Революція у Венесуелі очима українців
10/01/2005 | Боррачо
У кінці - порівняння боліваріанської Венесуели та олігарх-імперіалістичної путинської Росії. Все інше - ілюстрована розповідь про інакшу революцію, яка можлива і в Україні.
http://www.caracas.ru/rus/stol/bolivarianskie_zapiski
http://www.caracas.ru/rus/stol/bolivarianskie_zapiski
Відповіді
2005.10.02 | Divchina
Re: Революція у Венесуелі очима українців
Так, це дуже цікаво. Треба ще до Аргентини придивитися. Теж є дещо спільне з Україною. Я до речі, і як журналіст цікавлюся Венесуелою та Кубою.2005.10.02 | Боррачо
Re: Революція у Венесуелі очима українців
Щодо Венесуели та Куби - це не проблема. Звертайтесь по будь-яку інформацію. Ми з ними активно приятелюємо.2005.10.02 | Divchina
Re: Революція у Венесуелі очима українців
Чудово! Куди я вам можу написати?Про всяк залишаю свою адресу ukrnow@yahoo.com
2005.10.03 | Боррачо
Re: Революція у Венесуелі очима українців
Пишіть на borracho@ua.fm Ми Вам зкинемо кілька гб фото та музики з В-ли2005.10.03 | Стопудів
А про ФМ=станції ви не розкажете вже? (-)
2005.10.03 | Боррачо
Re: А про ФМ=станції ви не розкажете вже? (-)
Чом ні? Розкажу. Якщо телеканали країни все ще знаходятся у олігархів, а архідемократичний Чавес не хоче іх в них відбрирати, то фм-станції переважно контролює боліваріанська молодь. Звісно, це люди не на кшталт каськівих, а щось подібне до павлів корчагіних. Тобто, вихідці з барріос, що отримали освіту та социальний статус завдяки революції, і билися за неї під час путчу (наприклад, молодий міністр зв`язку Андрес Ісарра). Відповідно, радіостанції дуже популярні у барріос Каракасу та провінції (а це 80% населення Венесуели). Звісно, вони дуже не схожі на європейські та українські. В ефірі багато народної, антиімперіалістичної музики, майже нема реклами (окрім соціальної - проти паління, тощо), а замість шансону - Алі Прімера, Віолета Парра, "Сабор і Пуебло", та інші шедеври.2005.10.03 | Стопудів
взагалі-то я в Дівчини питав
Вона колись в іншій гілці казала, що може допомогти інфою впро власників ФМ.А за Венесуелу дякую - дуже цікаво. А гроші звідки вони беруть, якщо немає реклами? Чи це державні радіо?
2005.10.03 | Боррачо
Re:
> А за Венесуелу дякую - дуже цікаво. А гроші звідки вони беруть, якщо немає реклами? Чи це державні радіо?Державні. Сама тільки націоналізована нафта дає у бюджет 13 млрд. доларів (!) щорічно. Втім, раніше вона давала не менше. Але за Чавеса велика частина ціх грошей була спрямована у русло соціальної політики, а до цього вона підживлювала рахунки місцевих олігархів у Маямі. В обмін на нафту Венесуела "імпортувала" із Куби десятки тисяч висококваліфікованих лікарів та вчителів. З цього ж фінансуються і боліваріанські фм-и, а також новостворений латиноамериканскій вваріант "Аль-Джазіри" - "Телесур" (спільний проект Венесуели, Бразилії, Аргентини, Уругваю, Куби).
2005.10.02 | Сергій Кабуд
Венесуелa очима Freedom House. фіговінький режим
Country Reports 587Spain
Population: 42,500,000
GNI/capita: $14,580
Life Expectancy: 79
Religious Groups: Roman Catholic (94 percent),
other (6 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Mediterranean and Nordic
Capital: Madrid
Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 1
Status: Free
Overview:
Ten-Year Ratings Timeline (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1,2F 1,2F 1,2F 1,2F 1,2F 1,2F 1,2F 1,1F 1,1F 1,1F
After eight years of conservative rule, the Socialist Party
won general elections in March 2004. The elections took
place only a few days after the bombing of commuter trains
in Madrid by al-Qaeda, the Islamic terrorist group, took the lives of nearly 200 people.
The government’s quick response in blaming Basque terrorists was largely seen as
the reason for the conservatives’ defeat at the polls. Keeping an election promise, the newly
elected prime minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, pulled 1,300 Spanish soldiers
out of Iraq, citing the lack of a UN mandate for the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. On the
domestic front, the government began drafting a law to legalize same-sex marriage.
The unification of present-day Spain dates from 1512. After a period of colonial
influence and wealth, the country declined as a European power and was occupied
by France in the early nineteenth century. By the end of the century, after a number
of wars and revolts, Spain lost its American colonies. The Spanish Civil War, from
1936 to 1939, led to the deaths of more than 350,000 Spaniards and the victory of
Franco’s Nationalists, who executed, jailed, and exiled the opposition Republicans.
During Franco’s long rule, many countries cut off diplomatic ties, and his regime
was ostracized by the United Nations from 1946 to 1955. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
(ETA, or Basque Fatherland and Freedom) was formed in 1959 with the aim of creating
an independent Basque homeland. After a transitional period on Franco’s death
in 1975, Spain emerged as a parliamentary democracy, joining the European Economic
Community, the precursor to the European Union (EU), in 1986.
During the March 2004 parliamentary elections, the Spanish Socialist Workers’
Party (PSOE) won more than 43 percent of the vote, capturing 164 seats in the Congress
of Deputies (lower house). The PSOE toppled the conservative People’s Party
(PP), which had been in power for 11 years, and which took 148 seats. Other parties
winning seats included the left Convergence and Union (CiU), Catalonia’s Republican
Left (ERC), the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), the United Left (IU), and the
Canarian Coalition (CC). Lacking an outright majority, the PSOE relied on the support
of various regionalist parties to support its legislation. In the Senate, the PP led
by winning 102 directly elected seats, while the PSOE took 81 directly elected seats.
The election came only three days after multiple terrorist bombings of commuter
trains in Madrid that killed nearly 200 people. Shortly after the bombing, the conser588
Freedom in the World—2005
Political Rights
and Civil Liberties:
vative government blamed ETA, a factor that angered voters when it was discovered
that the perpetrators were linked to al-Qaeda. The attacks allegedly came in
response to the conservative government’s staunch support of the U.S.-led war in
Iraq. Shortly after his accession to the post of prime minister, Rodriguez Zapatero
pulled the 1,300 Spanish troops out of Iraq. However, he also promised to double
the Spanish peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. A 16-year old Spaniard accused of
trafficking a significant amount of explosives used in the bombing admitted to his
role in the attacks during a very quick trial in November 2004 and received a six year
sentence.
Regionalist pressures continued during the year as the Basque regional government
continued to make plans for an illegal referendum in early 2005 that would
propose de facto political independence from Spain. In the Catalan region, a coalition
of socialists and radical nationalists joined forces after elections in November
2003 to demand more autonomy for the region.
In October 2004, the government, in collaboration with the French police, arrested
ETA’s political leader, Mikel Albizu, as well as his girlfriend and 16 other members
of the group, in southwest France. The arrests, which also netted a significant
amount of firearms and explosives, dealt a serious blow to the separatist group, which
has been waging a 30-war against the Spanish state for Basque independence. By
the end of the year, over 70 ETA members and collaborators had been arrested by
the police.
The new government introduced a number of socially liberal pieces of legislation,
including a same-sex marriage bill. If approved by parliament, Spain will be the
third EU country to allow same-sex marriage. The prime minister, who made women’s
rights and gender equality a centerpiece of his electoral campaign, also introduced
a “gender violence” law that would confront the widespread problem of domestic
violence in the country.
Citizens of Spain can change their government democratically.
The Chamber of Deputies has 350 members that are
elected from closed party lists in individual constituencies.
There is also a Senate, which has 259 members, 208 of which are directly elected and
51 of which are appointed as regional representatives. The country is divided into
17 autonomous regions with varying degrees of power. People generally have the
right to organize in different political parties and other competitive groups of their
choice. However, the Basque-separatist Batasuna Party remains permanently banned
since 2003 for its alleged ties to the armed group ETA.
Political corruption remains an issue in Spain. Spain was ranked 22 out of 146
countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2004 Corruption Perceptions
Index.
Spain has a free and lively press with more than 100 newspapers that cover a
wide range of perspectives and are active in investigating high-level corruption. Daily
newspaper ownership, however, is concentrated within large media groups like Prisa
and Zeta. A Syrian-born television reporter for the Qatar-based satellite network Al-
Jazeera, Spanish citizen Tayseer Alouni, was arrested and placed in police custody
again in November. Alouni was among 35 people arrested and charged with terrorrelated
offenses in September 2003. Alouni, who has interviewed Osama bin Laden
Country Reports 589
for Al-Jazeera, was charged with having links to al-Qaeda and using reporting trips
to Kabul, Afghanistan, as a cover for fund-raising activities.
The Basque separatist group, ETA, continued its campaign of fear targeted
against journalists that oppose its views on the political situation in the disputed region.
Journalists and newspapers reported receiving threats by ETA in October 2004.
Freedom of religion is guaranteed in Spain through constitutional and legal protections.
Roman Catholicism, however, is the dominant religion and enjoys privileges
that other religions do not, such as financing through the tax system. Jews,
Muslims, and Protestants have official status through bilateral agreements with the
state, while other religions (for example, Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Mormons)
have no special agreements with the state.
The government does not restrict academic freedom. However, ETA and other
Basque nationalists, through a campaign of street violence and vandalism in the
region, continue to intimidate unsympathetic academics, journalists, and politicians.
The constitution provides for freedom of assembly and the government respected
this right. People are free to demonstrate and speak publicly. Domestic and international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operated within the country freely
without government restrictions. With the exception of members of the military,
workers are free to organize and join unions of their choice. Workers also have the
right to strike, although there are limitations imposed on foreigners. The Basic Act
on Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain, which went into force in 2001, limits
the rights of foreign workers to organize and strike. The law, which forces foreigners
to “obtain authorization for their stay or residence in Spain” before they can organize,
strike, or freely assemble, is intended to distinguish between “legal” and “irregular”
foreigners. The issue is currently before the Constitutional Court.
The constitution provides for an independent judiciary. However, there have
been concerns about the functioning of the judicial system, including the impact of
media pressure on sensitive issues like immigration and Basque terrorism. The Spanish
government endorsed a judicial reform plan in 2003 that will enhance the transparency
of judges and magistrates. The judiciary has also been affected by Basque
terrorism as judicial officials and law enforcement officers have been targets of ETA.
Prison conditions generally met international standards. There were, however, reports
of police abuse of prisoners, especially immigrants. Police can also hold suspects
of certain terror-related crimes for up to five days with access only to a public
lawyer.
The constitution provides for an ombudsman (the People’s Defender) whose
duties include investigating alleged human rights abuses by government officials.
The country has tightened its immigration legislation in recent years to stem the
influx of immigrants into the country. In May, two foreign nationals who were loosely
tied to the March 11 bomb attacks in Madrid were expelled from the country because
they were deemed a threat to national security. The country’s Aliens Law allows for
the expulsion of legal immigrants if they are involved in activities that are considered
threatening to the country’s national security.
A Spanish national, Hamed Abderrahman Ahmed, who was held in U.S. military custody
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was turned over to Spanish authorities in February.
Women enjoy legal protections against rape, domestic abuse, and sexual harassment
in the workplace. Despite this, violence against women—particularly within
590 Freedom in the World—2005
Sri Lanka
Population: 19,600,000
GNI/capita: $850
Life Expectancy: 72
Religious Groups: Buddhist (70 percent),
Hindu (15 percent), Christian (8 percent),
Muslim (7 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Sinhalese (74 percent), Tamil (18 percent),
Moor (7 percent), other (1 percent)
Capital: Colombo
Political Rights: 3
Civil Liberties: 3
Status: Partly Free ★
Overview:
Ten-Year Ratings Timeline (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
4,5PF 3,5PF 3,4PF 3,4PF 3,4PF 3,4PF 3,4PF 3,4PF 3,3PF 3,3PF
the home—remains a serious problem in the country. The new prime minister has
made the protection of women’s rights and gender equality a centerpiece of his
administration. A “gender violence” law was drafted only a week after the government
was installed in April.
There are no quotas for women in national elective office. However, 35 percent
of the seats in parliament during the elections in March were won by women, a 7
percent increase from the previous elections in 2000. Trafficking in women for the
purpose of sexual exploitation remains a problem. The government targets traffickers
as part of its larger plan to control immigration.
The uneasy cohabitation between Sri Lanka’s two main
political parties came to an end in 2004, as President
Chandrika Kumaratunga dissolved parliament in February
and called for fresh elections to be held in April. Strengthened by a strategic electoral
alliance with a leftist Sinhalese party, Kumaratunga’s coalition was able to
form a minority government, failing as it did to win a majority of seats in parliament.
Meanwhile, wrangling between the southern political factions continues to impede
any meaningful progress on peace talks with the Tamil Tiger separatist rebels. The
February 2002 ceasefire is still in place and has contributed to somewhat greater
freedom of movement and a reduction in human rights violations by security forces
in the north and east of the country. However, the Tigers continue to commit numerous
abuses, including the forcible conscription of child soldiers, politically motivated
killings, and restrictions on freedom of expression and of association.
Since independence from Britain in 1948, political power in this island nation has
alternated between the conservative United National Party (UNP) and the leftist Sri
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). While the country has made impressive gains in literacy,
basic health care, and other social needs, its economic development has been
stunted and its social fabric tested by a long-standing civil war that has killed an
Country Reports 591
estimated 65,000 people. The conflict initially pitted several Tamil guerrilla groups
against the government, which is dominated by the Sinhalese majority. The war,
although triggered by anti-Tamil riots in 1983 that claimed hundreds of lives, came in
the context of long-standing Tamil claims of discrimination in education and employment
opportunities. By 1986, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or
Tamil Tigers), which called for an independent Tamil homeland in the Northeastern
Province, had eliminated most rival Tamil guerrilla groups and was in control of much
of the northern Jaffna Peninsula. At the same time, the government was also fighting
an insurgency in the south by the leftist People’s Liberation Front (JVP). The
JVP insurgency, and the brutal methods used by the army to quell it in 1989, killed
60,000 people.
In 1994, Kumaratunga ended nearly two decades of UNP rule by leading the
SLFP-dominated People’s Alliance (PA) coalition to victory in parliamentary elections
and then winning the presidential election. Early in her term, she tried to negotiate
a peace agreement with the LTTE, but following a renewal of hostilities by the
LTTE, she reverted to focusing on a military solution to the conflict. Kumaratunga won
early presidential elections in 1999, but the UNP and its allies gained a majority in parliamentary
elections held in December 2001, and UNP leader Ranil Wickremasinghe became
prime minister.
In response to an LTTE ceasefire offer, the new government declared a truce
with the rebels, lifted an economic embargo on rebel-held territory, and restarted
Norwegian-brokered peace talks. A permanent ceasefire accord with provisions for
international monitoring was signed in February 2002. Shortly before the first round
of talks took place, the government lifted its ban on the LTTE, and by December
2002, the government and the Tigers had agreed to share political power in a federal
system. Although the LTTE suspended its participation in peace talks in April 2003,
it stated that it remained committed to a political solution. In June, bilateral and multilateral
donors pledged a total of $4.5 billion over a four-year period to support Sri
Lanka’s reconstruction, although much of the aid was conditionally tied to further
progress in reaching a settlement with the Tigers.
However, such progress has remained constrained by conflict between the two
main political parties. In November 2003, President Kumaratunga declared a state of
emergency, sacked three cabinet ministers and assumed their portfolios, and temporarily
suspended parliament. In order to justify these steps, she expressed concern
that LTTE proposals for the establishment of a Tiger-dominated Interim Self
Governing Authority (IGSA) in the Northeastern Province were a threat to national
security. However, analysts noted that an equally compelling impetus for her actions
was the UNP’s motion to initiate impeachment proceedings against the chief
justice of the supreme court, whom the president views as a key ally.
Although the state of emergency was pulled back and parliament resumed functioning,
Wickremasinghe claimed that his ability to govern had been severely curtailed
by the fact that President Kumaratunga continued to hold the important defense
portfolio. The impasse was broken when the president dissolved parliament in
February 2004 and called for fresh elections to be held in April. Bolstered by the
direct support of the Marxist JVP, Kumaratunga’s new PA-led United People’s Freedom
Alliance (UPFA) coalition won 105 out of 225 seats and managed to form a
minority government. Apart from the JVP, other extremist and ethnic-based parties
592 Freedom in the World—2005
Political Rights
and Civil Liberties:
also made inroads, including a new party formed by Buddhist clergy, the Jathika
Hela Urumaya (JHU, or National Heritage Party), which won nine seats. The new
government’s tenuous grip on power became immediately apparent when it failed to
secure the election of its candidate to the post of Speaker of parliament; instead, the
UNP was able to win the position with the help of votes from members of the smaller
ethnic parties.
