03/16/2011 | Мірко

Закони ЕС змушують Ґазпром продати свої Литовські газопроводи. У водповідь Ґазпром підвищив Литві ціни на ґаз.
Wall Street Journal Europe
March 15, 2011
Gazprom and the Rule of EU Law
Europe should hold its ground against Russia's ex-imperial arrogance.
By ALAN RILEY
Mr. Riley is professor of law, at City Law School, City University, Grays Inn, London.

EU energy liberalization is clearly getting Gazprom hot under the collar. Already the prospect of an EU-inspired forced sell-off of Gazprom's pipeline assets in Lithuania has provoked outrage in Moscow. Last month Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was in Brussels seeking a special exemption for Gazprom from EU energy liberalization, brandishing the not-so-subtle threat of higher gas prices for Europe if he does not get his way. The EU has no need to entertain such demands. Other energy firms have been forced to liberalize, and the same rules should apply to Gazprom. If a U.S. official had demanded a special exemption for U.S. companies from EU law, it would have been denounced in Brussels as imperial arrogance. Russia's ex-imperial arrogance should equally be rejected.

Russian officials are openly dismissive of EU energy liberalization and are outraged at the idea that Gazprom's operations within the EU should be subject to EU competition and liberalization law. The deputy chairman of the Duma, Valeri Yazev, speaking to the Brussels press corps recently, argued that liberalization would inflict on Gazprom "direct economic prejudice," and demanded a change in the rules of the game.

EU energy liberalization has already sparked a furious row in Lithuania, where government proposals for unbundling the ownership of the partially Gazprom-controlled local gas company have prompted Gazprom to increase gas prices in Lithuania significantly compared to other Baltic states. The Lithuanians reacted by filing an antitrust complaint against Gazprom with the European Commission, alleging that it had abused its market dominance in the local market.

The EU should hold its ground. Europe's vertically integrated domestic energy monopolies, which follow the Gazprom model, have proven highly damaging to consumers. In parallel with its new energy liberalization rules, the Commission some years ago launched an inquiry into competition in Europe's energy sector, and found overwhelming evidence of anti-competitive behavior, from price-fixing to denials of third-party access to throttling of capacity, by almost all major energy incumbents.

The Commission's Competition department launched more than a dozen prosecutions on the back of this inquiry, and it is these prosecutions that are really forcing the pace of liberalization in Europe. Already E.ON and RWE, under threat of prosecution, have backed down and agreed to sell their electricity and gas networks and thus open up their markets.

Why, then, should Gazprom have its own special exemption from EU law? Gazprom can hardly argue that it is being prejudiced economically, as it would be able to sell off its networks, in Lithuania for instance, at full market value. Clearly, it may no longer reap super-monopoly profits, but EU competition law exists in large part to deny businesses the opportunity to do just that.

No one in the EU institutions should be entertaining Moscow's requests for legal exemptions for Russian companies on EU territory. The equal application of the law and the rule of law are fundamental European values. So why is the EU cringing before Russian demands? The core reason is that many EU and national officials really believe that Russia is essential to Europe's energy future, and that as the North Sea fields decline, Europe will have no choice but to go, cap in hand, to the Russians for gas.

But this argument does not stand up to close examination. Firstly, Gazprom depends on the EU far more than the EU depends on Gazprom. EU gas sales of around 140 billion cubic meters represent approximately two-thirds of Gazprom's revenues (and approximately one-third of total production). Any cut in production would harm Gazprom's revenues. Second, Gazprom should have learned from the 2006 and 2009 Ukraine-Gazprom conflicts that taking aggressive action against its customers only winds up shrinking its market. Since Gazprom's January 2009 cut-off, many EU states­and not just in Central and Eastern Europe­have taken steps to ensure they have access to greater storage facilities and alternative pipeline and liquefied natural gas supplies.

Third, there are now more and more new gas sources coming on stream. The shale gas revolution in the United States has seen the demand for liquefied natural gas collapse in America, causing a major supply diversion to Europe. As a result, the European spot-market price for gas has been below the key German border price for most of this year. Worse still for Gazprom, even more liquefied natural gas is coming onto the market, with global production set to soar to 410 billion cubic meters in 2013 from approximately 240 billion cubic meters in 2008.

In the medium term, shale gas discoveries across the planet, from India to China to Argentina, will likely hurt demand for liquefied natural gas further, which will lead to more liquefied natural gas dumping in Europe. This is all before actual shale-gas production starts in Europe, where well over 100 exploratory licences have now been granted.

Rather than looking for special exemptions from the EU, Gazprom should look at developing its own huge shale-gas resources. Much of the resource base is close to its existing pipeline infrastructure, meaning shale gas would be cheaper to develop than Russia's Arctic Shtokman or Siberian Yamal fields. A liberalized market structure would encourage development and ensure a rapid build up of production. Then Gazprom too would be able to compete effectively on Europe's increasingly liberalized gas market.