!
Julia! Join a new Nasha Ukrajina campaign - 2006 as part of one team!
Nasha Ukrajina! Be open or loose an 80% majority.
Nasha Ukrajina! Rely on the people's power and get more democratic - elect deputies by internal voting procedures! You have a broader financial and human resource support now - no need to beg the old donors only. Be a good party.
Yuschenko! Corporate interests - out of government and out of Rada!
Yuschenko! New government should be functional, not political. You are supported.
Crooks - fewer losses for you if you are cooperative. Then, transparent, level playground for all!
2005.01.05 | Englishman
Ще один погляд
Мій дайджест по матеріалх від Economist Intelligence UnitThe political scene will continue to be dominated by the president, Mikhail Saakashvili, and, to a lesser extent, by the prime minister, Zurab Zhvania, and the speaker of parliament, Nino Burjanadze. The three leaders govern the country through their political alliance, the National Movement-Democrats bloc. However, tensions between the three are likely to come to the fore over the forecast period, owing to differences over the direction and sequencing of political and economic reform. This may in turn lead to a growing rift between the government and parliament.
The Economist Intelligence Unit has previously highlighted the risk of an increase in tension between the three leaders, mainly owing to differences in their political style—Mr Saakashvili is confrontational and populist, Ms Burjanadze and Mr Zhvania more moderate and circumspect—and also in ideology. These differences are reflected in their respective political movements. The National Movement has a strongly nationalist and populist streak, which Mr Saakashvili has nurtured, whereas the Democrats bloc seems inclined towards a centre-right stance. However, frictions are most likely to emerge between Mr Saakashvili and Mr Zhvania, who are politically ambitious and therefore likely to compete with each other for power and prestige. These differences are not conducive to an effective government, particularly given the highly competitive personal element in Georgian politics. It remains too early to state whether their alliance will hold in the longer term, but they are likely to work together in the short term, since the high degree of public expectation and their overall dominance of the political system means that they could individually lose more by disagreeing than by presenting a united front.
The other issue is whether the three leaders can retain their hold over their almost two-thirds parliamentary majority. Ten members of parliament have defected from the ruling alliance since the March 2004 parliamentary election and are in the process of establishing different factions in parliament. Their decisions were the result of disagreements over the direction of the reform effort, criticism of which has been mirrored by other opposition parties, and other government members were unhappy at Mr Saakashvili’s decision to exclude them from heading the new government in the autonomous republic of Adzharia. There is therefore a risk that more government members will leave the ruling alliance, which would lead to problems in passing reform legislation. This would have a knock-on effect on trust in the ruling alliance and its mandate for reform—the public has so far backed the government in the hope that reforms would eventually result in an improved economic performance and a better standard of living.
The construction of two major pipelines—the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline Project (SCP)—will be the main factor fuelling economic growth over the forecast period. Pipeline activity will have important spillover effects on related sectors such as transport and communications, and hotels and catering. Employees in these sectors of the economy will benefit from an increase in wages, which will translate into further strong domestic demand. A resurgence of international interest in Georgia will pull in external financial assistance, which will also have a beneficial impact on growth. External financing will be used to implement economic reforms, build up Georgia's deteriorating infrastructure and cover budgetary spending. We therefore expect average annual real GDP growth of about 12% in 2005-06.
Georgia's economy is in such a poor state that the implementation of milder reforms is having an immediate and positive effect on economic growth. However, this effect will be more than offset if the new government undertakes crucial structural reforms, such as privatisation and public-sector reform. This would have a negative impact on economic growth in the short term, owing to an increase in unemployment and social hardship in the industrial and public sectors—at present, Georgia does not have the capacity to generate jobs for the newly unemployed, and pipeline activity is unlikely to absorb such high numbers. However, the benefits in terms of long-term growth would be substantial, since the industrial base could be diversified beyond the traditional metallurgy and mining sectors. The development of a viable manufacturing sector would make Georgia's export base less dependent on low value-added goods, which provide less revenue and are subject to wide variations in price. This would help to cushion Georgia's internal and external balances from external shocks.