Meanwhile, the ceasefire with the LTTE continued to hold, despite an increasing
incidence of violations during the year. Of particular concern was a spate of
assassinations by the LTTE of political opponents, suspected informants, and intelligence
operatives in the northeast, and more unusually, in Colombo. Uncertainty
was also created when the leader of the LTTE forces in the eastern part of the Northeastern
Province, Colonel Karuna, who controlled an estimated 6,000 out of a total
of 15,000 LTTE troops, formed a breakaway faction in March, alleging discrimination
in the treatment of eastern Tamils by the LTTE leadership. However, his rebellion
proved to be short lived; after fierce internecine fighting in April, Karuna disbanded
his forces and went into hiding, although clashes and killings between the
two groups continued throughout the year as both attempted to reassert their control
over the east.
Though President Kumaratunga had repeatedly criticized the UNP government
for making excessive concessions to the LTTE, she has indicated that she also remains
committed to finding a political solution to the ethnic conflict. Nevertheless,
progress in resuming meaningful peace talks has been complicated by the addition
to the ruling coalition of the JVP, which adamantly opposes granting more powers
to the provinces or to the LTTE, and by the presence of pro-Sinhalese forces such
as the JHU in parliament. While the LTTE insists that any future talks include discussions
on the formation of an IGSA, which would give them effective rule over the
Northeastern Province, it is clear that the stability of the present coalition government
would be at risk if Kumaratunga were to proceed with talks on this basis.
Sri Lankans can change their government through elections
based on universal adult suffrage. The 1978 constitution
vested strong executive powers in a president who is directly
elected for a six-year term and can dissolve parliament. The 225-member unicameral
parliament is directly elected for a five-year term through a mix of singleseat,
simple-plurality districts and proportional representation. Elections are open
to multiple parties, and fair electoral laws and equal campaigning opportunities ensure
a competitive political process. While elections are generally free and fair, they
continue to be marred by some irregularities, violence, and intimidation. However, the
interim report issued by the independent Center for Monitoring Election Violence noted
that with 368 incidents on election day, the 2004 elections were considerably less
beleaguered by violence and malpractice than previous polls had been. The LTTE
refuses to allow free elections in the areas under its control and continues to intimidate—
and sometimes kill—members of rival non-militarized Tamil political parties.
In recent years, the fact that the executive and legislative branches of government
have been controlled by competing parties headed by long-standing political
rivals has led to a general unwillingness to effectively resolve issues and construct
coherent state policies. Although President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s coalition was
Country Reports 593
able to unseat the UNP’s Ranil Wickremasinghe in the April 2004 elections and form
a minority government headed by her choice of prime minister, it lacks the mandate
and parliamentary strength to accomplish meaningful change. Differences of opinion
between the main political factions over the correct way to approach the peace
process have led to an inability to formulate a united strategy toward the LTTE and
its specific demands during the ongoing but currently stalled negotiations.
Official corruption is a growing concern, and the legal and administrative framework
currently in force is inadequate in terms of either promoting integrity or punishing
the corrupt behavior of public officials. No current or former politician has
thus far been sentenced for bribery or corruption, although a number of cases are
under investigation or prosecution. Sri Lanka was ranked 67 out of 146 countries
surveyed in the 2004 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.
Freedom of expression is provided for in the constitution, and independent media
outlets can generally express their views openly. However, the LTTE does not permit
free expression in the areas under its control and continues to terrorize a number
of Tamil journalists and other critics. During the November 2003 state of emergency,
President Kumaratunga briefly deployed troops outside government-run media
outlets and sacked the chairman of the government-owned Lake House media group.
In 2004, the Colombo-based Free Media Movement repeatedly condemned the manipulation
of the state media by the president’s party for political ends, including
pressure on editors and biased election coverage. Reporters, particularly those who
cover human rights issues or official misconduct, continued to face harassment and
threats from the police and security forces, government officials, political activists,
and the LTTE. A number of journalists and media outlets were attacked during the
year, and three journalists were killed. The government controls the largest newspaper
chain, two major television stations, and a radio station, while business interests
wield some control over content in the form of selective advertising and bribery.
Religious freedom is respected and members of all faiths are generally allowed
to worship freely, although the constitution gives special status to Buddhism and
there is some discrimination and occasional violence against religious minorities.
The LTTE discriminates against Muslims in the areas under its control and has attacked
Buddhist sites in the past. The U.S. State Department’s 2004 Report on International
Religious Freedom notes that Christian missionaries are occasionally harassed
by Buddhist clergy and others opposed to their work. Tensions between the
island’s Buddhist majority and the Christian minority—and in particular, evangelical
Christian groups—appear to be worsening, according to a report released in
August by the U.S.-based Jubilee Campaign, with a sharp increase in attacks against
churches and individuals noted at the end of 2003 and the introduction of draft anticonversion
legislation in May and June 2004.
The government generally respects academic freedom. However, the LTTE has
a record of repressing the voices of those intellectuals who criticize its actions, sometimes
through murder or other forms of violent intimidation. Groups such as the
University Teachers for Human Rights-Jaffna (UTHR-J) have faced particularly severe
harassment at the hands of the LTTE.
Freedom of assembly is generally respected, although both main political parties
occasionally disrupt each other’s rallies and political events. Except in conflictaffected
areas, human rights and social welfare nongovernmental organizations gen594
Freedom in the World—2005
erally operate freely. However, the LTTE does not allow for freedom of association
in the regions under its control and reportedly uses coercion to force civilians to
attend pro-LTTE rallies.
Trade unions are independent and engage in collective bargaining. Except for
civil servants, most workers can hold strikes. However, under the 1989 Essential
Services Act, the president can declare a strike in any industry illegal. Kumaratunga
has used the act to end several strikes. Employers on tea plantations routinely violate
the rights of the mainly Tamil workforce.
Successive governments have respected the constitutional provision for an independent
judiciary, and judges can generally make decisions in an atmosphere free
of overt intimidation from the legislative or executive branches. However, there is
growing concern about the perceived politicization of the judiciary, in particular regarding
the conduct of the chief justice of the Supreme Court. According to the
Colombo-based Free Media Movement, he has narrowed the scope of human rights
litigation, dismissed a number of judges without holding an inquiry or disciplinary
hearing, and consistently defended the president and her party in legal actions relating
to political disputes. At the lower levels of the judiciary, corruption is fairly
common among both judges and court staff, and those willing to pay bribes have
more efficient access to the legal system.
Despite an overall reduction in the number of human rights abuses committed
by police and security forces, the rule of law remains somewhat weak, and torture
and prolonged detention without trial continue to be issues of concern. Such practices
are facilitated by legislation such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA),
under which security personnel can arrest and detain suspects indefinitely without
court approval. Although over 1,000 detainees held under PTA legislation have been
released since the February 2002 ceasefire, several dozen remained in custody at the
end of 2003, according to Amnesty International. There has been little progress in reducing
acts of torture by the security forces and police, particularly of detainees during
routine interrogations. Cases of custodial death and custodial rape continue to be
reported. A lack of aggressive prosecution of the majority of past abuses contributes
to a climate of impunity for those who have overstepped the bounds of the law.
The LTTE has effective control on the ground in large sections of the north and
east of the country and operates a parallel administration that includes schools, hospitals,
courts, and police and other law enforcement personnel. The Tigers raise
money through extortion, kidnapping, theft, and the seizure of Muslim property,
and have used threats and attacks to close schools, courts, and government agencies
in their self-styled Tamil homeland. Despite their involvement in the peace process,
the rebels continue to be responsible for summary executions of civilians, disappearances,
arbitrary abductions and detentions, torture, and the forcible conscription of
children to be used as soldiers. Press reports as well as an exhaustive report issued
by Human Rights Watch in November indicated that the Tigers continued to recruit
thousands of teenage girls and boys in 2004 despite their signing of the “Action
Plan for Children Affected by War” in June 2003, in which they pledged to release all
children within their ranks. Recruitment efforts are at times so intense that parents
keep their children home from school so they will not be forcibly abducted.
The LTTE has also targeted Tamil political parties that challenge its claim to
represent the Tamil people, particularly the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP),
Country Reports 595
Sudan
Population: 39,100,000
GNI/capita: $370
Life Expectancy: 57
Religious Groups: Sunni Muslim (70 percent),
indigenous beliefs (25 percent), Christian (5 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Black (52 percent), Arab (39 percent),
Beja (6 percent), other (3 percent)
Capital: Khartoum
Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 7
Status: Not Free
Overview:
Ten-Year Ratings Timeline (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
7,7NF 7,7NF 7,7NF 7,7NF 7,7NF 7,7NF 7,7NF 7,7NF 7,7NF 7,7NF
with over 100 political killings being attributed to the LTTE since the ceasefire was
signed, according to Human Rights Watch. A statement issued by the Colombobased
Peace Support Group noted that during a four-month period from April to
July 2004, at least 40 people were killed as a consequence of their political affiliation,
including EPDP members, followers of the breakaway Karuna faction of the LTTE,
military intelligence officers, elected officials, and members of civil society.
Tamils maintain that they face systematic discrimination in several matters controlled
by the state, including government employment, university education, and
access to justice. Thousands of Tamils whose ancestors were brought from India to
work as indentured laborers in the nineteenth century did not qualify for Sri Lankan
citizenship and faced discrimination and exploitation by the native Sinhalese. However,
in October 2003, the parliament approved legislation granting citizenship to
about 170,000 previously stateless “Indian” Tamils. Tensions between the three major
ethnic groups (Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim), which lead to occasional violent
clashes, remain a concern. Overall, almost half of an estimated 730,000 internally
displaced refugees have returned to their homes following the February 2002
ceasefire, but an equal number remain unwilling or unable to return to the northeast
and continue to live in government-run camps throughout the country, according
to Refugees International.
Women are under represented in politics and the civil service. Female employees
in the private sector face some sexual harassment as well as discrimination in
salary and promotion opportunities. Rape and domestic violence against women
remain serious problems, and authorities weakly enforce existing laws. Although
women have equal rights under civil and criminal law, matters related to the family,
including marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance, are adjudicated under
the customary law of each ethnic or religious group, and the application of these
laws sometimes results in discrimination against women.
A long-simmering conflict in Sudan’s western Darfur region
exploded into widespread acts of ethnic cleansing, massacre,
rape, and forced displacement in 2004. The United
596 Freedom in the World—2005
States classified the situation as genocide. Sudanese government forces and statebacked
Arab militias killed at least 70,000 black Africans and created a massive refugee
crisis affecting at least 1.5 million people. Despite a ceasefire between rebel groups
and the government and the passage of UN Security Council resolutions against
Khartoum, attacks against civilians continued throughout the year. The conflict in
Darfur threatened to jeopardize progress toward a final resolution of the 22-yearlong
war in the country’s South. The government carried out a broad security
clampdown in response to an alleged coup attempt, re-arresting Hassan al-Turabi, a
leading Sudanese Muslim cleric and former leader of the ruling political party.
Africa’s largest country, which achieved independence in 1956 after nearly 80
years of British rule, has been embroiled in civil wars for 38 of its 48 years as an
independent state. The Anyanya movement, representing mainly Christian and
animist black Africans in southern Sudan, battled Arab Muslim government forces
from 1956 to 1972. In 1969, General Jafar Numeiri toppled an elected government and
ushered in a military dictatorship. The South gained extensive autonomy under a
1972 accord, and for the next decade, an uneasy peace prevailed. Then, in 1983, Numeiri
restricted southern autonomy and imposed Sharia (Islamic law). Civil war resumed,
and Numeiri was overthrown in 1985. Civilian rule was restored in 1986 with the election
of a government led by Sadiq al-Mahdi of the moderate Islamic Ummah Party.
War, however, continued. Lieutenant General Omar al-Bashir ousted al-Mahdi in a
1989 coup, and al-Mahdi spent seven years in prison or under house arrest before
fleeing to Eritrea. Until 1999, al-Bashir ruled through a military-civilian regime backed
by senior Muslim clerics including Hassan al-Turabi, who wielded considerable power
as the ruling National Congress (NC) party leader and speaker of the 360-member
National Assembly.
Tensions between al-Bashir and al-Turabi climaxed in December 1999; on the
eve of a parliamentary vote on a plan by al-Turabi to curb presidential powers, al-
Bashir dissolved parliament and declared a state of emergency. He fired al-Turabi as
NC head, replaced the cabinet with his own supporters, and held deeply flawed presidential
and parliamentary elections in December 2000, which the NC won overwhelmingly.
In June 2000, al-Turabi formed his own party, the Popular National Congress
(PNC), but he was prohibited from participating in politics. In January 2001, the Ummah
Party refused to join al-Bashir’s new government despite the president’s invitation,
declaring that it refused to support totalitarianism.
Al-Turabi and some 20 of his supporters were arrested in February 2001 after he
called for a national uprising against the government and signed a memorandum of
understanding in Geneva with the southern-based, rebel Sudanese People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA). In May 2001, al-Turabi and four aides were charged with conspiracy
to overthrow the government, and al-Turabi was placed under house arrest.
In September 2002, he was moved to a high-security prison and subsequently released
in October 2003.
By sidelining al-Turabi, who was considered a leading force behind Sudan’s
efforts to export Islamic extremism, al-Bashir began to lift Sudan out of international
isolation. Although Vice President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha—who replaced al-
Turabi as Islamic ideologue—remains firmly committed to Sudan’s status as an Islamic
state and to the government’s self-proclaimed jihad against non-Muslims, alCountry
Reports 597
Bashir has managed in recent years to repair relations with several countries, including
the United States. After the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United
States, al-Bashir offered his country’s cooperation in combating terrorism. Sudan
had previously provided a safe haven for Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the terrorist
network.
In March 2004, al-Turabi was again placed under house arrest, this time on suspicion
of plotting a coup with sympathizers of rebel groups in Darfur; al-Turabi had
been outspokenly critical of the government’s tactics in the region. In September,
al-Turabi was jailed amid a broad security crackdown after the government said it
foiled a coup attempt by his supporters. Thirty members of al-Turabi’s PNC were
detained, and authorities said they uncovered weapons caches in several locations
around Khartoum.
Sudan’s international image was substantially tarnished in 2004 as events in
Darfur reached horrific proportions. The conflict began in earnest in February 2003
when the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),
representing black farmers and villagers in Darfur, attacked Sudanese military garrisons
in the region. Darfur residents had long complained of official discrimination,
a lack of economic and land rights, and occasional pogrom-style attacks by statebacked
Arab militias known as “Janjaweed.” By early 2004, government and
Janjaweed attacks against villages in Darfur were well under way, creating mass casualties
and an enormous refugee crisis. Sudanese jet fighters and helicopter gunships
routinely bombed and strafed villages. Horse- and camel-mounted Janjaweed
militiamen, in seeming coordination with airborne government forces, would often
follow air strikes, massacring survivors, especially men and boys. Hundreds of thousands
of people, their villages torched, were forcibly displaced, relegated to makeshift,
government-run refugee camps. Tens of thousands escaped westward to neighboring
Chad. Attacks seemed to focus on three black tribal groups—the Fur, Massalit,
and Zhagawa—which led to charges of racial discrimination, ethnic cleansing, and
genocide by international human rights organizations. Many independent refugee
accounts described a systematic campaign of rape of women by Janjaweed and
government soldiers. By November 2004, approximately 70,000 people were dead
and 1.5 million displaced.
Government-run camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) set up throughout
Darfur lacked adequate sanitation facilities, water, or feeding centers. The government
also routinely blocked humanitarian workers from accessing the camps. To
discourage villagers from returning home, Janjaweed militiamen dumped the corpses
of executed civilians into village wells to poison the water. Male refugees generally
avoided venturing outside refugee camps for fear of being murdered; women generally
went out in search of firewood and water, often exposing themselves to rape. By
the fall of 2004, the World Health Organization announced that at least 10,000 people
were dying monthly in the substandard and fetid camps. The UN World Food Program
announced that nearly 22 percent of children under age five in Darfur were
malnourished.
An April 2004 ceasefire between Darfur’s rebel groups and government and
Janjaweed forces broke down amid renewed Janjaweed attacks and failure by the
government to disarm the militias. In July, the United States declared that the situation
in Darfur amounted to genocide, and the African Union dispatched 300 moni598
Freedom in the World—2005
tors to the region. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution imposing a 30-day
deadline on Khartoum to restore stability by disarming the Janjaweed and allowing
the safe return of refugees. The resolution did not outline penalties for failure to
adhere to its terms, and the deadline passed without Sudanese government compliance.
In August, the government and rebel groups began what would become onand-
off peace talks in Nigeria. Meanwhile, the United Nations reported that traumatized
refugees were being forcibly returned to unsafe villages vulnerable to attack
by the Janjaweed, in violation of the government’s prior agreement with the UN. In
September, reports of continued fighting and renewed refugee movements emerged.
