11/10/2011 | Hadjibei

The most superficial western analyses associate Ukrainian authoritarianism with the pro-Russian sympathies of Ukrainian leaders, but the picture is much more complex. It is true that during the Orange Revolution Russia supported Yanukovych and opposed Tymoshenko. But it is far from clear that Putin now has the same preferences. After all, the trade arrangement just deemed criminal in a Ukrainian court is one Putin negotiated himself. Does the Yanukovych regime believe that it can now renegotiate that deal? If so it is hard to know what they think they have to bargain with. Early in his term Yanukovych conceded pretty much everything Moscow has said that it wanted from Ukraine, above all naval basing rights at Sevastopol for the next quarter century. What Russia will want next is something that Yanukovych cannot concede: control over Ukrainian industry and natural gas pipelines—the very assets that have made Yanukovych’s own crucial supporters the very rich men that they are.

Ukraine has long been a borderland between greater powers. What is different about the present moment is that it is now an independent state, and that it has become a borderland between two authentically different approaches to foreign relations. The European Union has no interest in admitting Ukraine as it is today, but might be interested in admitting the orderly, lawful eastern neighbor it might one day become. Russia has no interest in the rule of law in Ukraine, but is happy to exert influence upon its territory as part of its efforts to control the distribution of natural resources and reassert its power in the post-Soviet space.

http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/nov/09/ukraines-last-chance/