Real GDP growth was a robust 9.4% year on year in the first half of 2004, compared with 8.6% a year earlier. Official GDP calculations include a proxy for the size of the shadow economy, which is assumed to be 30% of total output. Solid economic performance was attributable to a substantial expansion in the industrial, construction and services sectors. As in 2003, construction benefited from investment in the building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline Project (SCP). Together, these two projects accounted for over 70% of total construction activity in the first half of 2004. An increase in demand for private housing has also contributed to the construction boom. The increase in construction activity has had spillover effects into services such as telecommunications, and hotels and catering, with a consequent increase in employment and, therefore, domestic demand.
The industrial sector posted growth of just over 16% year on year in the first six months of 2004, as a result of the solid performance of the processing subsector. Wine production has been growing strongly, owing to a near doubling of the grape harvest in 2003—grapes are picked towards the end of the calendar year and processed in the following year. Mining grew at a far slower pace, but exports of metals have brought in substantial export revenue, since world prices have been buoyant (see Foreign trade and payments).
Industrial output nevertheless remains heavily dependent on the activity of a small number of enterprises. About 50 industrial enterprises—out of a total of 2,800—are responsible for over 75% of total output. The development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which account for only about 15% of industrial activity, has been hampered by unfavourable legislation and widespread corruption. By comparison, SMEs contribute about 50-60% to industrial activity in most developed economies. The government is gradually taking steps to deal with high-level corruption, which is forcing some large-scale businesses to emerge from the shadow economy out of a concern that their operations will also come under scrutiny. However, encouraging firms to emerge from the black economy will be difficult—corruption is rife, owing to low salaries; many firms are small, making it easy for them to evade taxes; and even though legislation is being streamlined in order to improve the business environment, enforcement will be hampered by the graft that permeates all sections of society.
2003a 2004b 2005c 2006c
Real GDP growth 11.1 9.5 12.0 12.0
Consumer price inflation (av) 4.8 5.1 5.6 5.8
Many of the political parties that were opposed to the Shevardnadze regime were marginalised in the March 2004 parliamentary election, when the National Movement-Democrats bloc (led by Mr Saakashvili, Mr Zhvania and the speaker of parliament, Nino Burjanadze) swept to power, since they had discredited themselves in the eyes of the public by failing to join Mr Saakashvili and his allies in calling for Mr Shevardnadze's resignation after the flawed parliamentary election of November 2003. Most of the effective political opposition in Georgia is therefore confined to the NGOs that were pivotal in helping to oust Mr Shevardnadze from office. These NGOs have become increasingly critical of Mr Saakashvili and his government. In mid-October fourteen prominent journalists, legal experts and analysts published an open letter that stated that the president was betraying his own declared principles by marginalising all forms of opposition or alternative opinion. The letter stated that "intolerance towards people with different opinions is being implanted in Georgian politics and in other areas of political life". The letter went on to state that "attempts to establish an intellectual dictatorship and mono-opinion will not lead to country to rapid reforms, but to authoritarian rule and stagnation".
NGOs have assailed the administration for attempting to control news media coverage and of applying the law selectively in the ongoing anti-corruption drive—they accuse the government of targeting political enemies while leaving supporters untouched. Human rights activists have also stated that those taken into custody have been subjected to police abuse and torture (August 2004, The political scene). Recent criticism of the government has extended beyond the NGOs and opposition: ten members of the ruling National Movement-Democrats bloc have left the alliance since the March 2004, with some of them citing disagreements with the government over its policy direction. Four members of the Republican Party also quit the alliance, primarily because Mr Saakashvili did not choose a member of their party to head the autonomous republic of Adzharia (August 2004, The political scene). Mr Saakashvili’s failure to govern by consensus could bode ill for Georgia’s future development: the evidence in many countries suggests that reform and economic progress can only be achieved by promoting political pluralism. In the transition economies, in particular, market reforms and political democratisation have gone hand-in-hand. Moreover, the president's leadership style could lead to marked frictions, both within the government and with parliament, slowing down the reform process.
The possible development of these frictions is of especial concern, since vested interests associated with the previous administration, led by Mr Shevardnadze, still retain considerable influence—even though the arrest of officials from the old regime on charges of corruption has continued. Some are present in parliament, since they were elected on a constituency basis in the November 2003 election, the results of which were not annulled (although there are 235 seats in parliament, voting in the March parliamentary election only took place for the 150 seats under the proportional system based on party lists; the results obtained for the 85 seats from single-mandate constituencies in the November 2003 election were ratified by the Supreme Court). Others have ties to large industrial enterprises, and the most powerful retain their place in local government. The latter changed allegiance after Mr Shevardnadze resigned from his position as president, and they now appear to be attempting to infiltrate the ruling party at a local level, in an attempt to block reform efforts. There is similar resistance in the state bureaucracy, which is overstaffed. Even if government and the opposition parties are unified and press ahead with reform, their attempts are likely to be frustrated by a state administration and institutions that are dominated by the nomenklatura that gradually installed itself under Mr Shevardnadze's rule.