The UN Security Council authorized another resolution, but again declined to
threaten specified sanctions.
In late October, in the face of mounting international pressure, the Sudanese
government approved the dispatch of 3,500 additional African Union troops. Their
mobilization was delayed, however, because of lack of funds; the United States provided
air transport for some. Khartoum approved the dispatch of the additional
troops on condition that they not assume a civilian protection role. Rebel groups
reported fresh government air attacks after Khartoum signed a peace pact in November
and agreed to ban military flights over Darfur.
The Darfur crisis threatened to derail progress made in finally resolving the 22-
year-long civil war in the country’s South. While hostilities in the South declined
markedly in 2004, a final settlement to the conflict was not achieved by the end of the
year. The war pitted government forces and government-backed, northern Arab
Muslims against African animists and Christians in the country’s oil-rich South. A
convoluted mix of historical, religious, ethnic, and cultural tensions has made peace
elusive, while competition for economic resources—most notably, oil—has fueled
the conflict. Past ceasefire attempts have failed, with Khartoum insisting on an unconditional
ceasefire and the SPLA demanding the establishment of a secular constitution
first.
Throughout the war, the government regularly bombed civilian targets, including
villages, churches, and humanitarian relief facilities. The government also denied
humanitarian relief workers access to rebel-held areas or areas containing large
concentrations of internal refugees. The SPLA also engaged in attacks on civilians
and child soldier recruitment. Human Rights Watch has documented how the
Sudanese government used roads, bridges, and airfields built by international oil
companies to wage war in the South, especially in the oil rich Western Upper Nile
region. Some of the companies were criticized for ignoring government attacks against
civilian targets.
A peace plan proposed in December 2001 by former U.S. senator John Danforth
called for “one country, two systems” in Sudan, with an Islamic government in the
North and a secular system in the South. The international community stepped up
its mediation efforts in the civil war in 2002, in part to prevent Sudan from becoming
a breeding ground for terror, as Afghanistan had prior to September 11, 2001. In
2003, substantive peace talks under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority
on Development (IGAD) finally resulted in a relaxation of hostilities and a high
degree of optimism that a final resolution of the conflict was within reach. In December
2003, an agreement was reached on the sharing of oil wealth.
Talks continued in 2004, culminating in the June signing of the Nairobi DeclaraCountry
Reports 599
Political Rights
and Civil Liberties:
tion. The agreement paved the way toward a comprehensive ceasefire and a six-year
transition period leading to a referendum on southern secession, during which time
the government would withdraw 80 percent of its troops from the South. However,
continued negotiations in the summer broke down amid the worsening crisis in
Darfur, effectively stalling the IGAD process. Several international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) expressed concern that the West was neglecting the IGAD
process while focusing almost exclusively on Darfur.
By October, the protocols signed in 2003 were still not in place. However, optimism
was high that a peace accord would be signed early in the New Year.
While the United Nations has lifted sanctions against Sudan, the United States
still maintains its own based on the country’s human rights abuses and its alleged
continuing support for terrorism.
Sudanese citizens cannot change their government democratically.
December 2000 presidential and parliamentary
elections cannot credibly be said to have reflected the will
of the people. The major opposition parties, which are believed to have the support
of most Sudanese, boycotted in protest of what they said were attempts by a totalitarian
regime to impart the appearance of fairness. The European Union declined an
invitation to monitor the polls to avoid bestowing legitimacy on the outcome. Omar
al-Bashir, running against former president Jafar Numeiri and three relative unknowns,
won 86 percent of the vote. NC candidates stood uncontested for nearly two-thirds
of parliamentary seats. Voting did not take place in some 17 rebel-held constituencies,
and government claims of 66 percent voter turnout in some states were denounced
as fictitious. The president can appoint and dismiss state governors at his
discretion.
Sudan was ranked 122 out of 146 countries surveyed in the 2004 Transparency
International Corruption Perceptions Index.
There is little press freedom in Sudan. Journalists practice self-censorship
to avoid harassment, arrest, and closure of their publications. However, there are
several daily newspapers and a wide variety of Arabic- and English-language publications,
and while all of these are subject to censorship, some do criticize the government.
Radio and television stations are owned by the government and are required
to reflect government policy in broadcasts. Penalties apply to journalists who
allegedly harm the nation or economy or violate national security. A 1999 law imposes
penalties for “professional errors.” In recent years, several journalists have
been detained without explanation, and newspapers have been arbitrarily shut down
by the authorities. There were reports throughout the year that the government was
preventing journalists from traveling to Darfur to cover the conflict there.
Islam is the state religion, and the constitution claims Sharia (Islamic law) as the
source of its legislation. At least 75 percent of Sudanese are Muslim, though most
southern Sudanese adhere to traditional indigenous beliefs or Christianity. The
overwhelming majority of those displaced or killed by war and famine in Sudan have
been non-Muslims, and many have starved under a policy of withholding food
pending conversion to Islam. Officials have described their campaign against non-
Muslims as a holy war. Under the 1994 Societies Registration Act, religious groups
must register in order to legally gather. Registration is reportedly difficult to obtain.
600 Freedom in the World—2005
The government denies permission to build churches and sometimes destroys Christian
schools, centers, and churches. Roman Catholic priests face random detention
and interrogation by police.
Emergency law severely restricts freedom of assembly and association. Students
are forbidden to participate in political activities, according to the Acts of Student
Codes, introduced in 2002 after several university students in Khartoum were suspended
for engaging in human rights activities, including organizing symposiums
on women’s rights and attending a conference on democracy. Other students have
been expelled for organizing political activities, and security forces have forcefully
broken up demonstrations and periodically closed the University of Khartoum.
According to the Los Angeles Times, in April Janjaweed gunmen attacked a
school in the Darfur town of Kailek, killing six teachers and 36 children. Many other
villages reported similar attacks on schools, stemming from what was claimed to be
a government policy of anti-black discrimination.
While many international NGOs operate in Sudan, the government at times restricts
their movement and ability to carry out their work, which often includes providing
essential humanitarian assistance. In early November, the UN World Food
Program reported that Sudanese army and police had surrounded IDP camps in Darfur
and were barring outside access to the camps’ inhabitants. Humanitarian workers
have also been targeted, and in some cases kidnapped and killed, by rebel groups.
There are no independent trade unions. The Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation
is the main labor organization, with about 800,000 members. Local union elections
are rigged to ensure the election of government-approved candidates. A lack
of labor legislation limits the freedom of workers to organize or bargain collectively.
The judiciary is not independent. The chief justice of the Supreme Court, who
presides over the entire judiciary, is government appointed. Regular courts provide
some due process safeguards, but special security and military courts, which are
used to punish political opponents of the government, provide none. “Special courts”
often deal with criminal matters, despite their use of military judges. Criminal law is
based on Sharia and provides for flogging, amputation, crucifixion, and execution.
Ten southern, predominantly non-Muslim states are officially exempted from Sharia,
although criminal law allows for its application in the future if the state assemblies
choose to implement it. Arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture are widespread,
and security forces act with impunity. Prison conditions do not meet international
standards.
Serious human rights abuses by nearly every faction involved in the country’s
long-standing civil war and in the Darfur conflict have been reported. Secret police
reportedly have operated “ghost houses”—detention and torture centers—in several
cities. Government forces are said to have routinely raided villages, burning
homes, killing residents, and abducting women and children to be used as slaves in
the North. Relief agencies have discovered thousands of people held captive in the
North and have purchased their freedom so they could return to the South. In 2002,
the International Eminent Persons Group—a fact-finding mission composed of humanitarian
relief workers, human rights lawyers, academics, and former European
and American diplomats—confirmed the existence of slavery in Sudan. The group
also reported on abductions and forced servitude under the SPLA’s authority. Although
there has been no organized effort to compile casualty statistics in southern
Country Reports 601
Sudan since 1994, the total number of people killed by war, famine, and disease is
believed to exceed two million, with millions more displaced as refugees.
In February, national security agency officials arrested Salih Mahmoud Osman,
a lawyer and member of the Sudanese Organization Against Torture (SOAT), after
he advocated publicly on behalf of civilians in Darfur. He reportedly began a hunger
strike at the end of June while being held incommunicado and without having been
formally charged. According to Amnesty International, in August several civilians
in Darfur reported being imprisoned for speaking with foreign journalists and visiting
dignitaries, including U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell and UN secretary general
Kofi Annan. SOAT has reported on the arbitrary arrest and torture of several
people, including students suspected of engaging in political activities or harboring
SPLA sympathies.
An anonymously written book about ingrained discrimination in Sudan circulated
widely during the year. Called the “Black Book,” it laid out in succinct detail a
broad system of favoritism of northern Arabs over other peoples in Sudan. The book
states that Sudan’s northern region, constituting roughly 5 percent of the country’s
population, is overly represented in government. Most of the national budget is
devoted to northern development, with other, non-Arab regions notably neglected
by Khartoum, the book says. Equality of opportunity and business and property
rights are generally restricted to Sudan’s Arab Muslim community.
Women face discrimination in family matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance,
which are governed by Sharia. Women are represented in parliament and
hold 35 of the assembly’s 360 seats. Public order police frequently harass women
and monitor their dress for adherence to government standards of modesty. Female
genital mutilation occurs despite legal prohibition, and rape is reportedly widespread
in war zones. In March, the BBC reported the mass rape of at least 100 women by
militiamen in Darfur. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour speculated
during the year that the systematic raping of women in Darfur would constitute
crimes against humanity. There was also evidence of official attempts to cover
up the problem: police arrested a Darfur man filing a complaint with the African Union
ceasefire commission about attacks against women at a camp in El Fasher. He was
released only after UN intervention. According to Amnesty International, women
have less access to legal representation than men. President al-Bashir announced in
January 2001 that Sudan would not ratify the international Convention on Eradication
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women because it “contradicted Sudanese
values and traditions.” Children are used as soldiers by government and opposition
forces in the Darfur conflict, just as they were used in the civil war in the South.
602 Freedom in the World—2005
Suriname
Political Rights: 1
Civil Liberties: 2
Status: Free
★
Overview:
Population: 400,000
GNI/capita: $1,921
Life Expectancy: 70
Religious Groups: Hindu (27.4 percent),
Muslim (19.6 percent), Roman Catholic (22.8 percent),
Protestant (25.2 percent), indigenous beliefs (5 percent)
Ethnic Groups: East Indian (37 percent), Creole (31 percent),
Javanese (15 percent), other (17 percent)
Capital: Paramaribo
Ten-Year Ratings Timeline (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
3,3PF 3,3PF 3,3PF 3,3PF 3,3PF 1,2F 1,2F 1,2F 1,2F 1,2F
Legislative elections scheduled for May 2005 dominated
Suriname’s political debate in 2004, with speculation over
whether the ruling New Front (NF) would prevail in the face
of the surprising popularity of the party of a former dictator of Suriname.
The Republic of Suriname achieved independence from The Netherlands in 1975,
which had acquired it as a result of the Treaty of Breda with the British in 1667. Five
years after independence, a military coup, which brought Desi Bouterse to power as
the head of a regime that brutally suppressed civic and political opposition, initiated
a decade of military intervention in politics. In 1987, Bouterse permitted elections
that were won handily by the NF, a four-party coalition of mainly East Indian, Creole,
and Javanese parties. The National Democratic Party (NDP), organized by the
military, won just three seats.
In 1990, the army ousted President Ramsewak Shankar, and Bouterse again took
power, this time in a bloodless putsch popularly known as the “telephone coup.”
International pressure led to new elections in 1991. The center-right NF won a majority,
although the NDP increased its share to 12. The National Assembly selected the
NF’s candidate, Ronald Venetiaan, as president. Bouterse quit the army in 1992 in
order to lead the NDP. In the May 25, 2000, legislative elections, the NF won the
majority of 51 National Assembly seats—three times as many as its closest rival.
The May 2001 death of a labor leader who was to be the star witness in a trial
against Bouterse and others accused of 15 political killings committed on December
8, 1982, initially appeared to rob the prosecution of key testimony. However, the
government vowed that testimony given by the witness during a preliminary hearing
would be submitted in the trial by the judge who questioned him. The death of
the lone survivor of the December 1982 massacre came amid a renewed push by the
Dutch to bring Bouterse to account for the murders and for his role in the 1982 coup.
He had already been tried and convicted by a Dutch court in absentia on charges of
having introduced more than two tons of cocaine into The Netherlands between
1989 and 1997. Suriname did not extradite Bouterse to The Netherlands because of
a bilateral agreement not to extradite their own citizens to each other’s country.
Country Reports 603
Political Rights
and Civil Liberties:
In October 2002, authorities from neighboring Guyana complained that Suriname
is a major supply route for illegal arms used in a crime wave gripping the Guyanese
capital of Georgetown. The spillover effects of narcotics trafficking and the drug
trade’s ties to top political leaders—including Bouterse—continued to make the
news.
In October 2003, a judge gave more than 50 convicted cocaine traffickers light
sentences in an effort by the government to reduce overcrowding in the country’s
jails. The UN Drug Control Agency estimates that 20 tons of cocaine are smuggled
annually through Suriname to Europe alone. Also in October, Dino Bouterse—the
son of Desi Bouterse—was acquitted by a military court of stealing more than 80
guns, including 21 AK-47 assault rifles, from the government’s secret service compound.
The court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to convict him.
In 2004, legislative elections scheduled for May 2005 dominated Suriname’s political
debate, with observers saying that the ruling NF coalition headed by President
Venetiaan appeared posed to capitalize on the country’s new-found price and
exchange-rate stability. However, a July public opinion poll by the Institute for Demographic
Research showed surprising strength for Bouterse’s NDP, which placed
less than 1 percent behind the NF. The relatively weak showing by the NF reflected
voter discontent, in part, with the side effects of the government’s fiscal austerity
program, which helped to stabilize both prices and the economy generally.
Citizens of Suriname can change their government democratically.
The 1987 constitution provides for a 51-seat National
Assembly, directly elected by proportional representation,
which serves a five-year term and selects the state president. A Council of
State (Raad van State), consisting of the president and representatives of the major
political groupings, including unions, business, the military, and the legislature, has
veto power over legislation deemed to violate the constitution.
Political parties largely reflect the cleavages in Suriname’s ethnically complex
society, although political-racial discord is much less than in neighboring Guyana.
A record number of 23 parties competed in the 2000 elections.
The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal 2004 Index of Economic Freedom
found that corruption is rampant in Suriname, regulations are applied randomly,
and there is a general level of very high regulation. Favoritism, particularly at elite
levels, is common in business and government. Suriname was ranked 49 out of 146
countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2004 Corruption Perceptions
Index.
The government generally respects freedom of expression. Radio is both public
and private. A number of small commercial radio stations compete with the government-
owned radio and television broadcasting systems, which generally offer pluralistic
viewpoints. The government does not restrict access to the Internet. Public
access to government information is recognized in law; however, it is very limited in
practice.
The government generally respects freedom of religion and does not restrict
academic freedom.
Although civic institutions remain weak, human rights organizations function
freely. Freedom of assembly and association are provided for in the constitution,
604 Freedom in the World—2005
Swaziland
Population: 1,200,000
GNI/capita: $1,240
Life Expectancy: 43
Religious Groups: Zionist [a blend of Christianity and
indigenous ancestral worship] (40 percent),
Roman Catholic (20 percent), Muslim (10 percent),
other (30 percent)
Ethnic Groups: African (97 percent), European (3 percent)
Capital: Mbabane
Trend Arrow: Swaziland received a downward trend arrow due to an increase in the
autocratic powers of the king under the country’s new constitution.
Political Rights: 7
Civil Liberties: 5
Status: Not Free
★
Overview:
Ten-Year Ratings Timeline (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
6,5NF 6,5NF 6,5NF 6,4NF 6,5NF 6,5NF 6,5NF 6,5NF 7,5NF 7,5NF
and the government respects these rights in practice. Workers can join independent
trade unions, and the labor movement is active in politics. Collective bargaining is
legal and conducted fairly widely. Civil servants have no legal right to strike.
The judiciary is weak and susceptible to political influence and suffers from ineffectiveness,
a significant shortage of judges, and a large backlog of cases. The
courts and the prisons are seriously overburdened by the volume of people detained
for narcotics trafficking. The civilian police abuse detainees, particularly during arrests;
guards mistreat prisoners; and prisons are dangerously overcrowded. Military
personnel generally are not subject to civilian criminal law.
Discrimination against indigenous and tribal peoples is widespread. Tribal
peoples, called Maroons, are the descendants of escaped African slaves who formed
autonomous communities in the rain forest in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Their rights to their lands and resources, to cultural integrity, and to the autonomous
administration of their affairs are not recognized in Surinamese law.
Constitutional guarantees of gender equality are not enforced. Several organizations
specifically address violence against women and related issues. Despite their
central role in agriculture and food production, 60 percent of rural women, particularly
those in tribal communities, live below the poverty level. In the absence of a
comprehensive law against trafficking in persons, the practice, including the sexual
exploitation of women and children, remained a problem. In 2004, there were no convictions
for such trafficking.
Public debate of Swaziland’s controversial and long-delayed
draft constitution concluded at a conference in September
2004 that was dominated by supporters of royal rule and
largely ignored submissions by labor and human rights groups urging democratic
reforms. In November, the parliament, a body with little independent authority, voted
overwhelmingly to ratify the new constitution.
Country Reports 605
Political Rights
and Civil Liberties:
Swaziland’s King Mswati III is the latest monarch of the Dlamini dynasty, under
which the Swazi kingdom expanded and contracted in conflicts with neighboring
groups. Britain declared the kingdom a protectorate to prevent Boer expansion in
the 1880s and assumed administrative power in 1903. Swaziland regained its independence
in 1968, and an elected parliament was added to the traditional kingship
and chieftaincies. In 1973, Mswati’s predecessor, Sobhuza II (who died in 1983) repealed
the 1968 constitution, ended the multiparty system in favor of the tinkhundla
(local council) system, and declared himself absolute monarch.
Voting in October 1998 legislative elections was marked by very low turnout
and was neither open nor fair. It was based on the Swazi tinkhundla system of closely
controlled nominations and voting that seeks to legitimatize the rule of King Mswati
III and his Dlamini clan. Security forces arrested and briefly detained labor and other
pro-democracy leaders before the elections and after a series of bomb blasts. The 55
elected members of the National Assembly were approved by the government and
were joined by 10 royal appointees.
Parliamentary elections in October 2003 were preceded by calls by critics of royal
rule to boycott the polls, which were not deemed credible by international observers.
However, the number of women legislators increased to an impressive 30 percent,
or a total of 16 of 55 seats.
The country’s new constitution, a product of five years of work by the Constitutional
Review Commission, was unveiled in May 2003. Drafted by two of King
Mswati’s brothers, the document maintains a ban on political opposition to royal
rule and reaffirms the palace’s absolute control over the cabinet, parliament, and the
courts. Although it provides for limited freedom of speech, assembly, and association,
as well as limited equality for women, King Mswati may waive these rights at
his discretion. In September 2004, public debate of the constitution concluded at a
conference dominated by supporters of royal rule; submissions by labor and human
rights groups that pushed for democratic reforms were largely ignored. The king has
set a November deadline for ratification of the new charter by the parliament, a body
with little independent authority. A group called the National Constitutional Assembly—
a coalition of trade unions, banned political parties, and other civil society
groups—is seeking an order from the country’s Supreme Court to block King Mswati
from decreeing the new constitution into law. The document already has the approval
of parliament.
Most Swazis remain engaged in subsistence agriculture. In addition, many families
depend on income from men working in South African mines. The country has
the world’s highest rate of HIV infection, at 38.6 percent of all adults.
Citizens of Swaziland cannot change their government
democratically. King Mswati III is an absolute monarch, and
royal decrees carry the full force of law. Of the 65 members
of the National Assembly, 55 are elected by popular vote and 10 are appointed by
the king. The king also appoints 20 members of the Senate, with the remaining 10
selected by the National Assembly. Members of both houses serve five-year terms.
Political parties are banned by the constitution, although there are political associations,
the two largest being the People’s United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO)
and the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC).
606 Freedom in the World—2005
Swaziland was not surveyed in the 2004 Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index. A private firm hired by the Finance Ministry estimates that the government
is losing more than $6.5 million per month to corrupt practices. An Anti-Corruption
Unit was established in 1998 but has failed to produce a single indictment.
Freedom of expression is severely restricted, especially regarding po
2005.10.11 | Мартинюк
Тут нема про Венесуелу (-)
2005.10.12 | Сергій Кабуд
там глюк, я не можу відкрити той допис. венесуела тут:
особливо цікаво про те як Чавес фальшує вибори і як вбиває проти
противників.
Дуже схоже на україну з кучмою, дійсно я тепер розумію чому кучма і бандити там гроші ховають
Venezuela
Population: 26,200,000
GNI/capita: $4,080
Life Expectancy: 73
Religious Groups: Roman Catholic (96 percent),
Protestant (2 percent), other (2 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Arab,
German, African, indigenous people
Capital: Caracas
Political Rights: 3
Civil Liberties: 4
Status: Partly Free
Overview:
Ten-Year Ratings Timeline (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
3,3PF 2,3F 2,3F 2,3F 4,4PF 3,5PF 3,5PF 3,4PF 3,4PF 3,4PF
support from foreign private foundations and bilateral aid donors. Public demonstrations
are permitted by law and respected by the government in practice. Workers
can organize unions, bargain collectively, and strike. There are five independent
trade unions organized under the umbrella Vanuatu Council of Trade Unions, which
represents about 40 percent of the country’s 25,000-person workforce.
Although the judiciary is generally independent, it is weak and inefficient. Lack
of resources has kept the government from hiring and retaining qualified judges and
prosecutors. Criminal defendants are often held for long pretrial detentions, and
prison conditions are poor. Vanuatu has no armed forces. The Vanuatu Mobile Force
is a parliamentary wing of the small police force; both are under the command of a
civilian police commissioner. There have been reports of police abuse, but such incidents
appear to be infrequent and not widespread or severe.
The vast majority of the population is engaged in either subsistence farming or
fishing. In January, parliament passed a new law to stop all mixed-race and naturalized
citizens from farming kava, a native herb that has gained popularity among health
supplement consumers in the West. Tourism, the civil service, and offshore banking
provide employment in the service sector.
In September, the National Council of Chiefs passed a motion to require people
to carry permits for movement between provinces because of concerns about crime
in the capital.
Violence against women is common and particularly severe in rural areas. Spousal
rape is not a crime, and no law prohibits wife beating or sexual harassment. Most
cases go unreported because the victims fear reprisal or are discouraged by family
pressure, and the police and courts generally hesitate to intervene or impose stronger
punishment for offenders. Women’s rights leaders consider village chiefs to be
major obstacles to improving conditions for women. The traditional practice of “bride
payment,” or a dowry, is still widely used, which critics charge encourages the view
of women as property.
President Hugo Chavez consolidated his hold on power following
the defeat of a presidential recall referendum in Au696
Freedom in the World—2005
gust 2004 that was held amid charges of ballot rigging. Although he faced an economy
in ruins and high levels of street crime and unemployment, Chavez devoted considerable
attention during the year to advancing his influence over the judicial system,
media, and other institutions of civil society.
The Republic of Venezuela was established in 1830, nine years after independence
from Spain. Long periods of instability and military rule ended with the establishment
in 1961 of civilian rule and the approval of a constitution. Until 1993, the
social-democratic Democratic Action Party (AD) and the Social Christian Party
(COPEI) dominated politics. Former president Carlos Andres Perez (1989–1993) of
the AD was nearly overthrown by Chavez and other nationalist military officers in
two 1992 coup attempts in which dozens were killed. In 1993, Perez was charged with
corruption and removed from office by congress. Rafael Caldera, a former president
(1969–1974) of the COPEI and a populist, was elected president in late 1993 as head
of the 16-party National Convergence, which included Communists, other leftists,
and right-wing groups. With crime soaring, public corruption unabated, oil wealth
drying up, and the country in its worst economic crisis in 50 years, popular disillusionment
with politics deepened.
In 1998, Chavez made his antiestablishment, anticorruption, populist message a
referendum on the long-ruling political elite—famous for its interlocking system of
privilege and graft, but also for its consensual approach to politics—in that year’s
presidential contest. As the country’s long-ruling political parties teetered at the
edge of collapse, last-minute efforts to find a consensus candidate to oppose Chavez
were unsuccessful. In February 1999, Chavez won with 57 percent of the vote, taking
the reins of the world’s fifth-largest oil-producing country.
A constituent assembly dominated by Chavez followers drafted a new constitution
that strengthened the presidency and allowed Chavez to retain power until 2013.
After Venezuelans approved the new constitution in a national referendum on December
15, 2000, congress and the Supreme Court were dismissed. Although he was
reelected as president, new national elections held in July 2000 marked a resurgence
of a political opposition that had been hamstrung in its efforts to contest Chavez’s
stripping of congress and the judiciary of their independence and power. Opposition
parties won most of the country’s governorships, about half the mayoralties,
and a significant share of power in the new congress. Nevertheless, that November,
Chavez’s congressional allies granted him special fast-track powers that allowed
him to decree a wide range of laws without parliamentary debate.
In April 2002, following the deaths of 19 people in a massive protest against the
government, Chavez was deposed in a putsch by dissident military officers working
with major opposition groups. However, he was reinstated two days later when loyalist
troops and supporters gained the upper hand in the streets and in barracks
around the country. Opponents of Chavez cited as giving them a right to rebel Article
350 of the 1999 constitution, which permits citizens not to recognize a government
that infringes on human and democratic rights—an article that was included
by Chavez to justify his own 1992 coup attempts.
Throughout the year, the country was wracked by protests by a broad spectrum
of civil society and saw unprecedented discontent among military officers. In
October, an estimated one million Venezuelans marched in Caracas demanding that
Country Reports 697
Chavez call either early elections or a referendum on his rule—and threatening a
general strike if he did not accede. When Chavez did not respond, the opposition
called for a general strike in February 2003. Although the strike lasted 62 days, it was
unsuccessful in forcing Chavez’s hand. During the remainder of 2003, Chavez appeared
on a collision course with a political opposition that seemed determined to
force his resignation before the end of his elected term. However, the opposition
also faced questions about its own democratic commitment given the failed coup
attempt and its promotion of the failed strike, as well as more practical concerns about
its own cohesion and effectiveness.
Following Chavez’s successful quashing of the strike, opponents quickly mobilized
behind a recall referendum, which is allowed under the constitution. The first
attempt to collect the necessary signatures succeeded in gathering 2.8 million at a
time when polls showed 65 percent of Venezuelans would vote to oust Chavez, but
it was declared invalid by the National Elections Council (CNE). Opponents then
quickly mobilized to collect new signatures. The last half of 2003 was marked by a
series of government social services initiatives, including urban health care and literacy
programs supported by the Cuban government, that appeared to give Chavez
a lift in popularity in the face of the potential referendum. An increase in political
violence in the country came as a crime wave continued unabated.
In March 2004, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights published a
major country report highlighting serious and long-standing institutional issues
related to the rule of law and the respect for civil and political rights. Meanwhile,
congress, controlled by Chavez supporters, approved a measure allowing it to remove
and appoint judges to the Supreme Court, which controls the rest of the judiciary.
The Organic Law of the Supreme Court allowed Chavez to limit the tribunal’s
independence, while the body was expanded from 20 to 32 justices—appointed by
a simple majority vote of the pro-government majority in parliament. The government
also announced that it was studying a measure to unify municipal and state
police forces into a single institution, thus wresting control from mayors and governors,
many of whom oppose Chavez.
By midyear, more than four million people had signed petitions in favor of the
recall vote against Chavez. The poll, which was the country’s first-ever referendum
to recall a president, was set for August 15. Chavez won the referendum with 58
percent of the vote. The European Union declined to monitor the referendum, saying
that it had not been able to secure from Venezuelan officials “the conditions to
carry out an observation in line with the Union’s standard methodology.” Other
international observer groups that did monitor the vote issued findings that the election
was legitimate, though flawed. Following the referendum, which was conducted
in relative peace and characterized by a high turnout, domestic opposition groups
continued to insist that there was a large discrepancy between the official results
and their own exit polls. Independent observers said that there were credible reports
of voter harassment, including physical intimidation and the reassignment of thousand
of voters to far-away polling stations, and vote tampering; it was an open
question, however, if these materially affected the overwhelming outcome. In October,
regional and municipal elections, voters overwhelmingly backed pro-Chavez
candidates.
In November, the assassination of a “super prosecutor” investigating the failed
698 Freedom in the World—2005
Political Rights
and Civil Liberties:
2002 coup against Chavez gave the president an opportunity to blame Florida-based
anti-Chavez “terrorists” for the crime;
***************************************************************
a lawyer suspected of participation in the crime
was killed by police in what was described as a “shootout.” In December, a law giving
the government control over the content of radio and television programs was
to go into effect, with Chavez claiming that the “Venezuelan people have begun to
free themselves from. . .the dictatorship of the private media.”
*****************************************************************
The record high oil
prices that in 2004 enabled the president to engage in spectacular social spending in
poorer districts, his unbroken string of electoral victories, and the government’s
growing control over sectors of Venezuelan life all appeared to make Chavez largely
unassailable in the 2006 presidential election.
Citizens can change their government democratically. Under
the constitution approved in 1961, the president and a
bicameral National Assembly are elected for five years. The
Senate has at least two members from each of the 21 states and the federal district of
Caracas. The Chamber of Deputies has 189 seats. On the national level, there are no
independent government institutions. The military high command is loyal to a single
person, the president, rather than to the constitution and the law. Hugo Chavez’s
party, the Fifth Republic Movement, controls the National Assembly (though narrowly),
as well as the Supreme Justice Tribunal and the intelligence services. It also
controls the Citizen Power branch of government created to fight corruption by the
1999 constitution. This branch is made up of the offices of the ombudsman (responsible
for compelling the government to adhere to the constitution and laws), the
comptroller-general (who controls the revenues and expenses incurred by the government),
and the public prosecutor (who provides opinions to the courts on the
prosecution of criminal cases and brings to the attention of the proper authorities
cases of public employee misconduct and violations of the constitutional rights of
prisoners or accused persons).
The Chavez government has done little to free the government from excessive
bureaucratic regulations, registration requirements, and other forms of control that
increase opportunities for corruption. It has relied instead on attacking persons and
social sectors it considers to be corrupt and selectively enforcing good-government
laws and regulations against its opponents. A 2003 study by the World Bank
found that Venezuela has one of the most regulated economies in the world.
*****************************************************************8
New
regulations and controls over the economy have ensured that public officials have
retained ample opportunities for personal enrichment enjoyed under previous
governments.
*******************************************************************
A July 2004 ruling by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a U.S.
government agency, held that Venezuela illegally expropriated the assets of a U.S.
company involved in a joint venture with the country’s state-owned oil company.
On April 7, 2003, the Law against Corruption was put into effect. It establishes
a citizen’s right to know, and sets out the state’s obligations to provide a thriceyearly
rendition of public goods and expenses, except those security and national
defense expenditures as exempted by law. The law also requires most public employees
to present a sworn declaration of personal assets within 30 days of assuming
a post, as well as 30 days after leaving it; allows for the extradition of corrupt
officials and their prohibition from holding office in the future; and includes a prohibition
on officials holding secret foreign bank accounts. Venezuela was ranked 114
Country Reports 699
out of 146 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2004 Corruption Perceptions
Index.
Although the constitution provides for freedom of the press, exercise of that
right is becoming increasingly difficult in practice. In 2003, as the country moved
toward a referendum on Chavez’s presidency, the government proposed several
measures to tighten its control over opposition newspapers and television and radio
stations. A climate of intimidation and hostility against the press has been established
in the past few years, in large part as a result of strong anti-media rhetoric
by the government and a significant anti-Chavez slant on the part of media owners.
The state allocates broadcast licenses in a biased fashion and engages in favoritism
in the distribution of government advertising revenues. In July 2004, a new law was
ratified that regulates the work of journalists, provides for compulsory registration
with the national journalism association, and punishes reporters’ “illegal” conduct
with prison sentences of three to six months. A Supreme Court ruling upheld censorship
laws that effectively declared that laws protecting public authorities and
institutions from insulting criticism were constitutional. The Law on the Social Responsibility
of Radio and TV, giving the government control over the content of
radio and television programs, was to go into effect in December. The government
does not restrict Internet access.
Freedom of religion, which the constitution guarantees on the condition that its
practice not violate public morality, decency, or the public order, is generally respected
by the government. Academic freedom traditionally is generally respected. However,
government funding has been withheld from the country’s universities, and
the rectors of those institutions charged that the government did so to punish them;
all of the major public university rectors were elected on antigovernment platforms.
Although professional and academic associations generally operate without official
interference,
********************************************************************
the Supreme Court ruled in 2000 that nongovernmental organizations
that receive funding from foreign governments or whose leaders are not Venezuelan
are not part of “civil society.” As a result, they may not represent citizens in
court or bring their own legal actions. In January 2004, the Chavez government made
an effort to undermine the legitimacy of reputable human rights organizations by
questioning their ties to international organizations and making unsupported accusations
of links to foreign governments. Freedom of peaceful assembly and association
are guaranteed in the constitution, and the government generally respected
these rights in practice. Public meetings and marches, the latter of which require
government permits, were generally permitted without impediment, although government
supporters often sought to disrupt these, frequently using violence.
*******************************************************************
The president and his supporters have sought to break what they term a “stranglehold”
of corrupt labor leaders on the job market, a move that labor activists say
tramples on the rights of private organizations. Opposition and traditional labor leaders
say that challenges by insurgent workers’ organizations mask Chavez’s intent
to create government-controlled unions; the president’s supporters maintain that the old
labor regime amounted to little more than employer-controlled workers’ organizations.