2005.01.05 | ky
O well, smart people learn from other people mistakes
Демократия в Грузии так и не закрепилась (нет политического плюрализма), с коррупцией так и не разобрались (чиновники воруютсссс)....
Економичеслая свобода - хуже чем при кучмовской власти in Ukraine ????
Cовершить революцию одно дело - закрепить её завоевание - другое.
Давить надо на власть, не спускать ошибки, заставлять власть делать то, что необходимо для прогресса и демократии.
Первое, с чем надо бороться - коррупция в государственных струкрурах.
Smart people learn from other people mistakes,
stupid people learn from their own.
Умные учатся на чужих шишках, глупые - набивают собственные.
2005.01.05 | Sergunia
Рост реального ВВП на 12% в год - очень впечатляет .
Таким образом, за 6,5 лет грузинский ВВП удвоится.Хотя и останется предельно малым в абсолютных цифрах.
Но вот если им удастся опять присоединить Абхазию, и всерьез заняться туризмом - то рост еще ускорится.
К тому же, как сказал Ющенко из Карпат, всего за один год удалось увеличить сборы в бюджет в 3 (три) !!!! раза.
Глядишь, и Украинский бюджет за год раза в полтора вырастет...
2005.01.05 | Бобров
Re: Рост реального ВВП на 12% в год - очень впечатляет .
Сьогодні знайшов і іншу статтю з цієї теми в "Газеті по-києвські"Грузия: год без Шеварднадзе, но с Саакашвили
ГОД НАЗАД, 4 ЯНВАРЯ 2004 ГОДА, ГРУЗИЯ ВЫБРАЛА ПРЕЗИДЕНТА, С КОТОРЫМ СВЯЗЫВАЛИ ВСЕ ЧАЯНИЯ «РЕВОЛЮЦИИ РОЗ». КОЕ-ЧТО СБЫЛОСЬПосле долгих лет правления Эдуарда Шеварднадзе, с небольшим перерывом на Звиада Гамсахурдиа, страна получила нового лидера – молодого и энергичного. Свои надежды с ним связали год назад 96% граждан этой натерпевшейся бед страны. Насколько изменилась Грузия за это короткое время?
«Газета...» беседовала на эту тему с грузинским журналистом Бачо Корчилава.
– Бачо, что изменилось в Грузии за прошедший год?
– Пожалуй, самые заметные успехи произошли в экономике. Бюджет страны никогда не превышал при Шеварднадзе $400 млн, а в этом году он уже составил более $1 млрд, впервые Грузия узнала, что такое профицит бюджета. Минимальная зарплата выросла с 20 лари ($10) до 115 лари, пенсии – с 14 лари ($7) до 28 лари (дифференциации пенсий в Грузии, к сожалению, нет). Заметно понизился уровень коррупции в государственных структурах.
– А самые болезненные точки?
– Это, конечно, социальная сфера. У нас почти отсутствует средний класс – либо бедные, либо богатые, и бедных очень много. Не реформированы многие государственные органы, они остаются неповоротливыми и не могут адекватно реагировать на запросы населения. Единственное, что реформировалось активно, – это армия; но этот процесс был начат еще при Шеварднадзе, во многом под давлением Вашингтона.
– Мы привыкли видеть в репортажах из Грузии трубы печек-буржуек, которые выходят из окон тбилисских многоэтажек...
– Да, в Грузии уже 14 лет нет ни центрального отопления, ни горячей воды. С электричеством в Тбилиси уже более-менее благополучно, – если его и отключают, то на час в неделю максимум. А вот в провинции ситуация страшная: тут люди могут пользоваться электричеством от силы четыре часа в сутки. Правительство пытается навести порядок, но осязаемых успехов пока нет.
– Запад, как известно, приветствовал победу «революции роз» и приход на президентский пост Михаила Саакашвили. Ощутила ли страна за этот год экономическую составляющую этой поддержки? В страну пошли инвестиции?