****************************************************************
Security forces frequently break up strikes and arrest trade unionists, allegedly
under the guidance of Cuban security officials. In early 2004, the government
refused to recognize the elected leaders of the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers
and ordered the arrest of its secretary-general, forcing him to flee the country.
700 Freedom in the World—2005
Until Chavez took power, the judicial system was headed by a nominally independent
*******************************************************************
Supreme Court that was nevertheless highly politicized, undermined by the
chronic corruption (including the growing influence of narcotics traffickers) that
permeates the entire political system, and unresponsive to charges of rights abuses.
Under Chavez, the effectiveness and impartiality of the judicial branch remains tenuous.
An unwieldy new judicial code, which has helped to reduce the number of people
jailed while awaiting arraignment, has hampered some law enforcement efforts, resulting
in low rates of conviction and shorter jail terms even for convicted murderers.
*****************************************************************
Police salaries are inadequate.
Widespread arbitrary detention and torture of suspects, as well as dozens of
extrajudicial killings by the often-corrupt military security forces and the police, have
increased as crime continues to soar. Since the 1992 coup attempts, weakened civilian
governments have had less authority over the military and the police, and overall
rights abuses are committed with impunity.
****************************************************************
Since Chavez’s election, Venezuela’s military, which is largely unaccountable to
civilian rule, has become an active participant in the country’s social development
and delivery of public services. The 1999 constitution assigns the armed forces a
significant role in the state but does not provide for civilian control over the military’s
budget or procurement practices, or for related institutional checks. A separate system
of armed forces courts retains jurisdiction over members of the military accused
of rights violations and common criminal crimes, and decisions cannot be appealed
in civilian court.
Venezuela’s indigenous peoples belong to 27 ethnic groups. The formal rights
of Native Americans have improved under Chavez, although those rights, specifically
the groups’ ability to make decisions affecting their lands, cultures, and traditions,
and the allocation of natural resources, are seldom enforced, as local political
authorities rarely take their interests into account. Indigenous communities typically
face deforestation and water pollution. Few Indians hold title to their land; many
say that they do not want to, as they reject market concepts of individual property,
preferring instead that the government recognize those lands traditionally held by
them as native territories. At the same time, indigenous communities trying to defend
their legal land rights are subject to abuses, including murder, by gold miners
and corrupt rural police. The constitution creates three seats in the National Assembly
for indigenous people and also provides for “the protection of indigenous communities
and their progressive incorporation into the life of the nation.” The lack of
effective legal rights, however, has created an unprecedented migration by Indians
to poverty-stricken urban areas.
Women are more active in politics than in many other Latin American countries
and comprise the backbone of Venezuela’s sophisticated grassroots network of nongovernmental
organizations. However, there is substantial institutional and societal
prejudice on issues of domestic violence and rape, and work-related sexual harassment
is common.
2005.10.03 | Стопудів
Венесуела-дуже цікаво!Не схоже ні на що з нинішного "дискурсу"(-
2005.10.03 | Боррачо
Re: Венесуела-дуже цікаво!Не схоже ні на що з нинішного "дискурсу"(-
Отож. Це дійсно не "діскурс", не патякання, а дуже цікаве життя. Звісно, Венесуела не лізе "підтримувати демократію" до Іраку, або до Чечні, - а отже, для когось це "фіговінький режим". Але, як на мене, про демократичність країни по-справжньому кажуть не фрідом-хауси, а кількість здорових, освічених дітей. Смішно дивитися на наш міжолігархічний дерібан заводів на тлі справжньої націоналізації, що проходить у Венесуелі і дає можливості для розвитку масштабних соціальних програм.Дякую за підтримку. Якщо Вам цікаво, в нас є майже 5 тисяч фото з Венесуели. Лише самих муралей знято за тисячу. А також 4 години відео. Пишіть на borracho@ua.fm, і ми з Вами охоче поділемося.
2005.10.04 | Сергій Кабуд
я знаю особисто членів одної родини напівбандитської
колишніх росіян, тепер американців, в яких всілякі напівкримінальні бізнеси, типу казліно і грошей там не міряно-от вони як раз люблять венесуелу включно і за те шо там можна заховати крадені міліарди.
Там також заховує їх кучма.
Ваша тупа реклама такого режиму робить цікавим питання хто ви?
хто проплачує рекламу венесуели чи хто це мотивує?
для вас це все моіже $20 за статтю чи скіки вам підкидують в алюмінієву міску шо ви жерете з неї-
а я знаю це все конкретно, бачив на власні очі.
Ви є шматок лайна і краще забирайтеся з цього0 форуму з вашею брехнею.
2005.10.05 | Боррачо
я теж знаю одну країну
>колишніх росіян, тепер американців, в яких всілякі напівкримінальні бізнеси, типу казліно і грошей там не міряно-от вони як раз люблять венесуелу включно і за те шо там можна >заховати крадені міліарди.
А я особисто знаю одну країну, де накопичена більша половина кримінально набутих мільярдів планети, конвертованих у капітал траснаціональніх монополій. Країну, яка практикує цинічні агресії проти інших країн в усьому світі. Країну, що як кошенят потопила у багні своїх бідних співгромадян, бо бюрократи всії рівнів банально покрали гроші на їх порятунок. Країну, де дискримінація та переслідування за расовим, статевим, політичним, релігійним та іншими ознаками займає перші шаблі світових рейтингів. Країну концтаборів "Абу-Грейб" та Гуантанамо.
Ця сама країна - США - має особливий цинізм звинувачувати у недемократичності Венесуелу, де режим настільки м`який, що люди, які хотіли його повалити, ходять по вулицях та дають войновниці інтервью. Де будують житло для бідних, дають освіту неписьменним, лікують тих, в кого немає на це грошей. Ну і, звісно, націоналізують вітчизняну промисловість, щоби мати змогу втілювати в життя соціальні програми. Так ось, купка зганблених народом олігархів як раз і проплачують облудні байки, які ви, що Венесуели і по ТБ не бачили, кидаєте нам із вглядом демократичного цербера. Тьху!
І не треба шити мені антиамериканізм. Я був у Чечні, і писав правду про те, що там коїться, не звертаючи уваги на галас російських шовіністів. І ваше псевдодемократичне патякання у бачив у тому ж самому місці. Познаєте світ з моє - будемо балакати.
>Ваша тупа реклама такого режиму робить цікавим питання хто ви?
хто проплачує рекламу венесуели чи хто це мотивує?
>для вас це все моіже $20 за статтю чи скіки
Отакої? А може це ви типовий недолугий грантоїд, що "в зєркало на сєбя пєняєт"? Це ж бо не маленька Венесуела вкладає гроші у "експорт демократії". Там нафтодолари на ліки та підручники ідуть.
>Ви є шматок лайна і краще забирайтеся з цього0 форуму .
Мені для вас и лайки школа. Дрібна ви людинка. Плазунчик форумний. Здогадуюсь, чого вас так бісить картина справжнього життя і справжньої, невіртуальної революції.
2005.10.23 | Боррачо
Білоруська опозиція хвалить демократичність Чавеса
http://3dway.org/articles/1/50/508/Аглядальнік газэты “Наша Ніва” Лёлік Ушкін, які нядаўна правёў тыдзень у Вэнэсуэле, называе параўнаньні беларускага і вэнэсуэльскага рэжыму некарэктнымі. На ягоную думку, параўнаньне роўню дэмакратыі ў дзьвюх краінах на карысьць Вэнэсуэлы:
(Ушкін: ) “Гэта абсалютна не дыктатура, і я гэта прынцыпова падкрэсьліваю. У краіне існуе парлямэнт, у краіне існуе свабода прэсы, у краіне 4 незалежныя тэлеканалы, якія ад ранку да вечара паліваюць Чавэса брудам. Калі б вы паглядзелі, што пішацца там у "Еl Nacional" альбо "Universal' – гэта лідэры мясцовай дэмакратычнай прэсы – яны пішуць абсалютна ўсё што заўгодна і няма ніякіх праблемаў з уладай”.
2005.10.03 | Friend of people
Де записують у боливаріанські революціонери???(-)
2005.10.04 | Friend of people
Про путч
http://www.communist.ru/root/archive/world/ugo.chaves2005.10.04 | Сергій Кабуд
особливо цікаво про те як Чавес фальшує вибори і як вбиває проти
противників.Дуже схоже на україну з кучмою, дійсно я тепер розумію чому кучма і бандити там гроші ховають
Venezuela
Population: 26,200,000
GNI/capita: $4,080
Life Expectancy: 73
Religious Groups: Roman Catholic (96 percent),
Protestant (2 percent), other (2 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Arab,
German, African, indigenous people
Capital: Caracas
Political Rights: 3
Civil Liberties: 4
Status: Partly Free
Overview:
Ten-Year Ratings Timeline (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
3,3PF 2,3F 2,3F 2,3F 4,4PF 3,5PF 3,5PF 3,4PF 3,4PF 3,4PF
support from foreign private foundations and bilateral aid donors. Public demonstrations
are permitted by law and respected by the government in practice. Workers
can organize unions, bargain collectively, and strike. There are five independent
trade unions organized under the umbrella Vanuatu Council of Trade Unions, which
represents about 40 percent of the country’s 25,000-person workforce.
Although the judiciary is generally independent, it is weak and inefficient. Lack
of resources has kept the government from hiring and retaining qualified judges and
prosecutors. Criminal defendants are often held for long pretrial detentions, and
prison conditions are poor. Vanuatu has no armed forces. The Vanuatu Mobile Force
is a parliamentary wing of the small police force; both are under the command of a
civilian police commissioner. There have been reports of police abuse, but such incidents
appear to be infrequent and not widespread or severe.
The vast majority of the population is engaged in either subsistence farming or
fishing. In January, parliament passed a new law to stop all mixed-race and naturalized
citizens from farming kava, a native herb that has gained popularity among health
supplement consumers in the West. Tourism, the civil service, and offshore banking
provide employment in the service sector.
In September, the National Council of Chiefs passed a motion to require people
to carry permits for movement between provinces because of concerns about crime
in the capital.
Violence against women is common and particularly severe in rural areas. Spousal
rape is not a crime, and no law prohibits wife beating or sexual harassment. Most
cases go unreported because the victims fear reprisal or are discouraged by family
pressure, and the police and courts generally hesitate to intervene or impose stronger
punishment for offenders. Women’s rights leaders consider village chiefs to be
major obstacles to improving conditions for women. The traditional practice of “bride
payment,” or a dowry, is still widely used, which critics charge encourages the view
of women as property.
President Hugo Chavez consolidated his hold on power following
the defeat of a presidential recall referendum in Au696
Freedom in the World—2005
gust 2004 that was held amid charges of ballot rigging. Although he faced an economy
in ruins and high levels of street crime and unemployment, Chavez devoted considerable
attention during the year to advancing his influence over the judicial system,
media, and other institutions of civil society.
The Republic of Venezuela was established in 1830, nine years after independence
from Spain. Long periods of instability and military rule ended with the establishment
in 1961 of civilian rule and the approval of a constitution. Until 1993, the
social-democratic Democratic Action Party (AD) and the Social Christian Party
(COPEI) dominated politics. Former president Carlos Andres Perez (1989–1993) of
the AD was nearly overthrown by Chavez and other nationalist military officers in
two 1992 coup attempts in which dozens were killed. In 1993, Perez was charged with
corruption and removed from office by congress. Rafael Caldera, a former president
(1969–1974) of the COPEI and a populist, was elected president in late 1993 as head
of the 16-party National Convergence, which included Communists, other leftists,
and right-wing groups. With crime soaring, public corruption unabated, oil wealth
drying up, and the country in its worst economic crisis in 50 years, popular disillusionment
with politics deepened.
In 1998, Chavez made his antiestablishment, anticorruption, populist message a
referendum on the long-ruling political elite—famous for its interlocking system of
privilege and graft, but also for its consensual approach to politics—in that year’s
presidential contest. As the country’s long-ruling political parties teetered at the
edge of collapse, last-minute efforts to find a consensus candidate to oppose Chavez
were unsuccessful. In February 1999, Chavez won with 57 percent of the vote, taking
the reins of the world’s fifth-largest oil-producing country.
A constituent assembly dominated by Chavez followers drafted a new constitution
that strengthened the presidency and allowed Chavez to retain power until 2013.
After Venezuelans approved the new constitution in a national referendum on December
15, 2000, congress and the Supreme Court were dismissed. Although he was
reelected as president, new national elections held in July 2000 marked a resurgence
of a political opposition that had been hamstrung in its efforts to contest Chavez’s
stripping of congress and the judiciary of their independence and power. Opposition
parties won most of the country’s governorships, about half the mayoralties,
and a significant share of power in the new congress. Nevertheless, that November,
Chavez’s congressional allies granted him special fast-track powers that allowed
him to decree a wide range of laws without parliamentary debate.
In April 2002, following the deaths of 19 people in a massive protest against the
government, Chavez was deposed in a putsch by dissident military officers working
with major opposition groups. However, he was reinstated two days later when loyalist
troops and supporters gained the upper hand in the streets and in barracks
around the country. Opponents of Chavez cited as giving them a right to rebel Article
350 of the 1999 constitution, which permits citizens not to recognize a government
that infringes on human and democratic rights—an article that was included
by Chavez to justify his own 1992 coup attempts.
Throughout the year, the country was wracked by protests by a broad spectrum
of civil society and saw unprecedented discontent among military officers. In
October, an estimated one million Venezuelans marched in Caracas demanding that
Country Reports 697
Chavez call either early elections or a referendum on his rule—and threatening a
general strike if he did not accede. When Chavez did not respond, the opposition
called for a general strike in February 2003. Although the strike lasted 62 days, it was
unsuccessful in forcing Chavez’s hand. During the remainder of 2003, Chavez appeared
on a collision course with a political opposition that seemed determined to
force his resignation before the end of his elected term. However, the opposition
also faced questions about its own democratic commitment given the failed coup
attempt and its promotion of the failed strike, as well as more practical concerns about
its own cohesion and effectiveness.
Following Chavez’s successful quashing of the strike, opponents quickly mobilized
behind a recall referendum, which is allowed under the constitution. The first
attempt to collect the necessary signatures succeeded in gathering 2.8 million at a
time when polls showed 65 percent of Venezuelans would vote to oust Chavez, but
it was declared invalid by the National Elections Council (CNE). Opponents then
quickly mobilized to collect new signatures. The last half of 2003 was marked by a
series of government social services initiatives, including urban health care and literacy
programs supported by the Cuban government, that appeared to give Chavez
a lift in popularity in the face of the potential referendum. An increase in political
violence in the country came as a crime wave continued unabated.
In March 2004, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights published a
major country report highlighting serious and long-standing institutional issues
related to the rule of law and the respect for civil and political rights. Meanwhile,
congress, controlled by Chavez supporters, approved a measure allowing it to remove
and appoint judges to the Supreme Court, which controls the rest of the judiciary.
The Organic Law of the Supreme Court allowed Chavez to limit the tribunal’s
independence, while the body was expanded from 20 to 32 justices—appointed by
a simple majority vote of the pro-government majority in parliament. The government
also announced that it was studying a measure to unify municipal and state
police forces into a single institution, thus wresting control from mayors and governors,
many of whom oppose Chavez.
By midyear, more than four million people had signed petitions in favor of the
recall vote against Chavez. The poll, which was the country’s first-ever referendum
to recall a president, was set for August 15. Chavez won the referendum with 58
percent of the vote. The European Union declined to monitor the referendum, saying
that it had not been able to secure from Venezuelan officials “the conditions to
carry out an observation in line with the Union’s standard methodology.” Other
international observer groups that did monitor the vote issued findings that the election
was legitimate, though flawed. Following the referendum, which was conducted
in relative peace and characterized by a high turnout, domestic opposition groups
continued to insist that there was a large discrepancy between the official results
and their own exit polls. Independent observers said that there were credible reports
of voter harassment, including physical intimidation and the reassignment of thousand
of voters to far-away polling stations, and vote tampering; it was an open
question, however, if these materially affected the overwhelming outcome. In October,
regional and municipal elections, voters overwhelmingly backed pro-Chavez
candidates.
In November, the assassination of a “super prosecutor” investigating the failed
698 Freedom in the World—2005
Political Rights
and Civil Liberties:
2002 coup against Chavez gave the president an opportunity to blame Florida-based
anti-Chavez “terrorists” for the crime;
***************************************************************
a lawyer suspected of participation in the crime
was killed by police in what was described as a “shootout.” In December, a law giving
the government control over the content of radio and television programs was
to go into effect, with Chavez claiming that the “Venezuelan people have begun to
free themselves from. . .the dictatorship of the private media.”
*****************************************************************
The record high oil
prices that in 2004 enabled the president to engage in spectacular social spending in
poorer districts, his unbroken string of electoral victories, and the government’s
growing control over sectors of Venezuelan life all appeared to make Chavez largely
unassailable in the 2006 presidential election.
Citizens can change their government democratically. Under
the constitution approved in 1961, the president and a
bicameral National Assembly are elected for five years. The
Senate has at least two members from each of the 21 states and the federal district of
Caracas. The Chamber of Deputies has 189 seats. On the national level, there are no
independent government institutions. The military high command is loyal to a single
person, the president, rather than to the constitution and the law. Hugo Chavez’s
party, the Fifth Republic Movement, controls the National Assembly (though narrowly),
as well as the Supreme Justice Tribunal and the intelligence services. It also
controls the Citizen Power branch of government created to fight corruption by the
1999 constitution. This branch is made up of the offices of the ombudsman (responsible
for compelling the government to adhere to the constitution and laws), the
comptroller-general (who controls the revenues and expenses incurred by the government),
and the public prosecutor (who provides opinions to the courts on the
prosecution of criminal cases and brings to the attention of the proper authorities
cases of public employee misconduct and violations of the constitutional rights of
prisoners or accused persons).
The Chavez government has done little to free the government from excessive
bureaucratic regulations, registration requirements, and other forms of control that
increase opportunities for corruption. It has relied instead on attacking persons and
social sectors it considers to be corrupt and selectively enforcing good-government
laws and regulations against its opponents. A 2003 study by the World Bank
found that Venezuela has one of the most regulated economies in the world.
*****************************************************************8
New
regulations and controls over the economy have ensured that public officials have
retained ample opportunities for personal enrichment enjoyed under previous
governments.
*******************************************************************
A July 2004 ruling by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a U.S.
government agency, held that Venezuela illegally expropriated the assets of a U.S.
company involved in a joint venture with the country’s state-owned oil company.
On April 7, 2003, the Law against Corruption was put into effect. It establishes
a citizen’s right to know, and sets out the state’s obligations to provide a thriceyearly
rendition of public goods and expenses, except those security and national
defense expenditures as exempted by law. The law also requires most public employees
to present a sworn declaration of personal assets within 30 days of assuming
a post, as well as 30 days after leaving it; allows for the extradition of corrupt
officials and their prohibition from holding office in the future; and includes a prohibition
on officials holding secret foreign bank accounts. Venezuela was ranked 114
Country Reports 699
out of 146 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2004 Corruption Perceptions
Index.
Although the constitution provides for freedom of the press, exercise of that
right is becoming increasingly difficult in practice. In 2003, as the country moved
toward a referendum on Chavez’s presidency, the government proposed several
measures to tighten its control over opposition newspapers and television and radio
stations. A climate of intimidation and hostility against the press has been established
in the past few years, in large part as a result of strong anti-media rhetoric
by the government and a significant anti-Chavez slant on the part of media owners.
The state allocates broadcast licenses in a biased fashion and engages in favoritism
in the distribution of government advertising revenues. In July 2004, a new law was
ratified that regulates the work of journalists, provides for compulsory registration
with the national journalism association, and punishes reporters’ “illegal” conduct
with prison sentences of three to six months. A Supreme Court ruling upheld censorship
laws that effectively declared that laws protecting public authorities and
institutions from insulting criticism were constitutional. The Law on the Social Responsibility
of Radio and TV, giving the government control over the content of
radio and television programs, was to go into effect in December. The government
does not restrict Internet access.
Freedom of religion, which the constitution guarantees on the condition that its
practice not violate public morality, decency, or the public order, is generally respected
by the government. Academic freedom traditionally is generally respected. However,
government funding has been withheld from the country’s universities, and
the rectors of those institutions charged that the government did so to punish them;
all of the major public university rectors were elected on antigovernment platforms.
Although professional and academic associations generally operate without official
interference,
********************************************************************
the Supreme Court ruled in 2000 that nongovernmental organizations
that receive funding from foreign governments or whose leaders are not Venezuelan
are not part of “civil society.” As a result, they may not represent citizens in
court or bring their own legal actions. In January 2004, the Chavez government made
an effort to undermine the legitimacy of reputable human rights organizations by
questioning their ties to international organizations and making unsupported accusations
of links to foreign governments. Freedom of peaceful assembly and association
are guaranteed in the constitution, and the government generally respected
these rights in practice. Public meetings and marches, the latter of which require
government permits, were generally permitted without impediment, although government
supporters often sought to disrupt these, frequently using violence.
*******************************************************************
The president and his supporters have sought to break what they term a “stranglehold”
of corrupt labor leaders on the job market, a move that labor activists say
tramples on the rights of private organizations. Opposition and traditional labor leaders
say that challenges by insurgent workers’ organizations mask Chavez’s intent
to create government-controlled unions; the president’s supporters maintain that the old
labor regime amounted to little more than employer-controlled workers’ organizations.
****************************************************************
Security forces frequently break up strikes and arrest trade unionists, allegedly
under the guidance of Cuban security officials. In early 2004, the government
refused to recognize the elected leaders of the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers
and ordered the arrest of its secretary-general, forcing him to flee the country.
700 Freedom in the World—2005
Until Chavez took power, the judicial system was headed by a nominally independent
*******************************************************************
Supreme Court that was nevertheless highly politicized, undermined by the
chronic corruption (including the growing influence of narcotics traffickers) that
permeates the entire political system, and unresponsive to charges of rights abuses.
Under Chavez, the effectiveness and impartiality of the judicial branch remains tenuous.
An unwieldy new judicial code, which has helped to reduce the number of people
jailed while awaiting arraignment, has hampered some law enforcement efforts, resulting
in low rates of conviction and shorter jail terms even for convicted murderers.
*****************************************************************
Police salaries are inadequate.
Widespread arbitrary detention and torture of suspects, as well as dozens of
extrajudicial killings by the often-corrupt military security forces and the police, have
increased as crime continues to soar. Since the 1992 coup attempts, weakened civilian
governments have had less authority over the military and the police, and overall
rights abuses are committed with impunity.
****************************************************************
Since Chavez’s election, Venezuela’s military, which is largely unaccountable to
civilian rule, has become an active participant in the country’s social development
and delivery of public services. The 1999 constitution assigns the armed forces a
significant role in the state but does not provide for civilian control over the military’s
budget or procurement practices, or for related institutional checks. A separate system
of armed forces courts retains jurisdiction over members of the military accused
of rights violations and common criminal crimes, and decisions cannot be appealed
in civilian court.
Venezuela’s indigenous peoples belong to 27 ethnic groups. The formal rights
of Native Americans have improved under Chavez, although those rights, specifically
the groups’ ability to make decisions affecting their lands, cultures, and traditions,
and the allocation of natural resources, are seldom enforced, as local political
authorities rarely take their interests into account. Indigenous communities typically
face deforestation and water pollution. Few Indians hold title to their land; many
say that they do not want to, as they reject market concepts of individual property,
preferring instead that the government recognize those lands traditionally held by
them as native territories. At the same time, indigenous communities trying to defend
their legal land rights are subject to abuses, including murder, by gold miners
and corrupt rural police. The constitution creates three seats in the National Assembly
for indigenous people and also provides for “the protection of indigenous communities
and their progressive incorporation into the life of the nation.” The lack of
effective legal rights, however, has created an unprecedented migration by Indians
to poverty-stricken urban areas.
Women are more active in politics than in many other Latin American countries
and comprise the backbone of Venezuela’s sophisticated grassroots network of nongovernmental
organizations. However, there is substantial institutional and societal
prejudice on issues of domestic violence and rape, and work-related sexual harassment
is common.
2005.10.05 | Friend of people
Чілієць Олег Ясинський про демократичну боліварську Венесуелу
http://www.tiwy.com/pais/venezuela/revolucion_bolivariana/camino.phtmlДо речі, наш земляк Олег зараз у Києві, можна з ним поспілкуватися.
Цікаво, що лжедемократи ні слова не кажуть про фашистський піночетівській путч проти законно обраного президента Чавеса.
2005.10.05 | Сергій Кабуд
мене завжди дивуіє скіки в україні довбаків
ваші феодали- кучма і пінчук зберігають покрадені в вас же міліарди у венесуелі, бо чавес точнісінько такий як кучмаале ж знаходяться лохи вроди вас які женуть всю цю пургу
не дивно що ви живете в лайні, де коже 80й з вас заражений СНІДом
2005.10.05 | Боррачо
то є правда :)
Сергій Кабуд пише:> ваші феодали- кучма і пінчук зберігають покрадені в вас же міліарди у венесуелі, бо чавес точнісінько такий як кучма
Послухайте, чи не досить брехні? Кучма та інші олігархі, від Ахметова-Суркіса-Пінчука до Волкова-Третякова-Тимошенко ховають гроші у більш "демократичних" країнах - на кшталт Швейцарії, Великої Британії, Росії, Бельгії та США. В Венесуелі вони ніколи у житті не були. А от до Буша, Путина, та іншіх вбивць, в гості один за одним їдуть - дупу цілувати. Тож, приберіть свої хапалки від боліваріанської революції. Там грантів не платять. Там люди за совість виборюють майбутнє своєї Батьківщини.
> не дивно що ви живете в лайні, де коже 80й з вас заражений СНІДом
То ви ще й не з України? Гадаю, кожен наш громадянин гідно відповів би вам на цей блюзнірський закід. Звісно, не у форумі, а "ліцом к ліцу"
2005.10.06 | Friend of people
Re: мене завжди дивуіє скіки в україні довбаків
> не дивно що ви живете в лайні, де коже 80й з вас заражений СНІДомОблиште його! Хлопець не поважає Україну та укранців, а ви хочете, щоб він про якусь Венесуелу правду казав!
2005.10.11 | Боррачо
новий кубинський сайт в Україні
Не всі такі! Ось хлопці зробили новий кубинський сайт в Україніhttp://five.cheguevara.org.ua/
2005.10.11 | Friend of people
Alerta! Aaleeertaaaaaa!!!
Хто ще не знає: від сьогодні і до 22-го у "Жовтні" проходить фестиваль документального кубинського кіно! Сьогоді, об 19.30 - відкриття! У програмі: мохіто, кубинська музика, сальса, сальса, сальса! Хто не бачив стрічку "Буена віста", тому у пеклі чорти будуть кожен день транслювати голівудське кінолайно!18 жовтня буде показана легендарна стрічка Великого Олівера Стоуна -"Команданте", запис його бесід із Фіделем, а також - стрічка про Че Гевару!!!
Крім того, наступного тижня також у Києві розпочнеться інший фест - також кубинського, і також документального кіно!
Віва Куба! Віва Революція! Віва Че! Down with imperialism!
2005.10.11 | Мартинюк
Що мене насторожило
>Последняя акция оппозиции прошла позавчера – 3 августа. Она призывала к бойкоту «недемократичных выборов», – но мотоциклетчики-чависты из «Тупамаро» успешно закидали митинг дымовыми шашками.>Оппозиция не так сильна, как раньше, однако в городе много вооруженных солдат – шестнадцатилетние призывники и двадцатилетние офицеры, самая надежная опора президента, как думают очень многие.
Чесно кажучи виглядає що в "демократичній" Венесуелі не надто педантично пильнують за дотримання демократичних процедур.
Особливо мне втішило таке досягнення уряду Чавеса, як ліквідація расової сегрегації у борделях.
Мій діагноз - Чавес опирається на бідних, але багаті продовжують існувати. Коли прихильники Чавеса стануть багатими( не весь же народ - бо на кого він буде опиратися?) то зневага до демократичних процедур посилиться і Штати отримають моральне право на інтервенцію.
Так що Чавесу не варто захоплюаватисяч тоталітарно-комуністичною "романтикою" - це дорога в тупик та в ізоляцію.
2005.10.11 | Боррачо
Проблема є. Демократії занадто багато
Мартинюк пише:> Чесно кажучи виглядає що в "демократичній" Венесуелі не надто педантично пильнують за дотримання демократичних процедур.
Ну, це як для кого. Чавісти, зазвичай, критикують Чавеса за "зайву", з їх точки зору, демократичність. Навіть керівники абсолютно незаконного військового путчу проти Чавеса залишилися на волі. Бо, з точки зору президента, не треба було робити мучеників та загострювати суспільні конфлікти. Тепер ці "горілас" ходять во вулицях Каракаса та дають войовничі інтервью. Усі оппозиційні партії працюють, а то, що вони не мають народної підтримки, це вже їх власна провина. Бо опозиція контролює майже усі (!) телеканали країни, крім недавно утвореного міжнародного "Телесур". Де ще ви бачили таку демократію?
Ну а те, що багато військових - то їх в десять разів меньше, ніж у сусідній Колумбії, де режим неоліберала Урібе, разом із загонами наркобаронів - парамілітарес, душить усіляку опозицію, просто на вулицях відстрілює профспілкових діячів, індианьских активістів, та іншу, підозріло ліву публіку. Або просто аполітичних бідних підлітків з барріос (Щоб не плодилася біднотА). І все це не заважає йому бути кращим другом Буша та "демократичним" діячем. Бо ж "свій сукін син".
Це по перше. По друге, армія Венесуели традиційно грає велику роль у суспільному житті країни - будівництво, виробництво, функції міністерства з надзвичайних срав, тощо.
> Особливо мне втішило таке досягнення уряду Чавеса, як ліквідація расової сегрегації у борделях.
І навіть у цьому він був таким обережним, що розібрався з расистами формальним шляхом, через Комісію у справах захисту прав споживача .
> Мій діагноз - Чавес опирається на бідних, але багаті продовжують існувати.
Справді, на бідних. Але чимало вихідців із середнього класу, - багатих, за місцевими мірками людей, - також підтримують цього лідера. Бо він справді покращив економічне та соціальне життя у країні, не зважаючи на агресивний саботаж. Власне, проти Чавеса активно виступають дуже багаті люди, а також іх менеджерська та медійна обслуга. І справи їх зараз вельми кепські. Вони навіть не оскаржували муніціпальні вібори у серпні - бо все всім було ясно заздалегідь.
>Коли прихильники Чавеса стануть багатими( не весь же народ - бо на кого він буде опиратися?) то зневага до демократичних процедур посилиться і Штати отримають моральне право на інтервенцію.
Чавес саме тому ретельно ставиться до демократичних процедур. Проте, якщо США поставлять на інтервенцію, ім не будуть потрібні особливі поводи. Ви ж не така наївна людина, щоби вірити у склади зброї масового винищення, та всесвітнє терорістичне кубло у нещасному Іраці?
Інтревенція можлива, але не зараз. США завязли у тому ж Іраці, а нападати на Венесуелу, це майже те ж саме, що нападати на Куби. А умови до партизанки там ще кращі, ніж у Фіделя. Ніякі супутники та авіація не можуть допомогти знищити потужний партизанський рух у сусідній Колумбії. А скільки демократичного напалму та конгресових грошей на це пішло!
> Так що Чавесу не варто захоплюаватисяч тоталітарно-комуністичною "романтикою" - це дорога в тупик та в ізоляцію.
Тоталітарною - ні. Та він нею ніколи і не захоплювався. А ось ліва романтика робить команданте Уго героєм для мільонів молодих людей у ЛАмериці та усьому світі. Яка ізоляція! Венесуела ніколи не була такою відкритою та популярної країною, своєрідним лідером третього світу. Це лише ми - бідна відстала країна, що молиться на своїх найстрашніших ворогів, у той час, коли весь світ постає до нового бою.
2005.10.11 | Мартинюк
В чому різниця між США і Венесуелою
В штатах би тих хто, не будучи поліцією закидав би демонстрацію "димовухами", зловили б і скоріше всього посадили. Навіть як би це була демонстрація комуністів чи фідель-кастристів.У Венесуелі це сприймається як приклад доблесті юних борців за не знати що. Тобто наяву суспільне виправдання насильства "для благородної мети". Поділ людей на класи за рівнем матеріального достатку - бідні - хороші бо бідні, багаті погані, бо багаті.
Особливо мило звучить пасаж про те як бідні венесуельці хочуть взяти щось "своє" в багатих віллах, а їх ... бють струмом на огорожах і стріляють гумовими і можливо справжніми кулями.
Взагалі подібні за тональністю ( до речі тональність стандартна для колишньої радянської пропаганди) статті я колись читав про "соціалістичну" Камбоджу і навіть про Центрально-африканську імперію імператора Боккаси. За останнього правда так мило писали до тих пір поки його "імперія" ще не була перейменована в таку з "Центрально-африканської республіки".
Я не хочу звинувачуватии Чавеса у тому що він хоче повести свій народ саме таким шляхом, али цим шляхом не ведуть , і навіть не йдуть - ним котяться ... І у певний момент ця інерція може розчавити навіть його самого...
2005.10.12 | толя дейнека
Re: В чому різниця між США і Венесуелою
найперша різниця між США і Венесуелою полягає в тому, що в Штатах чивуть імперіалісти, а в Венесуелі - ні. І в Кубі - ні.В Росії живуть імперіалісти, а в Україні - ні.