– Сами инвестиции, как вы понимаете, – не очень быстрое дело. В отношении Грузии работает американская программа «Миллениум» – программа помощи бедным странам, поступают гранты от неправительственных структур. Что касается непосредственно инвестиций, то тут активность проявляют американские компании, недавно заинтересованность в приобретении ряда предприятий и их дальнейшем развитии выразила украинская компания «Интерпайп». Кстати, в связи с последними событиями в вашей стране в Грузии появились большие надежды на то, что украинская экономика может стать альтернативой российской, которая всегда тут довлела. Отношение к Украине у нас очень хорошее: грузины очень чутки к тому, как к ним относятся, и платят той же монетой.
В общем, в нынешней ситуации грузинская экономика ориентирована на Турцию, Украину и США. Европейцы более осторожны и малоповоротливы.
– Существует такое мнение, что сейчас в Грузии все держится на одном человеке – президенте. Не остался ли Саакашвили без гражданской поддержки, один на один с проблемами год спустя после своей триумфальной победы?
– Нет, гражданская поддержка у Саакашвили есть, хотя она не такая, конечно, как была год назад, однако и сейчас она немалая. Если тогда было 96%, то сейчас – 70%. Но это разочарование из разряда ожидаемых, во время революций всегда ожидания завышены. И в этом спаде есть свои позитивные стороны. Например, сразу после революции в стране совсем не было оппозиции, если не считать небольшой группки людей из окружения Шеварднадзе, а сейчас она уже существует. Проблема одиночества президента есть, но это одиночество харизматика, который привык все делать сам, который сам хочет и готов быть в центре всех событий.
– Вы понимаете, что после событий оранжевой революции мы поневоле сравниваем наши страны и наших лидеров, и примеряем результаты правления Саакашвили на возможное будущее Украины.
– Думаю, как нельзя сравнивать наши страны – Грузия значительно более бедная страна, – так нельзя сравнивать и наших президентов. Виктор Ющенко более мягкий, Михаил Саакашвили жестче и радикальнее. Ющенко – политик прогнозируемый, он действует по некоему плану, а Саакашвили – всегда спонтанный, неожиданный. Кроме того, уровень харизмы Саакашвили иной – он сплотил всю нацию, а у Ющенко был конкурент в борьбе за первый пост. У вас процесс передачи власти от старого режима прошел в конституционном русле, у нас – нет. Не было у нас и президентских выборов во время революции – она произошла в период парламентских, и Саакашвили избрали позднее. И люди у вас, насколько мне известно, в своем большинстве голосовали не столько за Ющенко, сколько против Януковича, у нас – однозначно за Саакашвили.
– Бачо, как вы прокомментируете то, что «Репортеры без границ» в своем ежегодном рейтинге дали Грузии на целых 23 пункта меньше, чем за год до этого? В Грузии существует проблема со свободой слова, с правами человека?
– Есть такая проблема. Создавая себе имидж государственного деятеля – непримиримого борца с недостатками, – Саакашвили порой переступает черту, за которой начинаются нарушения прав человека. Что касается СМИ, некоторые из них в годы революции слишком сблизились с политиками и политикой, превратившись в средство воздействия на массы. И у них это, надо сказать, хорошо получилось. Но эти политики победили, а СМИ остались от них зависимыми. Потому у журналистов нередко очень сильна самоцензура, о проблемах зачастую стараются не говорить, если они задевают «своих». Это серьезный вопрос, который перед президентом и его командой поднимают в основном неправительственные организации.
– Кстати, о неправительственных организациях. Чем сейчас занимается знаменитая «Кмара», сыгравшая заметную роль в революции?
– Она ничем не занимается. Удел таких структур, созданных для перемены власти, – распад после того, как дело сделано. В какой-то момент они становятся опасны для политиков, которых они привели во власть. Но наша «Кмара» в оппозицию пока не ушла. Им остается делиться своим опытом, как и сербскому «Отпору». Вот сейчас к ним добавится ваша «Пора».
– Вы назвали множество проблем, которые сейчас существуют в Грузии. Значит ли это, что Грузия готова разочароваться в Саакашвили?
– Однозначно – нет. 32 года страной управлял один человек – Эдуард Шеварднадзе, это было какое-то болото, без надежды на обновление. Сейчас такая надежда появилась. И хотя не все меняется быстро и не всегда эти перемены к лучшему, шагов вперед все же больше, и это – главное.
http://www.pk.kiev.ua