В Українні дали під жопу кремлівським імперіалістам.
Таке само повелися з американськими імперіалістами в Венесуелі і на Кубі. Їхня біда в тім, що американські імперіалісти нахабніші і підступніші.
Дуже дивно, що ви не розумієтесь у таких простих речах.
2005.10.13 | Боррачо
То є свята правда
толя дейнека пише:> найперша різниця між США і Венесуелою полягає в тому, що в Штатах чивуть імперіалісти, а в Венесуелі - ні. І в Кубі - ні.
> В Росії живуть імперіалісти, а в Україні - ні.
>
> В Українні дали під жопу кремлівським імперіалістам.
> Таке само повелися з американськими імперіалістами в Венесуелі і на Кубі. Їхня біда в тім, що американські імперіалісти нахабніші і підступніші.
>
То є свята правда.
2005.10.13 | Боррачо
Re: В чому різниця між США і Венесуелою
Мартинюк пише:> В штатах би тих хто, не будучи поліцією закидав би демонстрацію "димовухами", зловили б і скоріше всього посадили. Навіть як би це була демонстрація комуністів чи фідель-кастристів.
"А у Штатах бруківки із сиру, і нема мишоловок та котів!!!" Ви наївний, як герой цього мультфільму
По-перше, політичних активістів у США вбивають и вбиватимуть. Більше вбивають лише у згаданій демократичній Колумбії. Наприклад партія "Чорних пантер" була фізично винищена за участю поліції та ФБР. З її проводу вцілив тільки один діяч - лише тому, що втік до Куби. По-друге: ось і в Україні у вересні ліві напали на корчистів, коли ті приперлися на їхній мітинг. "Молотових" не було, але біти та кастети, особливо у братчиків - у асортименті. І що, хтось сидить? І у самих США на антиглобівських акціях вайоленсу вище даху. Є, є в Америці коти:) І сир там, як усюди - лише у мишеловці:)
З іншого боку, політичне вбивство трьох студентів, яке вчинили ультраправі опозиціонери Чавесу, вас ніяк не зхвилювало. Дива?
> Поділ людей на класи за рівнем матеріального достатку - бідні - хороші бо бідні, багаті погані, бо багаті.
Дійсно. Багатим - добре, бідним - зле. За вами, останні мають не звертати на це уваги. Ну, в Україні вони й не звертають, тому й живуть як бидло, зо дня на день гірше...
> Особливо мило звучить пасаж про те як бідні венесуельці хочуть взяти щось "своє" в багатих віллах, а їх ... бють струмом на огорожах і стріляють гумовими і можливо справжніми кулями.
Ач, які злодюги-голодранці! Інша річ - 30 олігархічних родин Венесуели, що були вкрали у народу усю нафту на суму в мільярди доларів. Ото - законослухняні люди. Вони ж бо по огорожах не лазять
> Взагалі подібні за тональністю ( до речі тональність стандартна для колишньої радянської пропаганди) статті я колись читав
У нас з вами дещо різний погляд на демократію. З вашої точки зору країна демократична, якщо про неї так телебачення і фрідом хауз кажуть.З моєї - це коли у країни успішно ліквідують неписьменність, впроваджують безкоштовну медицину, дають людям нове житло та роботу. А то, що в когось через стане мільйоном меньше - це мені байдуже.
> Я не хочу звинувачуватии Чавеса у тому що він хоче повести свій народ саме таким шляхом, али цим шляхом не ведуть , і навіть не йдуть - ним котяться ... І у певний момент ця інерція може розчавити навіть його самого...
Дива. Венесуела пре в гору і за ВВП, і за рівнем життя, і за іншими показниками. Сме за це його й хочуть розчавити. Бо він - дуже "поганий приклад" того, як можна жити без МВФ та всевладдя олігархічного капіталу.
2005.10.12 | Сергій Кабуд
Чавес дуже і дуже багатий особисто, як Кучма
він витягує великий відсоток з нафтоторгівлі прямо собі.І ще відмиває, точніше заховує кучмам і прамалатам гроші
2005.10.13 | Боррачо
І діти його на бехах не вишивають :)
Вам це, певно, наснилося? Будь ласка, номера банківських рахунків у студію. Водночас можете "золото партії" пошукати. Напевне ж, кляті більшовики в Чавеса його й заховали. Ще дідусь Ленін, 100 років томуТільки поясніть мені, чому чавесові доньки вчаться у боліваріанських (неелітних) закладах, та практикують у програмі "Баріо адентро". А наш кронпринць, "добрий хлопець", плює українцям просто в очі своєю тачкою, хатою, шампанським та чаєвими на сотні баксів??
Може тому, що татусь в нього до біса демократичний, та дуже вже бідний?
2005.10.25 | Сергій Кабуд
не можу- вони засекречені(-)
2005.10.25 | Боррачо
Ось подивиться:
http://www2.maidanua.org/news/view.php3?bn=maidan_free&trs=-1&key=1130100012&first=1130228511&last=11301358422005.10.26 | Сергій Кабуд
повірте мені, я сам романтик, але коли я дізнався де тримає грош
гроші певний краями мені знайомий бандитський клан з Росії,то тут же й згадав і повідомлення про те як покрадені в ООН гроші Садам туди ж переводив і як Кучма переводив
карочє, за красивою революційною риторикою чавес став міліардером, одним з найбагатчих людей світу, бо ховати міліарди(хусейн-25, кучма- щонайменьше 2) це дуже прибуткова робота.
Мінімум 10% комісійних, а інколи і всі 100%
2005.10.26 | Боррачо
Злочин Уго Чавеса (л)
http://tiwy.com/pais/venezuela/revolucion_bolivariana/hugo.phtml2005.10.19 | Чучхе
Я до речі вернувся тиждень тому. Прожив у Каракасі тиждень
якщо когось зацікавить щось конкретне - питайте. сувенірів тільки не просіть, усі роздав.Зауважу тільки, що поліції важкувато буде розігнати якийсь мітинг "Тупамарос", бо ті самі кого хочеш розженуть. А поліція там затюкана і роздроблена: є федеральна, а є муніціпальна, причому не міська, а по районам - у кожного своя. Вона погано організована і у населення великою популярністю не користується. Плюс Тупамароси діють переважно по маргінальним кварталам, де взагалі ніякої поліції немає. Там вони ріжуться з точно такими ж придурками-ліваками які проти Чавеса під назвою "Бандера Роха".
Чавес, без сумніву, оригінал, як в житті так і за розмахом реформ, на які він замахнувся. І народ йому щиро вірить, бо реформи заділи дуже багатьох і загалом обернулися для широких верств населення позитивно. І загалом він мені симпатичний. Але хотів би замітити, що президент сусідньої Бразилії Лула да Сільва робить те ж що й Чавес, але умудряється обходитись без пафосу, настроювання проти себе Америки, війсмькових путчів та заявок на вселенське значення боліваріанської революції.
2005.10.19 | толя дейнека
Re: Лула обходиться без ..
Певно тому, що Бразилія велика країна і Штатам так легко її не з'їсти. (Так само Китай ніхто відверто не ображає).Венесуела порівняно менша, але одночасно є вагомим постачальником нафти в США. Тому була велика спокуса посадити в Каракасі слухняну і корумповану маріонетку, але не судилося - дали по жопі. По жопі організатору заколоту - послу з характерним призвищем Шапіро.
Ну а звідси вже особисті образи з одного і з другого боку, і Чавес і шапіри. Звідси й пафос, як в Чавеса, і в американських проповідників, близьких до неоконсерваторів.
З америкосами по доброму не можна, бо залізуть в хату і ноги покладуть на стіл.
2005.10.19 | Боррачо
ще про Шапiро
толя дейнека пише:> Певно тому, що Бразилія велика країна і Штатам так легко її не з'їсти. (Так само Китай ніхто відверто не ображає).
> Венесуела порівняно менша, але одночасно є вагомим постачальником нафти в США. Тому була велика спокуса посадити в Каракасі слухняну і корумповану маріонетку, але не судилося - дали по жопі. По жопі організатору заколоту - послу з характерним призвищем Шапіро.
Який, до речi, особисто брав участь в органiзацii фашистського перевороту у Чiлi в 73-му. Так би мовити, фахiвець iз поширення демократii За два днi в Сантьяго загинули 200 самих тiльки поетiв. А фрiдом хаус навiть i не почухався.
> З америкосами по доброму не можна, бо залізуть в хату і ноги покладуть на стіл.
Ще й насеруть. I скажуть, що так i було.
2005.10.19 | Боррачо
Re: Я до речі вернувся тиждень тому. Прожив у Каракасі тиждень
>Чавес, без сумніву, оригінал, як в житті так і за розмахом реформ, на які він замахнувся. І народ йому щиро вірить, бо реформи заділи дуже багатьох і загалом обернулися для широких верств населення позитивно. І загалом він мені симпатичний. Але хотів би замітити, що президент сусідньої Бразилії Лула да Сільва робить те ж що й Чавес, але умудряється обходитись без пафосу, настроювання проти себе Америки, війсмькових путчів та заявок на вселенське значення боліваріанської революції.Чавес но се ва! Но вольверан
Товарищу П.! Давайте спишемося. Завiтайте до нас у гостi
2005.10.19 | Чучхе
Загалом до кінця місяця я відпишусь у пресі...
Боррачо пише:>
> Чавес но се ва! Но вольверан
А ви бачили папуг, які викрикують це гасло? Для мене це був шок. Цікаво було б в Україні запровадити таку політтехнологію... Безкоштовні агітатори, навчання недороге, літають кругом, там гдє пєхота нє пройдьот... Ну і новизна цього політтехнологічного прийому без сумніву має подіяти.
> Товарищу П.! Давайте спишемося. Завiтайте до нас у гостi
Це куди? Я Вас щось не ідентифікую. Верник, чи що? Я загалом зайнятий, але можу виділити дві три години, особливо якби зустрітися в центрі і щоб там був комп"ютер (маю цікавий фільм про Чавеса в МПГ). Мені можна писати на polis1 @mail.ru
2005.10.19 | Боррачо
Re: Загалом до кінця місяця я відпишусь у пресі...
Чучхе пише:> Боррачо пише:
> >
> > Чавес но се ва! Но вольверан
>
> А ви бачили папуг, які викрикують це гасло? Для мене це був шок.
> Цікаво було б в Україні запровадити таку політтехнологію... > > Безкоштовні агітатори, навчання недороге, літають кругом, там гдє > пєхота нє пройдьот... Ну і новизна цього політтехнологічного прийому >без сумніву має подіяти.
Так. Ми у Гуаренас бачили їх дрисерувальника. Всі папуги, як один, за Чавеса. Казав, на гасла опозиції немає попиту.
> > Товарищу П.! Давайте спишемося. Завiтайте до нас у гостi
>
> Це куди? Я Вас щось не ідентифікую.
www.che.in.ua
www.ghetto.in.ua
>особливо, якби зустрітися в центрі і щоб там був комп"ютер (маю цікавий фільм про Чавеса в МПГ). Мені можна писати на polis1 @mail.ru
Ну, то це, напевно, у нас в офісі. Цікавих фільмів про Чавеса ми привезли купу, та перекладаємо в нас на відеостудії. Зпишемося.
Щодо преси. Крім сайтів, "Боліваріанські нотатки" вже надруковані у часописі та двох журналах. Цілком можливо надрукувати і ваш матеріал.
2005.10.25 | Чучхе
пропоную зустрітись в середу (деталі листом) (-)
2005.10.24 | Боррачо
до Чучхе
>Мені можна писати на polis1 @mail.ruПисав. Чи дійшло? Може, помилка в мейлі?
2005.10.22 | Боррачо
Венесуельский аналог Майдану
Про вашу конференцію писали на http://aporrea.orgВластиво, це місцевий боліваріанський аналог Майдану
2005.10.25 | Остап!
Сировинний соціалізм здохне разом з закінченням нафти (-)
2005.10.25 | Боррачо
Сировинний капіталізм здохне ще раніш
Щоб розуміти цю річ, не треба бути лівим. Акули світового капіталізму мають найбільший рівень спожівання енергоносіів, і повністью залежать від їх імпорту. Коли почнеться серйозна енергокриза, їх економіка полетить першою.2005.10.25 | Лыцо капкаскай националности
Венесуелі очима українців. Праздник сволочей..
В 1989 одна девочка ,окончившая Харьковский мединститут, вышла замуж за венесуэльца и уехала с ним. Он окончил в Харькове что - то строительное, то ли ХИСИ, то ли политех.Вернулась домой в мае этого года.Итоги жизни в Венесуэле: она вдова, дочь с трудом говорит по русски, в стрессовом состоянии, нуждается в реабилитации. Денег почти нет, жить негде, дочери год до окончания школы, но как это будет ещё не ясно, куча проблем.
Муж работал в Венесуэле государственным строительным инспектором. Был с семьей в каком - то Порт - Одасе. Вечером прямо возле гостиницы их остановил патруль, молодняк в защитной форме. Папу расстреляли на месте, без объяснений, дочку начали здесь же, на глазах у матери терзать, но услышав поблизости выстрелы похватали оружие и убежали.Маму с дочкой увели в аптеку и начали оказывать помощь. Ночь они провели не в гостинице, а в полицейском участке, в общей камере.
Труп мужа она никогда не увидела, никаких справок о смерти мужа ей не дали, выслали их с дочерью в Каракас. В Каракасе начала ходить по инстанциям, жаловаться, искать труп. Её, гражданку Венесуелы, в одной инстанции так отдубасили, что неделю не могла встать. Настойчиво помогли выехать в Бразилию и порекомендовали никогда больше не возвращаться.
Сейчас возится с документами и собирается переехать в Луганск. У нас в городе нет путнего психиатра.
Начинаешь о чем либо расспрашивать - замыкается в себе и молчит. Говорит - страшно. Никаких объяснений, что до Венесуэлы далеко - не принимает. Страшно, и все тут.Помощи ни от кого не принимает.
Господин Бардаччо! Ваши умиления по поводу революции и прочих прелестях эта женщина навряд ли поймет. А я думаю, что же творила здесь большевистская мразь, которой не нужно было никого никуда высылать. Стреляли на месте.
Эту мразь надо было рэзать, на месте!
2005.10.25 | Боррачо
завітайте до психіатра
Це вам точно не завадить. Венесуела - відкрита країна, де товстопузі туристи-грінго спокійно сидять у креольськіх ресторанах, та купаються на Маргариті. Найбільший промисловий центр регіону із хмарочосами та чудовим метро, що є навіть у барріос. Навіть білоруські опозіціонери побачили там повне торжєство дємократіі. Ніякого більшовізму, чи на жаль, чи на щастя, у Венесуелі нема. Навпаки, на відміну від сусідньої Колумбії, де 20 років точиться громадянська війна, у Венесуелі за Чавеса подолали проблему захвату людей за викуп. Так, рівень злочинності вельми високий - але не більший, ніж у підштатівському Пуерто-Ріко, а на тлі згаданої Колумбії чи Бразилії це просто безпечна країна.І не треба розповідати про важку долю ваших знайомих. Такі жахалочки хто завгодно наплете. Ви то самі були у Венесуелі? Я і 12 моїх друзів лазили по баріос, по руралю, і ніхто нас пальцем не торкнув. Був один випадок у центрі Каракасу. Розвели хлопців на 200 баксів при обміні. І то, побачили бейджики фестивалю, віддали все до копійки.
Да, власне, в Україні, і зокрема, на Луганщині, кожного дня когось безвинно вбивають. Чи кримінал, чи менти, чи бо зна хто. І шо, теж винні більшовикі? Нєча, шановний на зєркало-то пєнять
2005.10.25 | Лыцо капкаскай националности
Дарагой! Ребенку от твоих слов легче нэ стало! ( - )
2005.10.25 | Friend of people
Детей в покое оставь
Слышь ты, Федор Михалыч! Любитель размазывать чужие слезы по своим щекам.. Ты давай лучше поплачь за 4 миллионами украинцев. Которых мы без всяких латиносов потеряли. Там среди них миллион деток было, не меньше. Так что не надо далеко ехать.2005.10.25 | Анатолий
Пошто шумим? Не нужно столько эмоций.
Мне по роду работы много всяких данных приходится перерабатывать. И вот недавно , почему - то в технической библиотеке , нашел статистический сборник "Украина. 1983 год" Смешной местами до упаду. Скажем в основных показателях, написано как - то так " Наиболее интересные цифры", данных по урожайности пшеницы нет. Приходится самому вычислять . А вот данные по урожайности конопли в третьей строке. Почему ЦК КПУ решил, что мне конопля интереснее пшеницы я не знаю.Так вот. Есть в этой книжице и демографические данные, заканчивающиеся в 1983 году. Мне стало интересно, как это выглядит на графике. Построил , затем экстраполировал и получилось, что кривые рождаемости и смертности пересекаются в ...... 2000 году. Падение рождаемости началось ещё в 60 - е годы. Я думаю немного "помог" Чернобыль. Но только вот "буржуи" здесь не при чем. В 1983 году начим ЦеКистам и ЧеКистам в дурном сне не могло присниться, что скоро капитализм, хоть и хреновый, победит в Украине. Поэтому обвинить составителей в подыгрывании "буржуЯм" невозможно.
Поэтому в уменьшении населения Украины прошу винить коммунистов и эмиграцию, как явление.
С ком приветом. Анатолий.
2005.10.25 | Боррачо
Трохи неприємної правди
Емоцій дійсно не треба. Той тип цього не вартий. А якщо про інше...Анатолий пише:
> Мне по роду работы много всяких данных приходится перерабатывать. И вот недавно , почему - то в технической библиотеке , нашел статистический сборник "Украина. 1983 год" Смешной местами до упаду. Скажем в основных показателях, написано как - то так " Наиболее интересные цифры", данных по урожайности пшеницы нет. Приходится самому вычислять . А вот данные по урожайности конопли в третьей строке. Почему ЦК КПУ решил, что мне конопля интереснее пшеницы я не знаю.
Певно тому, що хліб потрібен кожному в цій країні (не Венесуела ж, тотальний маїс не покатить). "Даждь нам днесь", як то кажуть. А коноплі - лише окремо взятим бовдурам. Сам не дурний трохи курнути, але ще не докуривсь до того, щоб рівняти шмаль із пшеницею.
> Так вот. Есть в этой книжице и демографические данные, заканчивающиеся в 1983 году. Мне стало интересно, как это выглядит на графике. Построил , затем экстраполировал и получилось, что кривые рождаемости и смертности пересекаются в ...... 2000 году. Падение рождаемости началось ещё в 60 - е годы. Я думаю немного "помог" Чернобыль. Но только вот "буржуи" здесь не при чем.
Даруйте, але це не серйозно. Де посилання на конкретні цитати, де вихідні дані книги? Я б завтра у Вернандці якраз подивився. А то може вам це наснилося. Чи переплутали щось після конопель. Або порахували не так. Всяке ж буває. Коли вже ви захотіли відмазати від геноциду цілий клас (або ж соціальну групу, це вже на ваш смак) буржуазії, треба до цього сейозно відноситись.
> В 1983 году начим ЦеКистам и ЧеКистам в дурном сне не могло присниться, что скоро капитализм, хоть и хреновый, победит в Украине. Поэтому обвинить составителей в подыгрывании "буржуЯм" невозможно.
Чому ж? На той час вони вже являли собою окрему соціальну групу номенклатури, яка цілковито контролювала суспільно-економічне життя країни. А отже, почала завдавати собі питання - чому це ми, хазяєва жізні, не можемо жити так, як живуть хазяї життя у капкраїнах? Чому ми такі собі невідомі свту підпільні мільйонери Корейко, коли могли б бути Онасісами та Ротшильдами? Ні, я не про якийсь антикомуністичний заколот - то були широкі суспільні процеси. Але бажаннячко змінити суспільний лад у товаришів функціонерів було неябияке.
> Поэтому в уменьшении населения Украины прошу винить коммунистов и эмиграцию, как явление.
Знаєте, я вас так само можу звинуватити в загибелі мамонтів. Доказова база в нас буде однакова - тобто, ніяких серйозних доказів. А ось доказів, у тому, що стрімке поглиблення демографічної кризи розполчалося у 90-х - скільки завгодно. І комуняки, власне, тут ні до чого. Про це каже офіційна статистика. Ось, цьогорічне:http://www.korespondent.net/main/39758
"Представляючи статистичні дані з нагоди Всесвітнього дня народонаселення в п’ятницю, Наталя Власенко (заступник голови Державного комітету статистики України) заявила: "Скорочення чисельності населення, зниження тривалості життя і стрімке падіння народжуваності стали характерними ознаками демографічних процесів останнього десятиліття і дають підстави кваліфікувати їх як ознаки демографічної кризи.
За її словами, протягом останнього десятиліття в Україні значно прискорився процес зниження народжуваності. Якби протягом 1989-2001 років народжуваність залишалася на рівні 1989 року, за цей період народилося б на 2,3 млн. дітей більше, ніж фактично...
Якби смертність протягом 1989-2001 років залишалася на рівні 1989 року, то кількість померлих за цей період було б меншою, ніж фактично, на 2,4 млн. осіб (за період з 1989 по 2001 роки в Україні померло більше 9,3 млн. осіб, а народилося 6,6 млн. осіб".
То що, Толю, зпишемо ці легіони ненароджених та жмурів на комунистів? Чи все ж вкажемо на головного винуватця - буржуазію? Ви ж бо самі на неї вказали. Бо міграція - зокрема, трудова, - є прямим наслідком соціальної кризи в Україні, що її спричинило становлення ринкових відносин. Або ж, іншими словами - капіталізм.
> С ком приветом. Анатолий.
А ви член КПУ? Ні? Я теж. То чого понти ганять? Відповідати за цей геноцид мають всі буржуї, до Симоненка включно. А язиком чесати, як це ви робите, про такі речі не можна. Ви ж, певно, віруючий? Пана бога не боїтесь?
2005.10.26 | Анатолий
Данные по книге - завтра. Сегодня у меня её нет.
У нас библиотека плохая , поэтому меняемся.2005.10.26 | Боррачо
У вас, друже, іншого нема
Совісті. Розуму, щоб не патякати несінітниць про дуже серйозні речі.Яка там ще книга за 83-й рік? Нащо вона? Я вам щойно цитував офіційний звіт національної статистичної служби за червень поточного року. Гадаєте, туди комуняцькі агенти пролізли? З вас і таке станеться.
Це ж бо були б мільйони живих людей. Українців. Ви розумієте? На що ми їх проміняли? На ваучери Льоні Голубкова? На фастфуди, та таке інше лайно? На блюзнірський трьоп про духовніть та демократію? Щоб Андрій Вікторович Ющенко чаєві давав по 300 баксів за раз?
Чому в мене сусідка, офісна секретарка, та її чоловік, офісний ж клєрк, котрий рік поспіль бояться народити дитину - бо на що її годувати? І якби ж вони одні такі були. Чому в моїх родичів, на Поліссі, в районній лікарні люди, як мухи, без ліків мруть? Хіба в цьому комуняки винні? Здається, що ні - бо вони цю лікарню побудували. Спробуйте поміркувати, Толю. Голова від цього не заболить. Хіба що серце трохи.
2005.10.26 | Сергій Кабуд
ті ж секретарі йобкомів і зараз при владі
чи при власності.Вони всі були члєни кпсс, номенклатурного рівня.
Суттю совка була не назва камуніст, бо назва брехлива.
Я от до певної міри сповідаю кріпто-комунізм, топто необхідність безкоштовного росповсюдження для всіх- текстів, включно з компютерними програмами. В майбутньому ці 'тексти' будуть і їсти варити і сталь виробляти. Тому будуть кращі за теперішні гроші. Але це я відступив від тєми)))
Суттю совка була система тоталітарного управління, яка була досить вигідна для верхівки, але у 80і роки ця верхівка прийняла рішення перейти до госкапіталізму, шоб типу вже конкрєтно напхати кишені грішми і не притворятися як їм покайфу тусувати з міліардерами на яхтах, а треба ж було раніше це приховувати, от яка невдача...
Ну і поділили приватизаційно все народне майно.
Оголосили капіталізм, це коли коже за себе, але в екс-партайгеносів ще й гроші, звязки з екс-кгб, спільні інтереси.
І от десь тоді люди почали мерти особливо у великій кількості,
але за совка теж мерли. Жити було важко, голодно і страшно. Конкретно так страшно. Зараз вже такого немає, хоча може мруть більше і вбивають більше. Тоді більше залякували, але це морально було значно важче переживати ніж теперішнє.
2005.10.26 | Боррачо
Сергію, приємно констатувати
що наш погляд на кпссівську номенклатуру в цілому збігається. І ваш компьютерний кріптокомунізм - непогана річЄдине, мені не здається, що за "совка" було так голодно і страшно. Страшніше ніж зараз? Ні. Якщо, звісно, ви не живете у ситому Києві, та декількох великих містах, не рахуючи в них спальні райони. Так, я маю на увазі не 33-й, а "брежні" часи. Хоча саме тоді згадана номенклатура остаточно перейшла на шлях до нашої світлої кап-сучасності.
2005.10.29 | толя дейнека
Re: Сергію Кабуду, крипто-комуністу
а шо це ти хлопче, недавно намагався чіплятися до мене за якусь там M$ Віндовс? Переступив через переконання, аби дочепитися72005.10.30 | Сергій Кабуд
ти ніфіга не зрозумів тоді різниці
думаю шо й зараз не до кінця розрізняєш.Картина не чорно-біла, є сегменти всілякі, відтінки, таке інше.
М$ є компанія діяльність якої до певної міри відповідає нац. інтересм США, якщо їх розглядати в межах тих обставин що склалися, але це все міняється постійно.
2005.10.26 | Анатолий
Выполняю обещание.
Книга называется:"Народное хозяйство Украинской ССР в 1983 году." Статистический ежегодник.Киев. "Техника" , 1984.
Боррачо пишет:" (У вас, друже,іншого нема) Совісті. Розуму, щоб не патякати несінітниць про дуже серйозні речі."
Знаете , сударь, обвинять человека в таком только на том основании, что у него сейчас под рукой нет обещаной книги, может только ХАМ. А Вы, сударь, и есть ХАМ. Обычній бытовой ХАМ. А революционная фраза служит Вам, для камуфляжа. Вам мнимая революционность как бы дает право на обычное бытовое хамство. Дескать , сей человек борец за..., чего - то там. Революционером был Христос, но хамом он не был. Революционером был апостол Павел, но он тоже не был хамом. Революционером был Эйнштейн. Тоже явно не хам. А вы явно НЕ революционер и явно хам!
Вы даже не умеете разговаривать с людьми. Вы их просто не слушаете. Сначала мне, честно говоря, показалось, что Кабуд и особенно Забойщик (в другой ветке) резковаты. Но когда вчитался в Ваши "писания" понял, что Вы просто никого не слушаете и своей хамской манерой поведения провоцируете других на резкости. Вам Чучхе рассказывает о том, что он сам видел. Вы плюете на это. "Лыцо кавказской.." или как он там себя назвал, рассказывает о своей знакомой. Вы ему в ответ хамите. Это не диалог. Это монолог ХАМА.
Засим, прощайте. Скучно с Вами и Вам подобными.
2005.10.27 | Боррачо
Пострибайте!
> Знаете , сударь, обвинять человека в таком только на том основании, что у него сейчас под рукой нет обещаной книги, может только ХАМ.До чого тут книга? Мене цілком справедливо обурило те, як ви "походя" (адекватне російське слово) звинуватили комунистів у процесах, за які має відповідати ціла купа інших персон. Зауважте - особисто я не належу до симпатиків КПУ та брежнівської номенклатури. І не знимаю з останньої її долю провини за наш з вами сучасний стан. Але серйозна полеміка має певні правила. Бажаєте зробити гучну заяву - будь ласка, підкрепить її доказовою базою.
А то у вас комуняки винні і в тому, що вони надавали перевагу хлібу перед коноплею. Тьху! Дитинство.
>Вам Чучхе рассказывает о том, что он сам видел.
Так. Розповідає:
"Чавес, без сумніву, оригінал, як в житті так і за розмахом реформ, на які він замахнувся. І народ йому щиро вірить, бо реформи заділи дуже багатьох і загалом обернулися для широких верств населення позитивно. І загалом він мені симпатичний..." (с)Чучхе
Зауважте, що ми з Чучхе, на відміну від вашого "капкаського лиця", та інших нервових добродіів, у Венесуелі були. І наші з ним враження щодо Чавеса дивним чином співпадають. Та що там ми - навіть білоруські опозиціонери, які теж побували в Каракасі, пишуть:
“Гэта абсалютна не дыктатура, і я гэта прынцыпова падкрэсьліваю. У краіне існуе парлямэнт, у краіне існуе свабода прэсы, у краіне 4 незалежныя тэлеканалы, якія ад ранку да вечара паліваюць Чавэса брудам. Калі б вы паглядзелі, што пішацца там у "Еl Nacional" альбо "Universal' – гэта лідэры мясцовай дэмакратычнай прэсы – яны пішуць абсалютна ўсё што заўгодна і няма ніякіх праблемаў з уладай”.
http://3dway.org/articles/1/50/508/
То про що з вами сперечатись? Ви ж, звісна річ, відмовчалися з приводу свіжої офіційної статистики Держкомстату:
http://www2.maidanua.org/news/view.php3?bn=maidan_free&trs=-1&key=1130273503&first=1130403638&last=1130309213
2005.10.26 | Сергій Кабуд
відповідь про пшеницю і промислові коноплі
> Почему ЦК КПУ решил, что мне конопля интереснее пшеницы я не знаю.Ха, відповідь елементарна:
в ті роки пшеницю імпортували по 30 міліонів тон на рік з сша та канади. Написати як мало виросло в Україні і дати можливість читачеві отак просто порівняти з 1913 роком було б сказати правду про безладдя у господарстві.
А от чому коноплі:
це заборонена культура, тому в Україні, де воно дозволене і інших сортів- дійсно цілком можливо що збирали її біьше ніж денебудь у світі офіційно та промислово. Але вона загалом беспантова))
Що до населення- ті ж проблеми в усіх розвинених країнах, значить культурно ми належимо до Заходу, до Європи.
Чому це відбувається? Найбільш реалістичні пояснення на мою думку такі:
більше дозволяють абортів,
зменьшується религійність населення,
сексуальна революція робить із статевих відносин розвагу, замість того як на це дивилися раніше- любов, сім'я, діти.
Поки що ці фактори ніхто не спростував ніде, але цікаво які є варіянти пояснень
2005.10.28 | Боррачо
Чавес национализирует металлургию
Президент Венесуэлы Уго Чавес заявил о намерении национализировать крупнейшую в стране металлургическую компанию Sidor."Если руководство Sidor не откажется от порочной практики вывозить из Венесуэлы сырье, а потом продавать нам втридорога изготовленные из этого же сырья трубы, то я вынужден буду пойти на самые решительные меры", - цитируют слова Чавеса аргентинские СМИ.
"Мне уже надоело об этом говорить, и если через неделю они не согласятся с законными требованиями, то я издам указ о национализации компании", - заявил президент Венесуэлы.
Ежегодные затраты Венесуэлы на закупку труб для нефтяной и газовой промышленности составляют 1 миллиард долларов.
Sidor была приватизирована в начале 1990-х годов. Правительству Венесуэлы принадлежит только 10% акций компании, а контрольный пакет находится в собственности аргентинского концерна Techint.
2005.10.29 | толя дейнека
Re: дуже правильний, державний крок
не корупціонера, навіть не політика, а державного мужа.точнісінько такі питання не соромляться задавати і вирішувати в себе і в Штатах і різних інших Франціях.
Так і нам треба проводити прискіпливу інвентарізацію по всіх щілинах, де гроші липкими до чиїхось кишень струмочками розтікаються з країни.
2005.10.29 | Боррачо
Re: дуже правильний, державний крок
Цікаво, що єдине українське ЗМІ, яке правдиво висвітлює події у Венесуелі - це 5 канал у особі Ігора Слюсаренка. Особливо після його візиту до Куби2005.10.30 | толя дейнека
Re: цікаво, що
Слюсаренко чи не єдиний, кого на тому 5му каналі можна слухати, навіть дивно що він там ще є. Кращою ілюстрацією того, що він там біла ворона є те, що частина новин, що виголошується ним в ефір, не світиться на сайті 5го.2005.10.30 | Боррачо
Re: цікаво, що
толя дейнека пише:> Слюсаренко чи не єдиний, кого на тому 5му каналі можна слухати, навіть дивно що він там ще є. Кращою ілюстрацією того, що він там біла ворона є те, що частина новин, що виголошується ним в ефір, не світиться на сайті 5го.
Цікаво! Не звертав уваги. Спитаю про це Слюсаренка.
2005.10.30 | Боррачо
У Венесуелі ліквідовано неписьменність!!! (/)
По сообщению газеты "Гранма" вчера, 28 октября Боливарийская республика Венесуэла была объявлена свободной от неграмотности. Это вторая, после Кубы, страна на американском континенте, где ликвидирована неграмотность. Ни в одной другой стране Америки, включая США и Канаду, эта проблема полностью не решена.После 27 месяцев ударной работы по подготовленной при помощи кубинских специалистов программе "Я смогу!", реализация которой началась 1.07.2003г., было обучено читать и писать более чем 1, 5 млн. человек. из них более 70 тыс. человек - это индейцы, которые начились грамоте на своих родных языках и диалектах, которых в Венесуэле насчитывается 26.
http://communist.ru/root/news/847
2005.10.31 | Боррачо
Модератор підтримує неписьменність? (-)